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 ABSTRACT
This thesis examines and analyses factors and practices that are applied in end-of-life 
decision making for extremely premature and critically impaired neonates in the 
United Kingdom and Australia.
It explores the application of the best-interests principle by the courts and the medical 
profession in deciding whether life-sustaining medical treatment can lawfully by 
withdrawn or withheld. This thesis also examines the effectiveness of clinical 
guidelines, and the role and impact of key stakeholders—chiefly parents, medical 
practitioners and the courts—in the decision-making process for impaired neonates. 
This thesis finds that current practices in end-of-life decision making for impaired and 
extremely premature neonates are ambiguous and arbitrary; primarily being driven by 
the subjective sentiments of the decision maker.
The central contention of this thesis is that there is a need for more transparency and 
objectivity in end-of-life decision making for imperilled neonates. To achieve this 
greater objectivity, the allocation of finite public healthcare resources, and 
corresponding quality of life, should be a principal consideration in treatment decisions 
for impaired neonates.
 
 
 CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION
I: Medicine, technology and the law
During their life span, most human beings will require the intervention of medicine 
and possible care. In comparison with other areas of law, medical law profoundly 
affects people throughout their lives, from the period of pre-conception through to
organ donation and the possible withdrawal or withholding of treatment at the end of 
life.1
Medical law is an area of research, practice and, increasingly, litigation.2 Over the past 
three decades, it has been the topic of considered and intense academic and legal 
discussion.3 During the course of its development, issues that have required medical, 
ethical and legal debate have become increasingly complex, and topics that were once 
considered almost science fiction have now become a reality.4 The rapid advancement 
of medicine has brought these issues to the fore; correspondingly increasing the 
public’s expectations of medicine, in terms of both the simple treatment and 
management of illness, and the hope for a complete cure of illness.5
1 Note, ‘Developments in the Law: Medical Technology and the Law’ (1989–1990) 103 Harvard Law Review 1519, 1524.
2 See generally, Ian Kennedy and Andrew Grubb, Medical Law (Oxford University Press, 3rd ed, 2005) 3–8.
3 See especially, Ian Kennedy, Treat Me Right: Essays in Medical Law and Ethics (Oxford University Press, 1991) 1–18. See 
also Ben White, Fiona McDonald and Lindy Willmott, ‘Health Law: Scope, Sources and Forces’ in Ben White, Fiona McDonald 
and Lindy Willmott (eds), Health Law in Australia (Thomson Reuters, 2010) 3, 4. 
4 One such example of this is the emergence and development of robotic surgery. See, eg, Hockstein et al, ‘A History of Robots: 
From Science Fiction to Surgical Robotics’ (2007) 1(2) Journal of Robotic Surgery 113–118. 
5 Note, ‘Developments in the Law’, above n 1, 1523.
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 Advancements in medical technology and research require a parallel development of 
the law governing ethics, policies and regulation of medical issues.6 In Australia and 
the United Kingdom (UK), matters relating to issues such as human fertilisation and 
embryology, abortion and human tissue have been legislated.7 However, there 
continue to be areas governed under medical law that remain largely unlegislated.8
The traditional, conservative foundations of the law and its retrospective nature have 
observed the development of a widening gulf between the realised and possible 
achievements of medical science and any corresponding legislation. Put simply, the 
law has been unable to keep up and, consequently, medical law, while attempting to 
accommodate developments in medical science, remains an area with little statutory 
intervention, dominated largely by case law. 
Evidence of this lag can be found in Airedale NHS Trust v Bland, in which Lord Mustill 
poignantly recognised:
…the law has been left behind by the rapid advances of medical technology. By starting with a 
clean slate the law would be freed from the piecemeal expedients to which courts throughout the 
common law world have been driven when trying to fill the gap between old law and new 
medicine.9
 
6 For a brief overview and critique of the academic literature footnoted above see R A Hope, 'The Birth of Medical Law’ (1991) 
11(2) Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 247, 248.
7 This is not an exhaustive list. For a comprehensive compilation of medical law legislation in the UK see Anne E Morris and 
Michael A Jones (eds) Blackstone’s Statutes on Medical Law (Oxford University, 7th ed, 2011).
8 These include issues such as euthanasia and withdrawal or withholding of life-sustaining treatment in both adults and infants.
9 Airedale NHS Trust v Bland [1993] 1 ALL ER 789, 888. Balcombe LJ made a similar comment in Re C (a minor) (wardship: 
medical treatment) [1989] 2 ALL ER 782, 789 stating: ‘This is a problem of a kind with which, as a result of advances in medical 
science, the courts in this and other jurisdictions are increasingly being faced’.
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 II: Concepts of life and death and the law
Western society has observed a shift from divinity to secularity in relation to the 
contemplation and understanding of concepts of life and death.10 Once considered to 
be beyond human control and the preserve of religious leaders, matters of life and 
death have increasingly become the topic of regular discourse in hospitals and 
courtrooms as well as in less formal settings, such as talkback radio and internet 
blogs.11 Issues surrounding life and death, such as the withdrawal or withholding of 
life-sustaining treatment, are often discussed in the public arena with individuals and 
stakeholder groups expressing strong, often divergent opinions.12
That such issues and the ethical dilemmas they present arouse significant public 
interest is understandable. The finality and irreversibility of life and death decisions,
such as the withdrawal or withholding of life-sustaining treatment, are of ultimate
importance. It is critical that the law facilitates and guides these decisions in the most 
appropriate moral and ethical context. While moral, ethical, religious and sociological 
issues tend to dominate decisions of this kind, individual notions of rights, entitlements 
and personal autonomy have become a significant feature of western society and,
consequently, have also influenced the development of medical ethics and law.
10 See generally, Charles Taylor, A Secular Age (Harvard University Press, 2007).
11 See, eg, Madison Park, ‘Death at 25: Blogging the End of Life’, CNN, 27 April 2010 
<http://edition.cnn.com/2010/HEALTH/04/27/blog.terminal.illness/index.html>. 
12 The role, opinion and views of the stakeholders (parents, doctors and the judiciary) are discussed in Chapter Four of this 
thesis. 
3
 
                                                          
 The recognition of a right to life and protection from harm is one of the main ideals in
a civilised society, and thus it has the protection of law.13 As appropriate, the law will 
intervene when called upon in life and death situations. However, in many of these 
instances, the very right demanded is the right to die—a right that is not expressly 
endorsed by law in Australia or the UK.
Both medical practitioners and the judiciary are placed in a difficult moral dilemma 
when deciding the legal permissibility of decisions to withdraw or withhold medical 
treatment essential to maintaining the existence of an incapacitated patient. There are, 
inevitably, conflicts of opinion in this area, and it is fraught with moral quandaries. 
III: Individual autonomy 
Although the religious and philosophical tenets of western society underpin the 
principle of sanctity of life, there is no absolute medical obligation to preserve human 
life at all costs.14 In matters of life and death, individual autonomy provides a basis for 
individuals to decide what shall or shall not be done to their person, and this autonomy 
is often a cardinal and determinative principle. The seminal application of this 
principle can be found in Schloendorff v New York Hospital, in which Justice Cardozo 
famously stated: ‘every human being of adult years and sound mind has the right to 
13 For example, in the UK: The Human Rights Act 1998 art 2: ‘Everyone’s right to life shall be protected by law. No one shall be 
deprived of his life intentionally save in the execution of a sentence of a court following his conviction of a crime for which this 
penalty is provided by law’. See further, European Convention on Human Rights 1950. In Victoria, Australia see Charter of 
Human Rights and Responsibilities Act 2006 s 9: ‘Right to life—Every person has the right to life and has the right not to be 
arbitrarily deprived of life’. 
14 An example of the sanctity of life principle can be found in in Christianity, where it is recognised and founded on Genesis 9:6:
‘whoever sheds the blood of man, by man shall his blood be shed for God made man in his image’. See generally, Robert L Barry, 
The Sanctity of Human Life and its Protection (University Press of America, 2002). The sanctity of life principle is considered in 
greater detail in Chapter Two of this thesis.
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 determine what shall be done with his body; and a surgeon who performs without the 
patients consent commits an assault’.15
In Schloendorff, the principle of personal autonomy concerned an adult individual’s 
rights to and freedoms from non-consensual medical intervention. Individual 
autonomy is often regarded as being of such importance that in many cases it surpasses
competing cardinal virtues, including the sanctity of life, patient welfare, altruistic 
paternalism and medical best advice and opinion.16 However, no principle is always
paramount, and even patient autonomy will sometimes yield to other competing 
imperatives. Thus, voluntary euthanasia continues to remain illegal in most 
jurisdictions.17
Although patient autonomy is an important and empowering principle for competent 
individuals, neonates cannot express their rights, values or choices.18 That is not to 
suggest that life and death decisions for those who have never and may never be able 
to express their autonomy are straightforward.19 This issue is one of the most profound 
ethical, legal and medical minefields of our time. 
15 Schloendorff v New York Hospital (1914) 211 NY 125, 126. See also, Re R (a minor) (wardship: medical treatment) [1991] 4 
ALL ER 177 CA 183, in which Lord Donaldson stated: ‘…a doctor is not entitled to treat a patient without the consent of someone 
who is authorised to give that consent. If he does so, he will be liable in damages for trespass to the person and may be guilty of 
a criminal assault’. 
16 For a discussion about autonomy at the end of life, see generally, Charles Foster, Choosing Life, Choosing Death: The Tyranny 
of Autonomy in Medical Ethics and Law (Hart Publishing, 2009) 143–161.
17 Currently, the jurisdictions that allow lawful voluntary euthanasia include the Netherlands, Belgium, Luxembourg and 
Switzerland. 
18 As neonates lack patient autonomy, they cannot declare their wishes and treatment decisions are generally made on their behalf 
by parents or medical practitioners. Leading academic Peter Singer states, ‘…a newborn is not an autonomous being, capable of
making choices, and so to kill a newborn baby cannot violate the principle of respect for autonomy’. See especially, Peter Singer, 
Practical Ethics (Cambridge University Press, 2nd ed, 1993) 175–218. 
19 Neonates cannot declare their treatment wishes.
5
 
                                                          
 As the model of the western demographic nation-state progresses, topics once 
considered taboo or intractable are increasingly being discussed and resolved. Life and 
death decisions concerning neonates is one issue that deeply impacts modern medicine 
and society, and which therefore requires considered attention.
IV: Why is neonatal end-of-life decision making a matter of importance?
For the purposes of this thesis, a neonate is defined as a newborn infant in the first 28 
days of life.20 This thesis focuses on decisions to withdraw or withhold life-sustaining 
treatment from neonates that are born pre-term, prior to a full gestational pregnancy of 
37–42 weeks.21 In particular, this thesis concentrates on withdrawal or withholding of 
life-sustaining treatment from neonates considered to be extremely premature 22 and
suffering debilitating medical conditions.23
Approximately 8 per cent of neonates are born pre-term in Australia each year, before 
the 37-week gestation period.24 Birth weights of premature neonates vary, from very 
low (2,500 grams) to extremely low (less than 1,000 grams).25 In 2010, in Australia,
20 Collins, ‘Definition of Neonate’, Collins English Dictionary, <http://www.collinsdictionary.com/dictionary/english/neonate>. 
See also, World Health Organization, ‘Infant, Newborn’, http://www.who.int/topics/infant_newborn/en/.
21 However, the case law examined in Chapter Two of this thesis examines cases concerning neonates and very young infants. 
See further, William A Engle, ‘A Recommendation for the Definition of “Late Preterm” (Near-Term) and the Birth Weight–
Gestational Age Classification System’ (2006) 30(1) Seminars in Perinatology 2–7. Also see, Alan R Fleischman, Motoko 
Oinuma and Steven L Clark, ‘Rethinking the Definition of “Term Pregnancy”’ (2010) 116(1) Obstetrics & Genecology 136–
139.
22 This is generally between 23–25 weeks + 6 days gestation. See further, Nuffield Council on Bioethics, ‘Background: 
Extremely Premature Babies, <http://www.nuffieldbioethics.org/neonatal-medicine/neonatal-medicine-background-extremely-
premature-babies>. 
23 There is no discussion or examination of abortion or the concept of personhood. 
24 Z Li, R Zeki, L Hilder and EA Sullivan, ‘Australia’s Mothers and Babies’ (Perinatal Statistics Series No 27, Australian 
Institute of Health and Welfare, 2010) 29 <http://www.aihw.gov.au/WorkArea/DownloadAsset.aspx?id=60129542372>.
25 Department of Health and Ageing, Why is it Important? Australian Government,
<http://www.health.gov.au/internet/publications/publishing.nsf/Content/oatsih-hpf-2012-toc~tier1~health-cond~101>. 
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 8.3 per cent of live births were pre-term babies.26 Of those born in 2010, 6.2 per cent
weighed less than 2,500 grams.27 Figures from the UK highlight similar rates of 
premature birth; roughly 8 per cent of neonates are born pre-term.28 Statistics from the 
UK also illustrate that approximately 6 per cent of premature births occur between 23–
27 weeks’ gestations. Neonates born at 23 weeks’ gestation are often referred to as 
being born ‘at the borderline of viability’. This is likely to be the earliest point at which
a baby can be delivered alive with a possibility of survival with life-sustaining
treatment.29
The information age has engendered public awareness of medical technology. 
Consequently, parents of premature, critically ill neonates are often encouraged by the 
use of the digital age to request life-sustaining treatment from medical practitioners to 
attempt to prevent their pre-term neonate from death.30
Such requests are often made by parents even when the medical prognosis for the 
premature neonate is extremely poor.31 This is confirmed by Lantos and Meadows,
who have described the perception that many parents have of the neonatal intensive 
26 Li et al, above n 24. 
27 Ibid. 
28 Office for National Statistics, Preterm Births, Data, <www.ons.gov.uk/ons/publications/re-reference-
tables.html?edition=tcm%3A77-50818>. See also Tommy’s, Premature Birth Statistics,
<http://www.tommys.org/page.aspx?pid=387>. 
29 See Kimberley Pfeiffer, ‘The Ethics of Caring: Expressing Humanity towards Babies Born at the Borderline of Viability’ (2008)
20(02) Bioethics Research Notes 21, 21.
30 Extending this point further, the use of social media also plays a role in informing parents of premature neonates. Empirical 
research published in 2013 found that in 2011 there were 1497 Facebook groups created for and focusing on premature neonates 
and parents. The largest Facebook groups were in the UK, Australia and North America. See further, Thoren et al, ‘Online Support 
for Parents of Preterm Infants: A Qualitative and Content Analysis of Facebook ‘Preemie’ Groups’ (June 2013) (Online) Archives 
of Disease in Childhood—Fetal and Neonatal Edition 1–5. See also, Miracle Babies Foundation, ‘About Us’, 
<www.miraclebabies.org.au>. 
31 Jane Fortin, Children’s Rights and the Developing Law (Cambridge University Press, 3rd ed, 2009) 376.
7
 
                                                          
 care unit (NICU) as being ‘a saviour, a place where miracles will happen and babies 
are snatched from the jaws of death’.32 Arguably, this particularly reflects the attitudes 
of parents with strong religious beliefs who ‘wait for such miracles’33 to occur, or those 
who request the continuation of medical treatment even where doctors consider such 
treatment to be futile.34 Where such disagreements cannot be resolved, parents or 
doctors may seek judicial guidance as to whether treatment can or should be 
withdrawn. 
Decisions regarding the desirability of treatment in cases concerning critically ill 
neonates are extremely complex,35 involving multi-faceted considerations and 
competing principles and interests. While there is an abundance of case law on the 
matter, particularly in the UK, there is a corresponding and notable absence of 
32 John D Lantos and William L Meadow, Neonatal Bioethics: The Moral Challenges of Medical Innovation (John Hopkins 
University Press, 2006) 5.
33 See especially, Joe Brierley, Jim Linthicum and Andy A Petros, ‘Should Religious Beliefs be Allowed to Stonewall a Secular 
Approach to Withdrawing and Withholding Treatment in Children?’ (30 March 2012) Journal of Medical Ethics 100–104. The 
authors conducted a study about the importance of religion to the family unit in end-of-life decision making for children in 
paediatric intensive care. The study was conducted over a three-year period in the UK. The study found that, of the 203 cases 
reviewed, ‘11 (65%) involved explicit religious claims that intensive care should not be stopped due to expectation of divine
intervention and complete cure together with conviction that overly pessimistic medical predictions were wrong’. The authors 
concluded that, ‘While it is vital to support families in such difficult times, we are increasingly concerned that deeply held belief 
in religion can lead to children being potentially subjected to burdensome care in expectation of “miraculous” intervention’. For 
the other side of the discussion see, Steve Clarke, ‘When they Believe in Miracles’ (2013) 39(9) Journal of Medical Ethics 582–
583 and The Week, ‘Waiting for a Miracle: Is it Inhumane for Religious Parents to Prolong Treatment of Sick Kids?’ The Week 
(Online), 17 August 2012 <http://theweek.com/article/index/232122/waiting-for-a-miracle-is-it-inhumane-for-religious-parents-
to-prolong-treatment-of-sick-kids#>. Similar views are held by parents of premature and critically ill neonates. This is considered 
in Chapter Four of this thesis.
34 This is a view often held by parents that have strong religious beliefs, or feel their baby is not ‘ready’ to die. This is considered 
in Chapter Four of this thesis. The concepts of futility and quality of life are discussed in greater detail in Chapter Two. For a 
general discussion about the nature and application of the concept of futility see, eg, Robert D Truog, Allan S Brett, and Joel 
Frader, ‘The Problem with Futility’ (1992) 326(23) New England Journal of Medicine 1560–1564.
35 As will be considered in Chapter Four of this thesis, individuals with strong religious beliefs may not face any dilemmas in 
making treatment decisions, as they are guided by their religious view that all human life is sacred so life-sustaining treatment 
should not be withdrawn or withheld. See, eg, Rebagliato et al, ‘Neonatal End-of-life Decision Making: Physicians’ Attitudes and 
Relationship with Self-Reported Practices in 10 European Countries’ (2000) 284(19) Journal of American Medical Association
2451–2459; Roy et al, ‘Decision Making and Modes of Death in a Tertiary Neonatal Unit’ (2004) 89(6) Archives of Disease Child 
Fetal, Neonatal Edition 527–530.
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 statutory provision and parliamentary intervention. One of the recommendations of 
this thesis is that decisions to withdraw or withhold life-sustaining treatment from 
extremely premature, critically ill neonates should be governed, or at the very least 
guided by a clear and authoritative legislative framework.36 This thesis identifies the
need for more structured and unified decision making with regard to withdrawing or 
withholding life-sustaining treatment from extremely premature, critically ill neonates.
Decisions to withdraw or withhold treatment in cases of severely incapacitated 
neonates are fraught with inconsistency and lack of transparency. This is demonstrated 
in hospital clinical guidelines and case law from the UK, where the courts have been 
required to consider the withdrawal or withholding of life-sustaining treatment. In 
comparison, in Australia, over the past three decades, there have only been three cases 
requiring legal intervention, with two of these cases being heard in 2011 and 2012.37
As medical technology has advanced over the latter decades of the twentieth century, 
the instances in which newborn lives can be saved or extended have greatly 
increased.38 Accordingly, the legal and medical professions are facing ever more
situations that the inadequate regulatory framework struggles to address.
36 Professor Skene supports the view that there is a need for greater legal or procedural clarity in decisions to withdraw or withhold 
life-sustaining treatment from critically ill neonates. See especially, Loane Skene, ‘Legal Issues in Treating Critically Ill Newborn 
Infants’ (1993) 2(3) Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics 295–308. This is explored further in Chapters Five and Six of 
this thesis. 
37 See, eg, Re F: F v F (Unreported, Supreme Court of Victoria, Vincent J, 2 July 1986); Baby D (No 2) [2011] Fam CA 176; TS 
& TD v Sydney Children’s Hospital (‘Mohammed’s case’) [2012] NSWSC 1609. Case law from the UK and Australia are 
discussed in greater detail in Chapter Two of this thesis. 
38 See, eg, Callie Watson, ‘With Technological Advances, Most Premature Babies Survive against the Odds’, The Australian
(Online), 4 November 2012, <http://www.theaustralian.com.au/news/most-premature-babies-survive-against-the-odds/story-
e6frg6n6-1226510132523>. See also, the EPICure Studies of survival of extremely premature neonates, conducted in the UK in 
1995 and 2006. These studies are discussed in further detail in Chapter Three of this thesis. See especially, Lantos and Meadow, 
above n 32.
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 While adult patients lacking mental capacity may be able to exercise some patient 
autonomy,39 neonates are entirely dependent on the will of others; principally doctors, 
parents and the courts.40 This dependency places neonates in an extremely vulnerable 
position: they are subject to the withdrawal or withholding of life-sustaining treatment,
based on individual stakeholder subjectivity.41 There is no clear approach to decisions 
in this area, and clarity is unlikely to be achieved within the existing framework given 
the difficulty in reconciling factors that are often complicated by subjective social, 
cultural, religious and ethical beliefs. These subjective beliefs often cloud judgments
by decision makers.42
 
39 Often adult patients may declare their treatment wishes in the form of an advanced directive. However see, Alasdair MacLean, 
‘Advance Directives and the Rocky Waters of Anticipatory Decision Making’ (2008) 16(1) Medical Law Review 1–22. MacLean 
highlights the problematic nature of advance directives; in particularly, the author critiques the authority, autonomy and 
implementation of advice directives.
40 Ian Kerridge, Michael Lowe and Cameron Stewart, Ethics and Law for Health Professions (Federation Press, 4th ed, 2013) 582. 
The role, influence and impact of parents, doctors and judges on end-of-life decision making for neonates are discussed in Chapter 
Four of this thesis. 
41 These stakeholders are primarily the treating doctors, parents and judges. Chapter Four of this thesis explores the role and 
impact of stakeholders in end-of-life decision making in greater detail. 
42 See, eg, Roy, above n 35, 527–530; Kristina Orfali, ‘Parental Role in Medical Decision Making: Fact or Fiction? A Comparative 
Study of Ethical Dilemmas in French and American Neonatal Intensive Care Units’ (2004) 58(10) Social Science and Medicine
2009–2022; Peter Barr, ‘Relationships of Neonatologists: End-of-life Decisions to Their Personal Fear of Death’ (2007) 92(2) 
Archives of Disease Child Fetal, Neonatal Edition 104–107.
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 V: Historical development of neonatology 
Paediatric medicine concerns the care and treatment of sick children. Neonatology
exists as a branch of paediatrics specific to the treatment of newborns. Specialisation 
in neonatology includes the treatment of neonates with symptoms such as low birth 
weight, prematurity and congenital malformation.
The impetus to provide medical intervention for premature neonates; that is, those born 
before full-term pregnancy, did not commence out of benevolence or a duty to 
protect.43 Serious attempts to save very young lives began as a drive to rebuild and 
regenerate a destroyed population after the Franco-Prussian war during 1870–1871 in 
Paris.44 Neonatology as a medical science also began to develop in England.45
In western society, it is generally considered that providing medical treatment is 
motivated by preserving or improving quality of life. However, neonatology as a 
science was formed from practical considerations arising out of the geopolitical 
patchwork of nineteenth century Europe, where famines, war and poverty contributed 
to population loss that required a solution, including the preservation of the existing 
population. It is generally considered that the first infant incubator was developed by 
43 Today, a full-term pregnancy is calculated at 37–42 weeks’ gestation. 
44 See, eg, Richard A Meckel, Save the Babies: American Public Health Reform and the Prevention of Infant Mortality, 1850–
1929 (University of Michigan Press, 1998) 101–104. See also Russell Viner and Janet Golden, ‘Children’s Experiences of Illness’ 
in Roger Cooter and John Pickstone (eds), Companion to Medicine in the Twentieth Century (Routledge, 2003) 575–601.
45 See especially Peter M Dunn, ‘The Birth of Perinatal Medicine in the United Kingdom’ (2006) 11(6) Seminars in Fetal and 
Neonatal Medicine 386–397. See, eg, Leigh Davis, Heather Mohay and Helen Edwards, ‘Mothers’ Involvement in Caring for 
Their Premature Infants: An Historical Overview’ (2003) 42(6) Journal of Advanced Nursing 578, 580; Thomas E Cone, History 
of the Care and Feeding of the Premature Infant (Little Brown and Company, 1985).
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 Tarnier, a French obstetrician in 1880 at the Paris maternity hospital.46 By the turn of 
the twentieth century, another French physician, Pierre-Constant Budin, had 
concluded that the use of the infant incubator was an integral piece of equipment to 
improve the chances of survival of premature neonates.47
Over the past half-century, western medicine has witnessed both a widespread increase 
in public awareness and a corresponding increase in efforts to develop new 
technologies to improve pre-term neonatal survival and health outcomes.48 However,
despite these efforts, of those neonates that are treated and survive, many are still being 
left with a handicap or disability.49
Decisions to withdraw or withhold life-sustaining treatment from premature and 
critically ill neonates have an emotional and financial impact on many individuals and 
groups.50 Those most affected by decisions to either continue or withdraw or withhold 
treatment are parents. However, end-of-life decisions concerning neonates also 
46 See especially Jeffrey P Baker, The Machine in the Nursery: Incubator Technology and the Origins of Newborn Intensive 
Care (John Hopkins University Press, 1996) 25–44. See, eg, Lawrence M Gartner and Carol B Gartner, ‘The Care of Premature 
Infants: Historical Perspective’ (National Institute of Health, 1992) <http://www.neonatology.org/classics/nic.nih1985.pdf>. 
47 At a conference held in Geneva in 2012, Dr William Meadow discussed the development of neonatology in the United States, 
describing the predominant causes of infant death circa 1916 as caused by unsterilised milk, scarlet fever and measles. Dr William 
Meadow, ‘The Evolution of Neonatology’ (Speech delivered at Ethical, Legal and Social Implications of Neonatal Intensive Care 
Units, Geneva, Monday 4–5 June 2012) <http://www.brocher.ch/en/events/ethical-legal-and-social-implications-of-neonatal-
intensive-care-units/>. See, eg, Mitzi Duxbury and Lawrence R Adams, ‘Nursing Research Contributions to Improve NICU Care’ 
(National Institute of Health, 1992) <http://www.neonatology.org/classics/nic.nih1985.pdf>; G M Oppenheimer, ‘Prematurity as 
a Public Health Problem: US Policy from the 1920s to the 1960s’ (1996) 85(6) American Journal of Public Health 870–878.
48 But see, Joy E Lawn, Simon Cousens and Jelka Zupan, ‘4 Million Neonatal Deaths: When? Where? Why?’ (2005) 365(9462) 
The Lancet 891–900. This is most relevant to western developed countries; developing countries incur the highest rates of 
premature birth and mortality. See, eg, Beck et al, ‘The Worldwide Incidence of Preterm Birth: A Systematic Review of Maternal
Mortality and Morbidity’ (2010) 88(1) Bulletin of the World Health Organization 31–38.
49 This thesis finds that although advancements in science and technology have improved the survival rates of neonates born 
extremely premature (23 weeks), the likelihood of severe and long-term disability has largely remained unchanged. See, eg, Saroj 
Saigal and Lex W Doyle, ‘An Overview of Mortality and Sequelae of Preterm Birth from Infancy to Adulthood’ (2008) 371(9608) 
The Lancet 261–269. This is discussed in greater detail in Chapter Five of this thesis.
50 This is considered in detail in Chapter Five of this thesis. 
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 profoundly affect medical practitioners and the wider society. There is a need to guide 
the discussion in this area with greater transparency and objectivity. It is this need that 
this thesis proposes to facilitate.
VI: Thesis purpose 
The primary contention of this thesis is that current practices in decision making to 
withdraw or withhold life-sustaining treatment from premature, critically ill neonates,
predominantly in the UK and more recently in Australia, are nebulous and 
unsatisfactory.51 This thesis argues that end-of-life decisions for neonates born 
extremely prematurely should be driven by an objective, transparent and tangible 
approach.
This thesis advances the existing debate and learning in this area. The key points that 
it attempts to establish are: 
(i) The law regarding treatment decisions about critically ill neonates is 
obscure and incapable of providing meaningful guidance to relevant 
stakeholders, including doctors, parents and courts;
(ii) Resource allocation and corresponding quality of life should be important 
considerations regarding the treatment of neonates;
(iii) Ostensibly, resource allocation does not drive decisions in this area;
(iv) In fact resource allocation and quality of life decisions seem to cohere with 
the outcome of medical and judicial decisions in this area; and
51 The most recent case in Australia that has required legal intervention is TS & TD v Sydney Children’s Hospital (‘Mohammed’s 
case’) [2012] NSWSC 1609. This case is discussed in detail in Chapter Two of this thesis. 
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 (v) Resource allocation should be a cardinal consideration regarding the 
treatment of neonates. This would explain and justify existing practices and 
lead to more sound policies and decisions.
While recognising the existing academic work in this area to date, this thesis contests
existing practices and traditional thinking and provides recommendations for 
achieving more consistent and objective outcomes in decision making for extremely 
premature and critically ill neonates. 
Although religion, culture and morality predominantly drive decisions and debate in 
end-of-life decision making, this thesis argues that, although important, they should 
not overwhelm the debate and that objective medical, social and economic factors 
should be more weighty. The latter chapters of this thesis consider how such 
objectivity can be established. 
VII: Research methodology 
The method of research used in this thesis is interdisciplinary, involving an analysis of 
legal case judgments, peer-reviewed scholarly articles and grey literature across the 
fields of law, medicine and ethics. This will facilitate an understanding of the key 
factors relevant to determining end-of-life decisions from the, often competing,
perspectives of each of the respective key stakeholders (that is, parents, doctors, 
judges) and the wider society.
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 VIII: Thesis outline 
This chapter provides an introduction to the relationship between law, medicine and 
technology, and the public awareness and engaging debate about death and dying
among a growing number of individuals in western society. This chapter has offered a
brief reflection on the historical development of neonatal care and treatment in modern 
medicine. In addition, Chapter One establishes the research position and scope, the 
thesis’ structure and the research methodology applied throughout this work. 
Chapter Two provides a detailed critical analysis of selective case judgments involving 
end-of-life decisions concerning critically ill neonates. It examines the complex nature
and relevance of the sanctity of life principle—that all human life is sacred and
requires the utmost care and protection—in decision making for neonates. The chapter 
also assesses subjectivity and the arbitrary nature of decision making for incapacitated 
neonates by evaluating the application and effectiveness of the best-interests principle 
applied by the courts and medical practitioners to allow the withdrawal or withholding 
of life-sustaining treatment from critically ill neonates. 
Additionally, Chapter Two critically evaluates medico-legal concepts of futility, 
quality of life and intolerability, developed and discussed at length by judges in 
determining neonatal end-of-life decisions. A key part of the thesis is examining the 
current stream of judicial reasoning in this area, establishing a baseline from which the 
current orthodoxy can be evaluated and critiqued.52
52 Based primarily on the application of the concepts of best interests, futile treatment and quality of life. 
15
 
                                                          
 Chapter Three progresses to critique the efficacy and arbitrary nature of various 
frameworks applied in hospitals in the UK and Australia. This chapter also critically 
examines the impact and effectiveness of other initiatives and the much-publicised
Nuffield Council on Bioethics report: Critical Care Decisions in Foetal and Neonatal 
Medicine: Ethical Issues 2006.53
Chapter Four examines the subjective role and influence of the key stakeholders (that 
is, parents, doctors, judges) and the wider society in the decision-making process to 
withdraw or withhold life-sustaining treatment from critically ill neonates. It explores 
the competing interests of each stakeholder group, and how these are evaluated and 
weighed. 
In Chapter Five, the discussion turns to the limited financial resources available to treat 
critically ill neonates, particularly those suffering severe disability. It examines the 
objective and transparent nature and role that resource allocation should have in 
informing medical decisions relating to severely premature neonates. This chapter also 
provides other recommendations and alternative considerations for neonatal end-of-
life decision making. Relevant to this discussion are the profound short and long-term 
impacts of decisions to keep critically ill neonates alive, particularly as this decision 
relates to life after hospital discharge and the effect it may have on the neonate, wider 
family circle and the wider community.
53 Nuffield Council on Bioethics, Critical Care Decisions in Fetal and Neonatal Medicine: Ethical Issues (Nuffield Council on 
Bioethics, 2006).
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 Chapter Six concludes this thesis, drawing the thesis together by re-visiting the 
research aims and summarising its overall findings before proposing recommendations 
and a way forward. 
IX: Conclusion
Death is an inevitable event. This thesis focuses on one of the most vulnerable groups 
of society. However, decisions concerning whether critically ill neonates live or die 
should not be circumvented due to their vulnerability. On the contrary, given the long-
term ramifications for many individuals involved in such decision making, it is 
necessary to base such discussion on more objective and pragmatic grounds. The 
following chapter begins by examining the effectiveness of the best-interests principle 
in end-of-life decision making for incapacitated neonates.
17
 
 CHAPTER TWO: DOES THE BEST INTEREST PRINCIPLE 
FUNCTION EFFECTIVELY?
I: Summary 
The previous chapter provided an overview of the purpose and outline of this thesis. It 
included a brief insight into the historical impetus to save pre-term neonates, which 
would in time lead to the development of the NICU. Chapter One also discussed the
advancement of science and medical technology, and the corresponding need for 
development of the law in matters of life and death. 
II: Introduction
Chapter Two examines the best-interests principle as applied by the courts in 
determining whether to withdraw or withhold treatment from critically ill neonates.
The focus of this chapter is an analysis of the relevant case law and the application of 
the best-interests test. This leads to a critical evaluation of the function and 
effectiveness of the best-interests principle as it applies to end-of-life decisions for 
incapacitated neonates and young infants. This chapter illustrates the first of several 
speculative, subjective, nebulous and arbitrary factors that are currently applied to 
decisions to withdraw or withhold life-sustaining treatment from incapacitated 
neonates.1 It thus supports the contention of this thesis: that there is a need for a more 
1 Chapter Three explores the subjectivity and lack of uniformity of clinical guidelines in the hospital setting. Chapter Four 
examines the subjectivity of decision making of parents, doctors and the courts. This leads to Chapter Five, which argues the need 
for greater objectivity and transparency in end-of-life decision making for neonates born at 23 weeks by focusing on resource 
allocation as an objective factor in decisions to withdraw or withhold life-sustaining treatment. 
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objective, transparent and tangible approach to decision making for premature and 
severely imperilled neonates, and that this approach should primarily be based on
resource allocation.
Before examining the best-interests principle and its application in relevant case law 
from the UK and Australia, this chapter begins by considering the historical and 
religious orthodoxy underpinning modern-day societal approaches to life and death. 
The principle of sanctity of life is informed by this view, and an understanding of its 
genesis is necessary to illustrate its gradual attrition over time, and the prevailing 
notion of the principle of best interests in relation to decisions to withdraw or withhold 
life-sustaining treatment from incapacitated neonates.
III: Sanctity of life perspectives 
Judeo-Christian tradition
Distilled, the sanctity of life principle is that human life is a gift from God and is sacred. 
The doctrine of sanctity of life is most widely associated with the Judeo-Christian 
tradition asserting that life is precious and valuable.2 According to the book of Genesis, 
God created man in his own image and, as it is gifted, only God may take life.3 Further, 
2 The importance of the sanctity of life doctrine is also found in Eastern religions such as Hinduism and the religious scriptures 
of the Bhagawat Gita. See, eg, O P Dwivedi, ‘Satyagraha for Conservation: Awakening the Spirit of Hinduism’ in J Ronald Engel
and Joan Gibb Engel (eds), Ethics of Environment and Development: Global Challenge, International Response (University of 
Arizona Press, 1990) 203–207. Also see, Cameron Stewart, ‘The sanctity of life in law: Comparisons between Jewish, Catholic, 
Islamic and common law approaches’ in Peter Radan, Denise Meyerson, Rosalind F Croucher (eds), Law and Religion: God, the 
State and the Common Law (Routledge Studies in Religion, Volume 9 2004) 249-273.
3 Book of Genesis: 1:26 and 1:27. Robert L Barry suggests that it is immoral for an individual to take the life of another, as it 
‘deprived God of a possession which is rightly His’. See further, Robert L Barry, The Sanctity of Human Life and its Protection
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 Keown, a leading advocate for the sanctity of life principle highlights that those in 
favour of this school of thought believe ‘human life is … therefore, possessed of an 
intrinsic dignity which entitles it to protection from unjust attack’.4
In his book, History of European Morals, Lecky provides what some commentators 
have referred to as a ‘classical account’ of the sanctity of human life: 
Considered as immortal beings, destined for the extremes of happiness or of misery, and united to 
one another by a special community of redemption, the first and most manifest duty of the 
Christian man was to look upon his fellowmen as sacred beings and from this notion grew up the 
eminently Christian idea of sanctity of human life … it was one of the most important services of 
Christianity that besides quickening greatly our benevolent affections it definitely and 
dogmatically asserted the sinfulness of all destruction of human life as a matter of amusement, or 
of simple convenience, and thereby formed a new standard higher than any which then existed in 
the world. 5
More recently, Amarasekara and Bagaric have discussed the sanctity of life as being 
one of the highest moral orders over human law stating, ‘…a belief in eternal life allied 
to sanctity of human life, and a metaphysical value attached to pain and suffering. 
Underpinning these is an assertion of the primacy of Divine, Eternal or Natural Law 
over human law’.6 The idea of living by virtue of ‘guiding principles’ or an ‘acceptable 
moral system’7 can be found in many biblical texts, in particular the Book of Exodus 
(University Press of America, 2002) 19. See also, A J L Gormally, ‘Prolongation of Life: The Principle of Respect for Human 
Life’ (1978) Linacre Centre Papers 1–28. 
4 John Keown, Euthanasia, Ethics and Public Policy: An Argument Against Legislation (Cambridge University Press, 2002) 40. 
5 Quoted in, Helga Kuhse, The Sanctity-of-Life Doctrine in Medicine (Oxford University Press, 1987) 17.
6 Kumar Amarasekara and Mirko Bagaric, Euthanasia, Morality and the Law (Peter Lang Publishing, 2002) 130. See also, J K 
Mason and R A McCall Smith, Law and Medical Ethics (Butterworths, 4th ed, 1994) 3–12.
7 Jonathan Glover, Causing Death and Saving Lives (Pelican Books, 1977) 39. See also, the influential text by Jean Jacques 
Rousseau, The Social Contract (Hafner Publishing Company, 1947) (first published 1762).
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 and the Ten Commandments. Perhaps the most acknowledged commandment in 
society today and the most relevant to this thesis is from the King James Bible: Exodus: 
20:13—‘Thou Shalt Not Kill’.
The ideal that human life is sacrosanct and of the greatest importance is ‘emotionally 
appealing’8 and, intuitively, probably the easiest approach to take in matters of life and 
death. In this regard, Brazier asserts ‘to most people who are not philosophers the
answer is simple. There is a deep and embedded instinct that taking human life is 
wrong. Life is a most precious possession. All other possessions, all potential joys, 
depend upon its continued existence’.9
The primacy of this principle has diluted over time in line with evolving social and 
political thought, and is enforced today with less rigidity than previously. In a western 
modern secular society, the rigid application of these principles distilled from religious 
philosophies and traditions is limited, and it is arguable that it does not have the same 
support that it may once have enjoyed. Churches, Synagogues and other places of 
worship remain of importance and retain symbolic value when people marry or are 
buried or cremated. At death, however, the attachment to a particular creed or practice 
is more limited.10
For many, to live a life in accordance with this most fundamental principle of the 
sanctity of life is both honourable and practical. This is reflected in the laws governing 
our societies. Even if most individuals do not conform to the biblical moral code for 
8 Sheila McLean, Old Law, New Medicine: Medical Ethics and Human Rights (Pandora, 1999) 116. 
9 Margaret Brazier, Medicine, Patients and the Law (Penguin Books, 3rd ed, 2003) 44. 
10 Ibid.
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reasons of virtue or belief, they will still adhere to the legal code for reasons of 
community and identity. In addition to the religious philosophies regarding the sanctity 
of life, some of the longest standing and most influential philosophies of Greek 
Medicine derive from Hippocrates.
Greco-Roman principles and the Hippocratic Oath
Ancient Greek philosophers and texts played an important role in the birth of medical 
ethics. Both Aristotle and Plato placed importance on the principle of life, believing 
that body and soul was one unit, with the soul ultimately being the ‘life principle’ of 
the body.11
The Hippocratic Oath is the most well-known Greek medical text, and is thought to 
have established the principles of medical ethics, obligations and responsibilities 
bestowed on medical practitioners. It was written by the Greek physician Hippocrates 
of Kos, an archetypal figure of western civilisation, circa fourth and fifth century 
BCE.12 Many believe Hippocrates to be the father of medicine; he rejected notions of
superstition, legend and myths, laying the foundations of medicine as a science guided 
by ethics and professionalism.13 However, in his book Pilgrims in Medicine, Faunce,
sceptical of the way Hippocrates is often revered, asserted:
11 Jesus Christ Saviour, Traditional Principles of Medical Ethics <http://www.jesuschristsavior.net/Ethics.html>. See generally, 
Steven H Miles, The Hippocratic Oath and the Ethics of Medicine (Oxford University Press, 2004). Jesus Christ Saviour, 
Traditional Principles of Medical Ethics <http://www.jesuschristsavior.net/Ethics.html>. For selected works by Aristotle, see 
generally, Aristotle (English translation by A L Peck), On the Generation of Animals (W Heinmann, 1943) and Aristotle 
(Translated by Richard Cresswell), On the History of Animals (Henry G Bohn, 1862). 
12 Thomas Alured Faunce, Pilgrims in Medicine: Conscience, Legalism and Human Rights (Koninklijke Brill NV, 2005) 125.
13 Crystal Links, Hippocrates <http://www.crystalinks.com/hippocrates.html>. Some scholars believe that Pythagoreans wrote 
the Hippocratic Oath. 
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 The Hippocratic Oath is often portrayed as a course of culture-neutral professional virtues and 
foundational ethical principles. Its espousal of medical duties not to do harm (non-maleficence), to enter 
houses only for the good of patients (beneficence), to practise within the bounds of competence and to 
respect a patient’s confidences, even after they are dead, show an egalitarian respect for human dignity 
remarkable, though not necessarily unique for its time.14
A translated version of the Oath from the National Library of Medicine reads: 15
I swear by Apollo the physician, and Asclepius, and Hygieia and Panacea and all the gods and 
goddesses as my witnesses, that, according to my ability and judgement, I will keep this Oath and 
this contract:
To hold him who taught me this art equally dear to me as my parents, to be a partner in life with 
him, and to fulfil his needs when required; to look upon his offspring as equals to my own siblings, 
and to teach them this art, if they shall wish to learn it, without fee or contract; and that by the set 
rules, lectures, and every other mode of instruction, I will impart a knowledge of the art to my own 
sons, and those of my teachers, and to students bound by this contract and having sworn this Oath 
to the law of medicine, but to no others.
I will use those dietary regimens which will benefit my patients according to my greatest ability 
and judgement, and I will do no harm or injustice to them.
I will not give a lethal drug to anyone if I am asked, nor will I advise such a plan; and similarly I 
will not give a woman a pessary to cause an abortion.
In purity and according to divine law will I carry out my life and my art.
14 Alured Faunce, above n 12, 121.
15 History of Medicine Division, Greek Medicine <http://www.nlm.nih.gov/hmd/greek/greek_oath.html>.
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 I will not use the knife, even upon those suffering from stones, but I will leave this to those who 
are trained in this craft.
Into whatever homes I go, I will enter them for the benefit of the sick, avoiding any voluntary act 
of impropriety or corruption, including the seduction of women or men, whether they are free men 
or slaves.
Whatever I see or hear in the lives of my patients, whether in connection with my professional 
practice or not, which ought not to be spoken of outside, I will keep secret, as considering all such 
things to be private.
So long as I maintain this Oath faithfully and without corruption, may it be granted to me to partake 
of life fully and the practice of my art, gaining the respect of all men for all time. However, should 
I transgress this Oath and violate it, may the opposite be my fate. 
Although the Hippocratic Oath may be considered as an aspirational body of 
principles, it has evolved significantly from its founding principles to the current 
medical declaration taken by practitioners. Brazier’s translation of some parts of the 
Oath is of interest. She notes:
…a doctor’s loyalty to his teachers is the main premise, followed secondly by his obligations to 
exercise skill for the benefit of his patient’s health and well-being. Doctors were not allowed to 
take payment for teaching others, the practice of patient confidentiality was imposed; abortion and 
euthanasia were prohibited, as were improper sexual relations with patients.16
While the principle of patient confidentiality remains as rigid today as when the Oath 
was first written, other elements are now outdated, reflecting society’s current mores. 
16 Brazier, above n 9, 36.
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For example, in Australia and the UK, the practice of abortion is no longer prohibited,
doctors pay for their tuition at medical school and, although prohibited in law,
euthanasia is widely supported.17
The current day declaration made by medical practitioners has evolved to incorporate 
contemporary values and changes in societal attitude. Central features of this renewed
oath focus on the principles of respect for human life, honour, nobility and dignity.
These principles do not necessarily translate to the absolute preservation of human life. 
The modern-day declaration taken by many medical practitioners is considered below. 
Declaration of Geneva
As a consequence of the atrocities committed by doctors in Germany during the 
Second World War,18 the World Medical Association recommended global medical 
ethical guidelines, upon which the Declaration of Geneva was founded in 1948.19 The 
Declaration emphasises equality, dignity and human rights. 
17 For further discussion about the evolution of the Hippocratic Oath, in particular from a postmodern and feminist perspective 
focusing on the changing values of the patient and the treatment and care of the pregnant patient, see, eg, Ben A Rich, ‘Postmodern 
Medicine: Deconstructing the Hippocratic Oath’ (1993) 65(1) University of Colorado Law Review 77–136. See also, G Iacovelli, 
‘The Evolution of the Hippocratic Oath’ (1989) 1(1) Medicina nei Secoli 39–48.
18 The Nuremburg Trials: The Doctor Trials, held at the Palace of Justice in Nuremburg, Germany began on 9 December 1946. 
The trial documented the medical experiments and torture that individuals were subjected to during the Second World War. See 
further, George J Annas and Michael A Grodin, The Nazi Doctors and the Nuremberg Code: Human Rights in Human 
Experimentation (Oxford University Press, 1992); Michael Robert Marrus, ‘The Nuremberg Doctors Trial in Historical Context’ 
(1999) 73(1) Bulletin of the History of Medicine 106–123.
19 The United Nations was founded post Second World War. In addition to the Declaration of Geneva, the United Nations General 
Assembly adopted the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. See, eg, Mann et al, ‘Health and Human Rights’ (1994) 1(1) 
Health and Human Rights 6–23. 
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 The explicit prohibition of euthanasia and abortion in the Hippocratic Oath is not found
in the Declaration. The most recently amended version of the Declaration was adopted 
in the 173rd WMA Council Session, Divonne-les-Bains, France, May 2006.20 It is 
taken at the time of being admitted as a member of the medical profession, and states:
I solemnly pledge to consecrate my life to the service of humanity;
I will give to my teachers the respect and gratitude that is their due;
I will practise my profession with conscience and dignity;
The health of my patient will be my first consideration;
I will respect the secrets that are confided in me, even after the patient has died;
I will maintain, by all the means in my power, the honour and the noble traditions of the medical 
profession;
My colleagues will be my sisters and brothers;
I will not permit considerations of age, disease or disability, creed, ethnic origin, gender, 
nationality, political affiliation, race, sexual orientation, social standing or any other factor to 
intervene between my duty and my patient;
I will maintain the utmost respect for human life;
I will not use my medical knowledge to violate human rights and civil liberties, even under threat;
20 World Medical Association, WMA Declaration of Geneva <http://www.wma.net/en/30publications/10policies/g1/>.
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 I make these promises solemnly, freely and upon my honour.
Today, modified versions of the Declaration of Geneva are used by many medical 
schools for students to declare their professional and ethical commitment to the 
practice of medicine.21
This chapter began by examining the genesis and historical, philosophical and 
theological foundations of the sanctity of life principle—that all human life is sacred.22
In addition, thus far, it has been noted that the Hippocratic Oath taken by medical 
practitioners has undergone modification, and the most current declaration taken by 
medical practitioners focuses of a respect for human life, which does not impose an 
absolute obligation to preserve human life at all costs. The gradual erosion of the 
sanctity of life principle and its staunch application in law is illustrated in the case law 
examined later in this chapter. 
This shift away from the sanctity of life principle in law has been noted by eminent 
academics. Keown asserts that ‘the western world is undergoing a legal revolution’ 
and ‘respect for life’s inviolability has been eroded increasingly by efforts to promote 
largely unbridled individual autonomy and the notion that some human lives, those
21 A study conducted across several university medical faculties in Australia and New Zealand between 2000 and 2001 found that 
varying versions of the Hippocratic Oath and the Declaration of Geneva were used at graduating and declaration ceremonies. See
further, Paul M McNeill and Bruce S Dowton, ‘Declarations Made By Graduating Medical Students in Australia and New 
Zealand’ (2002) 176(3) Medical Journal of Australia 123–127. 
22 John Keown has highlighted three competing interests that the law should consider when making end-of-life decisions. These 
are ‘vitalism, sanctity of life and quality of life’. Kewon argues that the sanctity of life principle is a ‘middle way’ between two 
extremes. These extremes being a vitalist approach—‘that regardless of pain, suffering, or expense that life-prolonging treatment 
entails, it must be administered because human life must be preserved at all costs’—and a quality of life approach—‘accepting 
that certain lives are of no benefit and may lawfully be terminated by omission’. See, especially, John Keown, ‘The Incompetent 
Patient: Sanctity of Life, Quality Of Life and Vitalism’ in Michael Parker and Donna Dickenson (eds), The Cambridge Medical 
Ethics Workbook (Cambridge University Press, 2001) 27–32.
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 which pass a certain “Quality” threshold, merit protection’.23 In contrast, Huxtable 
asserts a more progressive view about the erosion of the sanctity of life principle, 
referring to its ‘survival’ and application in English case law,24 stating:
English law therefore continues to promote the sanctity of life in the face of competent requests to 
have life ended. Quite how long that final barrier will stand remains to be seen, since the logic if 
autonomy and quality of life might ultimately necessitate dismantling’.25
The ‘dismantling’ of the sanctity of life principle is demonstrated by the development 
and application of the best-interests principle in law. Decisions to lawfully withdraw 
or withhold life-sustaining treatment from incapacitated patients illustrate that end-of-
life decision making does not always equate to a preservation of life. This chapter 
focuses on the first of several factors that are currently of central importance when 
making decisions to withdraw or withhold life-sustaining treatment from premature, 
critically ill neonates; that is, the effectiveness of the best-interests principle. First, the 
foundations of the best-interests principle will be considered.
IV: What is the best-interests principle? 
As noted in Chapter One of this thesis, unlike competent adult patients, neonates 
cannot express their wishes or choices in relation to medical treatment, articulate their 
23 John Keown, ‘The Legal Revolution: From Sanctity of Life to Quality of Life and Autonomy (1997–1998) (14)(2) Journal of 
Contemporary Health Law and Policy 253–285. Keown provides an example of the erosion of the sanctity of life principle in law 
by the introduction of the Abortion Act 1967 in the UK, whereby abortion ‘was transformed from a serious criminal offense to a 
minor medical procedure, commonly performed for reasons of social convenience rather than medical necessity’. Richard 
Huxtable provides the further example of the decriminalisation of suicide in the UK to highlight the erosion of the sanctity of life 
principle. See, Richard Huxtable, ‘D(en)ying Life: The Sanctity of Life Doctrine in English Law’ (2002) 14(3) Retfoerd 60–81.
24 Huxtable, above n 23, 60. 
25 Ibid 79.
28
 
                                                          
 individual autonomy or consent to or against treatment. Therefore, all decisions for 
neonates and young infants are (at least at first instance) made by their parents.
As Skene notes, parents of neonates or very young infants are ‘legally entitled (and 
responsible) to decide what medical treatment their child will—or will not—have, 
provided that they act in the child’s best interests’.26 Under the protection of the law 
in Australia, under section 61B of the Family Law Act 1975, parental responsibly 
includes, ‘…all duties, powers, responsibilities and authority which, by law, parents 
have in relation to children’.27
Under English jurisdiction, parental responsibility is defined under section 3 (1) of the 
Children’s Act 1989 as, ‘…all the rights, duties, powers, responsibilities and authority 
which by law a parent of a child has in relation to the child and his property’.28
However, where parents disagree with either the discontinuation or continuation of 
medical treatment recommended by medical practitioners, the court has inherent 
power and parens patriae jurisdiction to make orders and determinations with the 
child’s welfare as its paramount consideration.29 As the ‘parent of the nation’, it is 
settled law that the courts’ ‘prime and paramount consideration must be the best 
interests of the child’.30
26 Loane Skene, Law and Medical Practice: Rights, Duties, Claims and Defences (Lexis Nexis Butterworths, 3rd ed, 2008) 120. 
27 S 61B Family Law Act 1975 (Cth).
28 S 3(1) Childrens Act 1989.
29 For further discussion on the origins of Parens Patriae see, J Seymour, ‘Parens Patriae and Wardship Powers: Their Nature 
and Origins’ (1994) 14(2) Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 159–188. The paramount consideration of the child’s welfare is 
governed under s.1 of the Children’s Act 1989 in the UK. The Parens Patriae is also an inherent jurisdiction of Australian 
Supreme Courts. 
30 Re J (a minor) (medical treatment) [1992] 2 FCR 753. 
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 In both English and Australian legislation, there is no further explanation or definition
of ‘best interests’. Such interests are merely to be the prime and paramount 
‘consideration’ of the courts in making decisions for children.31 This assertion is 
supported by Eekelaar:
…the heavily subjective nature of the power granted to the judges means that, so long as he or she 
does not claim to be applying it as a conclusive rule of law, a judge can consider almost any factor 
which could possibly have a bearing on a child’s welfare and assign to it any weight he or she 
chooses.32
However, even with the lack of any normative basis upon which the best-interests
principle can be established, it remains the benchmark for deciding life and death 
decisions for incapacitated neonates and young infants.33 The best-interests principle
is so powerful that it can, at times, overwhelm competing principles such as patient 
autonomy and even the right to life.34 Despite its important status and the high number 
of decisions in which it has been applied, the criteria by which it is informed remain 
surprisingly unclear.
31 Archard extends this point further, arguing that the use of the indefinite and definite articles ‘a’ and ‘the’, in addition to the use 
of prime and paramount, allows for several interpretations of the best-interests principle. Further, the use of consideration allows 
for other factors to be considered, as opposed to a definite and authoritative assertion as to the child’s best interests. See especially, 
D W Archard, ‘Children’s Rights’ in E N Zalta et al (eds), The Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy (Winter 2002) 
<http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2002/entries/rights-children/>. 
32 J Eekelaar, Regulating Divorce (Clarendon Press, 1991) 248.
33 The best-interests principle is also applied to cases of incapacitated and incompetent adult and adolescent patients. The seminal 
case of F v West Berkshire Health Authority [1989] All ER 545 considered the lawful sterilisation of an incompetent patient. It 
was decided by the court that it was in the best interests of a mentally retarded but sexually active woman to be sterilised.
34 This point is illustrated throughout this chapter in cases that have required legal intervention, where parents consider that life-
sustaining treatment should be continued, contrary to medical opinion. However, it has been noted that given the infinite range 
of typically tragic medical conditions that can afflict individuals, it is understandable that the best-interests test can never be 
expressed with absolute rigidity to form a precise rule. For a discussion of the distinction between rules and principle see, Ronald 
Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously (Harvard University Press, 4th ed, 1977) 22–28, 76–77.
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 Case law from the UK and Australia has explored factors that should be considered in 
deciding what is in a patients best interests, and some of these cases will be discussed 
later in this chapter.  
V: The undefinable concept of futility 
In addition to the nebulous best-interest principle, the courts invariably apply the 
concept of futility in lawfully allowing for the discontinuation of life-sustaining 
treatment. In doing so, the courts, with the endorsement of medical opinion, prescribe 
that further treatment will provide no benefit or improvement to the patient’s health 
status or prognosis. The concept of futile is as inexplicit and ambiguous as the best-
interests principle. Given that both concepts are overwhelming co-dependant, there is 
a compelling need to improve the clarity and objectivity of these concepts.
In light of this, Stewart correctly asserts that there have been several failed attempts to 
define and elucidate the concept of futility by an objective standard.35 Qualitative and 
quantitative measures have been considered as methods of defining when treatment is 
futile.36 However, the application of the term remains a central contention in end-of-
life decisions.37
35 See, eg, Cameron Stewart, ‘A Defence of the Requirement to Seek Consent to Withhold and Withdraw Futile Treatments’ 
(2012) 196(6) Medical Journal of Australia, 406, 406. 
36 See further, N S Jecker and R A Pearlman, ‘Medical Futility: Who Decides?’ (1992) 152(6) Archives of Internal Medicine
1140, 1140. 
37 Chapter Three of this thesis considers the application and interpretation of the best-interests principle and the concept of futility 
in clinical guidelines. 
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 This thesis contends that perhaps, although not publically expressed, the courts and 
medical practitioners implicitly place emphasis on the utilisation of limited health 
resources, particularly when making end-of-life decisions for extremely premature and 
severely impaired neonate and young infants. This consideration should be discussed 
with greater transparency to achieve a more objective decision-making model.38
The best-interests test has been endorsed and applied in both English and Australian 
jurisdictions, although most cases requiring legal intervention have taken place in the 
UK. The number of decisions from the UK as compared to Australia is 
disproportionate, even allowing for its sizeable population advantage. The reason for 
this is unclear. Nevertheless, the analysis commences with a consideration of the 
jurisprudence from the UK.
VI: Early case law involving neonates: Inconsistency in case decisions 
During the early 1980s, the issue of withholding or withdrawing treatment from 
severely disabled neonates began to gain the awareness of the courts and the public in 
the UK. The British cases of Baby John Pearson and Baby Alexandra led to greater 
public awareness of the medical dilemmas concerning neonates. Doctors also became 
more cautious and aware of their actions being subject to scrutiny.
The case of R v Arthur concerned a reported criminal prosecution in relation to a
Doctor withholding care from a neonate.39 John Pearson was born with Down 
38 This argument is supported by John Lantos, see further, J Lantos, ‘When Parents Request Seemingly Futile Treatment for Their 
Children’ (2006) 73(3) The Mount Sinai Journal of Medicine 587–589. 
39 R v Arthur (1981) 12 BMLR 1. 
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 syndrome in June 1980 to Molly Pearson in Derby General Hospital in the UK.40 His 
parents did not want him to survive. Baby Pearson’s mother is reported to have told 
nurses ‘I don’t want it, Duck’.41 The treating physician, Dr Arthur, instructed the 
nurses to give ‘nursing care only’, which included a strong painkiller called 
dyhydrocodeine (DF 188) in four-hourly intervals as required. 
However, although Baby Pearson was born with many of the common known features 
of Down syndrome—slanting eyes, a flattened nose, a large tongue and a broad head—
he did not have any of the other more severe abnormities that can afflict people with 
the chromosomal defect, such as heart defects or intestinal blockages.42 He was 
capable of taking nourishment, by means of food and water. However, he was taken 
into a separate room and given only water and the drug DF 188. By the first evening 
of ‘letting nature takes its course’, John was ‘going grey’.43 He died three days later. 
Dr Arthur had provided ‘nursing care only’ and had previously allowed other 
unwanted newborns to die with only hospital staff and their parents’ awareness. 
However, in this case, one of the hospital staff informed an anti-abortion organisation 
called Life, who then reported the case to the police. He was later arrested and charged 
with murder, owing to having given Baby Pearson unnecessary and inappropriate 
drugs, in addition to allowing him to be starved to death. This was not a case of 
withdrawing or withholding medical treatment, but basic nourishment.44
40 Helga Kuhse and Peter Singer, Should the Baby Live? (Oxford University Press, 1985) 1.
41 Ibid 2. Duck is a term of endearment used in some parts of the UK.
42 Ibid. 
43 Peter Singer, Rethinking Life and Death (Text Publishing, 1994) 121.
44 Sarah Elliston, The Best Interests of the Child in Healthcare (Routledge Cavendish, 2007) 155.
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 The case was heard before Justice Farquharson and a jury at Leicester Crown Court in 
November 1981. The prosecution relied on evidence of the pathologist, Dr Usher, who 
alleged that the cause of death was lung poisoning by the DF 118 prescribed by Dr 
Arthur. In addition, Dr Usher claimed that, in an ‘uncomplicated’ case of Down 
syndrome such as that of Baby Pearson, the use of DF 118 was unnecessary. 
However, doubt was later cast on Dr Usher’s reasoning and evidence by the defence. 
Professor Emery stated that Baby Pearson had been suffering other defects before birth 
that may have caused his death. Moreover, several other medical physicians and 
colleagues considered Dr Arthur’s course of action as being ‘normal medical
practice’.45
The evidence put forward by the defence led to the charge of murder being reduced to 
attempted murder, in a trial in which neither Dr Arthur nor Baby Pearson’s parents 
gave evidence. During his interview with the police, Dr Arthur claimed his main 
intention in prescribing DF 118 was to alleviate any ‘suffering’ the neonate may have 
endured.46 After a mere two hours of deliberation, the jury returned to the dock,
acquitting Dr Arthur. Justice Farquharson stated to the jury: 
45 Kuhse and Singer, above n 40, 123.
46 This is contrary to the view that providing excessive medication or withdrawing or withholding life-sustaining treatment that 
intentionally causes the death of a neonate amounts to murder. Considering the decision in R v Arthur, Kuhse argues that there 
are instances and distinctions that should be drawn between killing and letting die. The author asserts that there may be cases in 
which it is morally permissible to intentionally allowing a neonate to die, such as when the neonate is suffering excessive pain. 
See especially, Helga Kuhse, ‘A Modern Myth. That Letting Die is Not the Intentional Causation of Death: Some Reflections on 
the Trial and Acquittal of Dr Leonard Arthur’ (1984) 1(1) Journal of Applied Philosophy 21–38. This thesis extends this argument 
further based on limited financial resources. This is discussed in greater detail in Chapter Five of this thesis. 
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 The case really revolves round the question of what is the duty of the doctor when prescribing 
treatment for a severely handicapped child suffering from a handicap of an irrevocable nature 
where parents do not wish the child to survive.47
Kennedy interpreted Justice Farquharson’s words as establishing a criteria justifying
ending the life of a neonate in the instance ‘where the child is irreversibly disabled and
… rejected by its parents’.48
Arguably, the decision in R v Arthur was flawed. The courts are not bound by the 
decisions or choices of either parents or medical practitioners. The judge placed heavy 
emphasis on the medical opinion presented by several expert witnesses. In his 
summing up before the jury, the judge stated ‘I imagine you will think long and hard 
before concluding that doctors, of the eminence we have heard … have evolved 
standards that amount to committing a crime’.49 In subsequent decisions made by the 
courts, discussed later in the thesis, judges vehemently declare that the wishes of 
parents and medical opinion, although given consideration, are not determinative in 
decision making. 
Considering in this decision a neonate was allowed to die because of the circumstances 
of his uncomplicated Down syndrome, it would be understandable to assume that
another case that same year, heard before the same judicial system, would lead to a 
similar result. However, in Re B (a minor) (wardship: medical treatment),50 the court 
47 R v Arthur (1981) 12 BMLR 1, 5. 
48 Ian Kennedy, Treat Me Right (Oxford University Press, 1988) 155. 
49 R v Arthur (1981) 12 BMLR 1, 22.
50 Re B (a minor) (wardship: medical treatment) [1990] 3 All ER (CA) 927.
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 was asked to decide on surgical treatment for an infant suffering an intestinal 
obstruction and who had Down syndrome.
Known as ‘Baby Alexandra’, her parents refused to authorise the surgery on the 
grounds that it was for either God or nature to decide the fate of their daughter. The 
Court of Appeal declared that the best interests of the neonate were served by allowing 
treatment. In a brief judgment of three pages, it was concluded that life, in this case, 
trumped death, medical and public opinion at the time.51
Templeman LJ stated:
It devolves on this court in this particular instance to decide whether the life of this child is 
demonstrably going to be so awful that in effect the child must be condemned to die or whether 
the life of this child is still so imponderable that it would be wrong for her to be condemned to die
… Faced with that choice, I have no doubt that it is the duty of this court to decide that the child 
must live.52
However, it is apparent further in the judgment that his lordship allowed for contrary 
applications of the principle of best interests in the future by stating, ‘there may be 
cases … of severe proved damage where the future is so certain and where the life of 
the child is so bound of pain and suffering that the court might be driven to a different 
conclusion’.53
51 Janet Read and Luke Clements, ‘Demonstrably Awful: The Right to Life and the Selective Non-Treatment of Disabled Babies 
and Young Children’ (2004) 31(4) Journal of Law and Society 482, 486.
52 Re B (A Minor) (wardship: medical treatment) [1990] 3 All ER (CA) 927, 929.
53 Ibid.
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 Unlike in the case of Baby Alexandra, John Pearson’s withdrawal of treatment and 
subsequent death was judged to be in his best interests, as Justice Farquharson deemed 
an irreversible disability and parental rejection as a permissible reason to end his life. 
The inconsistency in the decisions made by the courts in these early cases, both of 
which involved infants afflicted by Down syndrome, is stark. The decision in R v 
Arthur, in which the court determined to allow an infant with uncomplicated Down 
syndrome rejected by his parents to die, is illustrative of the non-application of the 
erosion of the sanctity of life principle. However in Re B (on appeal), Justice 
Templeman found no evidence that, even with an intestinal blockage, Baby 
Alexandra’s ‘quality of life’ would be hindered or would be any worse than any other 
child with Down syndrome. As Gunn and Smith succinctly state:
On the facts as they appeared to Dr Arthur at the time of his decision and, indeed, up to the time 
of the child’s death, John Pearson’s circumstances were, if anything, better than Baby B’s. If those 
responsible for Baby B owed a duty to keep her alive, there must have been at least an equal duty 
on those responsible for John Pearson.54
In Re B, the attitude of David Plank, Director of Social Services, was very different to 
that of the doctors: ‘we decided that clearly it was right that the baby should have the 
operation because the baby was an independent person and had a right to life … she 
was a child first and had Down syndrome second’.55
Robertson considered the need for a uniform, authoritative decision-making process 
in end-of-life decisions in 1981, soon after the Pearson case, stating:
54 M J Gunn and J C Smith, ‘Arthur’s Case and the Right to Life of a Down’s Syndrome Child’ (1985) (Nov) Criminal Law 
Review 705, 709.
55 Read and Clements, above n 50, 501. 
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 The criteria cannot be whatever doctors and families decide … rather they should be developed by 
an authoritative body that is representative of the community as a whole, such as legislature, a 
national commission or some publicly constituted body that reflects a wide range of societal 
views.56
The assertion above reinforces the contention of this thesis: that there is a need for a 
more objective and tangible approach to decisions to withdraw or withhold life-
sustaining treatment from incapacitated neonates. Three decades after the incongruous 
decisions in the cases discussed above, the arbitrary nature with which end-of-life 
decisions are made remains an issue in need of reform, as illustrated in later case 
decisions.
Robertson’s suggestion of a ‘community caucus’ is commendable, although deserving 
of some caution. As already noted in this chapter, societal views, values and 
perceptions continually evolve, as demonstrated by the widespread public acceptance 
of both the parental and medical decisions taken in the Pearson case in 1981. At the 
time of Dr Arthur’s acquittal, a contemporary British newspaper reported that women 
rejoiced ‘Thank God’. This societal attitude was further evidenced in a separate poll 
conducted by the BBC of 2000 adults, which reflected widespread support for Dr 
Arthur, with 86 per cent of British citizens stating that a doctor should not be found 
guilty of murder if, with the agreement of the parents, a severely handicapped baby 
dies.57
56 John A Robertson, ‘Substantive Criteria and Procedures in Withholding Care from Defective Newborns’ in Stuart F Spicker, 
Joseph M Healy and H Tristram Engelhardt (eds), The Law–Medicine Relation: A Philosophical Exploration (D Reidel Publishing 
Company, 1981) 217, 223. 
57 Kuhse and Singer, above n 40, 10. For further reading of the newspaper article reported women rejoicing see, ‘Women Cry 
‘Thank God’ as Dr Arthur is Cleared’, The Times (UK), 6 November 1981.
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 In contrast, most cases concerning critically ill neonates heard by the courts in more 
recent times have involved parental objections to life-sustaining treatment being 
withdrawn or withheld. As will be considered later in this chapter, more recent case 
decisions are far removed from that of Baby John Pearson, in which the treatment 
decision was based on his condition and parental rejection. It is very likely that a case 
such as that of Baby Pearson would be decided differently today.58
Post R v Arthur and Re B, end-of-life decision making by means of withdrawal or 
withholding life-sustaining treatment was subject to significant legal consideration and 
scrutiny in the seminal English case, Airedale National Health Service Trust v Bland,59
which concerned the withdrawal and withholding of life-sustaining treatment from an 
incapacitated adult. 
This thesis focuses on decisions to withdraw or withhold life-sustaining treatment from 
incapacitated neonates; however, to facilitate the discussion of the best-interests
principle in cases involving neonates and young infants, it is illuminating to examine 
its application in Bland. Chiefly, the case provided an important legal platform
compelling the courts to explore the legal and ethical role of the best-interests principle 
58 A study conducted in Canada in the early 1990s found a significant change in medical practitioner attitudes towards the 
withdrawal or withholding of treatment for neonates born with Down syndrome. Compared to a similar study conducted in 1975, 
the study found ‘Positive changes in physicians’ attitudes during the past 15 years have been influenced by parent advocacy 
groups, court decisions, and studies showing that the ultimate intellectual and social skills of Down syndrome children are greater 
than was previously believed. The most prominent variable associated with attitudes was the physician’s age: the older the 
physician, the more likely he or she would be non-supportive of active treatment on behalf of the Down syndrome individual’. 
See especially, Robert H A Haslam and Ruth Milner, ‘The Physician and Down Syndrome: Are Attitudes Changing?’ (1992) 7(3) 
Journal of Child Neurology, 304–331. A similar societal shift in attitude has been evidenced in the UK, see, eg, Polly Curtis, 
‘Down’s Syndrome Changing Attitudes’, The Guardian (Online) 1 September 2007 
<http://www.theguardian.com/stage/2007/sep/01/theatre3>. 
59 Airedale NHS Trust v Bland [1993] AC 789.
39
 
                                                          
 and its employment in decisions to allow for the lawful withdrawal or withholding of 
life-sustaining treatment.
VII: The legal and ethical challenges: Airedale NHS Trust v Bland
The concept of best interests was considered at length in the case of Airedale National 
Health Service Trust v Bland.60 The legal judgments focused on whether it was in the 
best interests of a patient in a permanent vegetative state to die.61 Anthony Bland was 
a victim of the Hillsborough football disaster on 15 April 1989 in the UK. From this, 
he was left with motor reflexes, but had no indication of significant cognitive function
and was being kept alive via artificial life-sustaining machinery. After he had remained
in the same mental and physical state for three and a half years, his family and the
medical professionals responsible for his care sought a declaration that no civil or 
criminal liability would result in discontinuing life-sustaining treatment. 
Bland was the first case in which the English courts were required to consider the
lawful discontinuation of life-sustaining treatment concerning an adult patient. In
Bland, the court decided in favour of discontinuing artificial hydration and nutrition. 
However, reaching this decision was not an easy or comfortable decision for their 
honours to make. Both the Court of Appeal and the House of Lords were confronted 
with what Miola refers to as ‘a blank canvass and recognition that the questions put to 
them were intrinsically moral and ethical’.62
60 Ibid.
61 The origins of the term PVS are discussed by Sir Stephen Brown in Airedale NHS Trust v Bland [1993] AC 789,797. The term 
‘permanent vegetative state’ was devised by Professor Bryan Jennet of Glasgow and Professor Plum of New York. For a 
discussion about the terminology and understanding of the term PVS, see, eg, C J Borthwick and R Crossley, ‘Permanent 
Vegetative State: Usefulness and Limits of a Prognostic Definition’ (2004) 19(4) Journal of Neuro Rehabilitation 381–389. 
62 Jose Miola, Medical Ethics and Medical Law: A Symbiotic Relationship (Hart Publishing, 2007) 154.
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 Sir Bingham’s description at the Court of Appeal of Anthony Bland’s physical 
condition provides a useful starting point for this discussion:
Mr. Bland lies in bed in the Airedale General Hospital, his eyes open, his mind vacant, his limbs 
crooked and taut. He cannot swallow, and so cannot be spoon-fed without a high risk that food 
will be inhaled into the lung. He is fed by means of a tube, threaded through the nose and down 
into the stomach, through which liquefied food is mechanically pumped. His bowels are evacuated 
by enema. His bladder is drained by catheter.63
One of the grounds on which Airedale NHS Trust sought a declaration to discontinue 
medical treatment in Bland lawfully was ‘for the sole purpose of enabling Mr Bland 
to end his life and die peacefully with the greatest dignity and the least of pain, 
suffering and distress’.64
The issue that confronted each of the judges in Bland was how to reach their concurring 
conclusions. Their honours sought to argue that it was lawful to discontinue treatment,
but without explicitly advocating that inevitable death was in his best interests. Each 
of the judges took their own novel route to come to the same conclusions. The 
judgments by their honours in Bland are illustrative of the legal and ethical challenge 
between the sanctity of life principle and the competing concept of patient autonomy.
63 Airedale NHS Trust v Bland [1993] AC 789, 807.
64 Ibid 807–808.
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Sanctity of life
Judges at the Court of Appeal and the House of Lords discussed the sanctity of life 
principle at some length. McGee has described the decision in Bland to allow treatment 
to be withheld as ‘inexorably leading towards the deterioration of the sanctity of life 
principle’.65
Hoffman LJ’s judgment in the Court of Appeal began by discussing the importance of 
the sanctity of life principle and the intrinsic value of human life:
our belief in the sanctity of life explains why we think it is almost always wrong to cause the death 
of another human being, even one who is terminally ill or so disabled that we think that if we were 
in his position we would rather be dead.66
However, his honour swiftly progressed to highlight the contrast between the sanctity 
of life principle and the competing doctrine of patient autonomy, stating: 
Take, for example, the sanctity of life and the right to self-determination. We all believe in them 
and yet we cannot always have them both. The patient who refuses medical treatment which is 
necessary to save his life is exercising his right to self-determination. But allowing him, in effect, 
to choose to die, is something which many people will believe offends the principle of the sanctity 
of life.67
65 Andrew McGee, ‘Finding a Way Through the Ethical and Legal Maze: Withdrawal of Medical Treatment and Euthanasia’ 
(2005) 13(3) Medical Law Review 357, 384.
66 Airedale NHS Trust v Bland [1993] AC 789, 826.
67 Ibid 826–827.
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 Only a few paragraphs later, in his judgment, Hoffman LJ asserted that between the 
two conflicting principles there might be a requirement for a ‘painful compromise to 
be made’.68 Lord Keith in the House of Lords was more robust in his approach, stating: 
The principle [of sanctity of life] is not an absolute one. It does not compel a medical practitioner 
on pain of criminal sanctions to treat a patient, who will die if he does not, contrary to the express 
wishes of the patient. It does not authorise forcible feeding of prisoners on hunger strike. It does 
not compel the temporary keeping alive of patients who are terminally ill where to do so would 
merely prolong their suffering.69
 
68 Ibid 827.
69 Ibid 859.
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Substituted judgment test
The substituted judgment test often applied under American jurisdiction focuses on 
the treatment options that the incapacitated patient would have opted for based on the 
values or views or lifestyle choices of the patient while still having capacity.70
Their honours considered the test in Bland and the court assessed that further treatment 
would simply prolong Anthony Bland’s ‘futile’ existence. As such, his existence was 
measured against his prior life as a youthful and energetic adolescent. This was 
illustrated by Lord Browne-Wilkinson, who stated, ‘the withdrawal of food and 
Anthony Bland’s subsequent death would be for his benefit, and attach importance to 
impalpable factors such as personal dignity and the way Anthony Bland would wish 
to be remembered’.71 As his father succinctly stated, ‘he certainly wouldn’t want to be 
left like that’.72 Lord Goff considered the substituted judgment test, stating: 
I wish however to refer at this stage to the approach adopted in most American courts under which 
this courts seeks, in a case in which the patient is incapacitated from expressing any view on the 
question whether life-prolonging treatment should be withheld in the relevant circumstance, to 
determine what decision the patient himself would have made had he been able to do so. This is 
70 McQueen and Walsh argue that the substituted judgement test is flawed as it ‘focuses disproportionately on the person’s 
statements rather than on the person’s overall best interests’. See especially, Moira M McQueen and James L Walsh, ‘The House
of Lords and the Discontinuation of Artificial Nutrition and Hydration: An Ethical Analysis of the Tony Bland Case’ (1991–
1994) 35 Catholic Lawyer 363, 368. The substituted judgement test is a contrast to the best-interests test, which takes a more 
paternalistic role in deciding what is ‘best’ for the patient. The origins of the substituted judgement test can be found in the 
nineteenth century ‘Lunacy Law’, whereby ‘Lord Eldon crafted the legal fiction of doing that which it is probable the lunatic 
himself would have done’. See especially, Louise Harmon, ‘Falling Off the Vine: Legal Fictions and the Doctrine of the 
Substituted Judgement Test’ (Oct 1990) 100(1) Yale Law Journal 1, 1. 
71 Airedale NHS Trust v Bland [1993] AC 789, 879–880. 
72 Ibid 807.
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called the substituted judgement test, and it generally involves a detailed inquiry into the patient’s 
views and preferences.73
While ultimately rejected as an applicable test for decision making in Bland, at the 
Court of Appeal, Lord Hoffman affirmed a view similar to the substituted judgment
test, stating, ‘we should try our honest best to do what we think he would have 
chosen’.74 However, unlike in cases involving incapacitated adults, best interests when 
applied to neonates is not distracted by comparisons of the life and capacities that the 
patient enjoyed prior to the illness or injury that now afflicts them.
The court in Bland favoured and applied the best-interests principle as the cornerstone 
in deciding to withdraw or withhold life-sustaining treatment. Although not as clearly 
subjective as the substituted judgment test, the application of the best-interests
principle in decisions to withdraw or withhold life-sustaining treatment raises others 
concerns, which are discussed below and considered later in this chapter.
Reliance on the medical profession
Lord Keith reached his conclusion by applying the test laid down in Bolam v Friern 
Hospital Management Committee,75 which states that a doctor has a duty to act in the 
best interests of patients as understood by a ‘responsible body’ of medical opinion. In 
relying on this test, Lord Keith abjured himself of any moral responsibility to reach a 
decision in Bland: ‘…a medical practitioner is under no duty to continue to treat such 
73 Ibid 871. 
74 Ibid 829–830. 
75 Bolam v Friern Hospital Management Committee [1957] 1 WLR 582.
45
 
                                                          
 a patient where a large body of informed and responsible medical opinion is to the 
effect that no benefit at all would be conferred by continuance’.76
Lord Goff was more forthright about the role of doctors. He also relied on the Bolam
test and the ethics committee of the British Medical Association (BMA) in stating, ‘he 
[the doctor] will be acting with the benefit of guidance from a responsible and 
competent body of relevant professional opinion’.77 Like Lord Keith, Lord Goff was 
unwilling to commit to a more independent position on the matter of lawful withdrawal 
of treatment:
The truth is that, in the course of their work, doctors frequently have to make decisions which may 
affect the continued survival of their patients, and are in reality far more experienced in matters of 
this kind than judges. It is nevertheless the function of the judges to state the legal principles upon 
which the lawfulness of the actions of doctors depend; but in the end the decisions to be made in 
individual cases must rest with the doctors themselves.78
In effect, Lord Goff considered that it was the role of doctors to make end-of-life 
decisions, and that the courts and judges were required to endorse the conduct of 
medical practitioners.
That two of the presiding judges arrived at their conclusions for best interests via the 
application of the Bolam test demonstrates its limitations. As a test, it has not been 
formulated and hypothesised in a wholly independent and informed manner.79 Stewart 
76 Airedale NHS Trust v Bland [1993] AC 789, 858–859. 
77 Ibid 871.
78 Ibid.
79 Right Honourable Lord Woolf argues that the courts should not interfere with medical decision making unless the courts are 
justified in doing so. Lord Woolf refers to the court’s role being that of a ‘regulatory body’ rather than a decision-making body. 
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 reinforces this view, arguing that the Bolam test ‘places the assessment of best interests 
solely within the sphere of medical competence’.80 Stone, in the New Law Journal,
raised similar arguments:
The reliance on the Bolam test of medical negligence to determine whether it is in the patient’s 
best interests to be allowed to die is scarcely an ideal approach where it is the continued existence 
of the patient rather than the conduct of the doctor which is to be assessed. ‘Best interests’ is a 
nebulous concept at the best of times.81
Lord Browne-Wilkinson did not show the same deference to the medical profession, 
highlighting that there might be instances in which a doctor, in deciding to withdraw 
life-prolonging treatment, ‘may well be influenced by his own attitude to the sanctity 
of human life.82 However, Lord Goff considered that, for this potential offence and the 
attendant consequences, a ‘change of medical practitioner’ would provide the 
necessary resolution.83
Although, the courts have the jurisdiction to override medical practitioners, judges 
rarely do so. Lord Browne-Wilkinson’s wording conveys the impression that the courts 
feel inconvenienced in having to make decisions regarding areas in which, ‘in the past, 
See especially, Right Honourable Lord Woolf, ‘Are the Courts Excessively Deferential to the Medical Profession?’ (2001) 9(1) 
Medical Law Review 1–16. This thesis contends that this view is flawed and end-of-life decision making should be governed by 
an authoritative body. This contention is examined in detail in Chapters Five and Six of this thesis. 
80 Cameron Stewart, ‘Legal Constructions of Life and Death in the Common Law’ (2002) 2(Summer) Oxford University 
Commonwealth Law Journal 67, 86.
81 Julie Stone, ‘Withholding Life-Sustaining Treatment’ (1995) 145(6686) New Law Journal 354, 354. 
82 Airedale NHS Trust v Bland [1993] AC 789, 884. Empirical research has found that medical practitioners are influenced in end-
of-life decision making based by their personal values and beliefs. The role and impact of key stakeholders in decision making is
examined in detail in Chapter Four of this thesis. 
83 Ibid 874.
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 doctors exercised their own discretion in accordance with medical ethics’.84 In the area 
of prolonging life, doctors ‘took the responsibility of deciding whether the 
perpetuation of life was pointless’.85
It is clear that Lord Browne-Wilkinson’s preference in Bland was for doctors to make 
life and death decisions and for the courts not to be troubled or confronted by such. 
Previously, doctors were given wide latitude to make difficult decisions behind closed 
doors; they assumed control and sole responsibility, and were seldom challenged. 
While not overtly criticising this shift away from the infallibility of doctors, Lord 
Browne-Wilkinson acknowledged the reason behind the increasing incidence of 
intervention by the courts:
…there are now present amongst the medical and nursing staff of hospitals those who genuinely 
believe in the sanctity of human life, no matter what the quality of that life, and report doctors who 
take such decisions to the authorities with a view to prosecution for a criminal offence.86
Arguably, reliance on the medical profession to make end-of-life decisions allows for 
less discomfort, debate or discussion by the courts, and does not force the courts to 
have to consider end-of-life decision making with the need to formulate any unified 
principles in this area. 
Any association between the discontinuation of treatment and euthanasia was 
explicitly denied by Lord Lowry: ‘I reject the idea, which is implicit in the appellant’s 
84 Ibid 880.
85 Ibid.
86 Ibid.
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 argument, that informed medical opinion is these respects is merely a disguise for a 
philosophy which, if accepted, would legalise euthanasia’.87 Lord Browne-Wilkinson 
was also vigorous in attempting to prevent the terms death and best interests being 
coined together, by asserting; 
…the critical decision to be made is whether it is in the best interests of Anthony Bland to continue 
the invasive medical care involved in artificial feeding. That question is not the same as, ‘Is it in 
Anthony Bland’s best interests that he should die?’88
Ensuring that the onus for ‘responsibility and accountability’ remained with the 
medical profession, and perhaps revealing some of the discomfort discussed above,
Lord Browne-Wilkinson commented:
…it follows that the legal question in this case is not whether the court thinks it is in the best 
interests of Anthony Bland to continue to receive intrusive medical care but whether the 
responsible doctor has reached a reasonable and bona fide belief that it is not.89
Lord Mustill seemed to believe that Anthony Bland had no best interests at all, stating,
‘the distressing truth which must not be shirked is that the proposed conduct is not in 
the best interests of Anthony Bland, for he has no best interests of any kind’.90 While 
a bold statement, it was not helpful in responding to the immediate matter at hand; that 
is, whether it was in his best interests to have life-sustaining treatment withdrawn or 
withheld. 
87 Ibid 876.
88 Ibid 884.
89 Ibid.
90 Ibid 897.
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Unlike his learned friend Lord Browne-Wilkinson, Lord Mustill did not show the same 
blind confidence in the medical profession in determining life and death decisions. 
Lord Mustill considered the role of the courts and the law in decision making with
caution, and acknowledged the difficulties facing judges in determining the best 
interests of the patient:
But when the intellectual part of the task is complete and the decision maker has to choose the 
factors which he will take into account, attach relevant weights to them and then strike a balance 
the judge is no better equipped, though no worse, than anyone else.91
In line with the contention of this thesis, Lord Mustill did not consider doctors to be 
those ‘best equipped’ to make such decisions—a welcome change to the general tenor 
of the judgment.92
Acts and omissions
The courts in Bland were required to differentiate between the ‘act’ of withdrawing 
life-prolonging treatment or merely ‘omitting’ to provide it. The distinction between 
the two was of significant importance to the court because, without resort to this 
distinction, the court would have effectively legalised euthanasia. As discussed earlier 
in this chapter, in the 1980s judgment in R v Arthur, the courts underlined the 
importance of distinguishing between ‘letting die’ by means of omission or ‘killing’ 
by an act. This issue continued to confront the courts over a decade later in Bland.
91 Ibid 887. 
92 The role, impact and function that the medical profession should have in end-of-life decision making is discussed in greater 
detail in Chapter Four of this thesis.
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 Lord Goff addressed this complexity:
so to act is to cross the Rubicon which runs between on the one hand the care of the living patient 
and on the other hand euthanasia- actively causing his death to avoid or to end his suffering. 
Euthanasia is not lawful at common law.93
Subsequent comments reflected an appreciation of the complexities of the distinction 
between acts and omissions: 
It is true that the drawing of this distinction may lead to a charge of hypocrisy; because it can be 
asked why, if the doctor, by discontinuing treatment is entitled in consequence to let his patient 
die, it should not be lawful to put him of out his misery straight away, in a more humane manner, 
by lethal injection, rather than let him linger on in pain until he dies. But the law does not feel able 
to authorise euthanasia, even in circumstances such as these.94
His honour was concerned about the possible repercussions and the potential for 
unintended consequences, as ‘…once euthanasia is recognised as lawful in these 
circumstances, it is difficult to see any logical basis for excluding it in others’.95
In the Court of Appeal, Lord Hoffman also considered the infamous ‘lethal injection’ 
scenario. In opposition to the judges in the House of Lords who thought the use of an 
injection would be ‘more humane’ than any suffering caused by the withdrawal of 
nutrition and hydration for an extended period of time, he asserted, ‘I must start by 
considering why most of us would be appalled if he was given a lethal injection. It is, 
93 Airedale NHS Trust v Bland [1993] AC 789, 865.
94 Ibid.
95 Ibid.
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 I think, connected with our view that the sanctity of life entails its inviolability by an 
outsider’.96 However, he went on to say ‘on the other hand, we recognise that, one way 
or another, life must come to an end’.97
Lord Hoffman’s view is aptly defined by Kuhse’s novel term, ‘qualified sanctity of 
life’, which affirms:
It is absolutely prohibited either intentionally to kill a patient or intentionally to let a patient die, 
and to base decisions relating to the prolongation or shortening of human life on considerations of 
its quality or kind; it is, however, sometimes permissible to refrain from preventing death.98
Lord Browne-Wilkinson considered that the objective of lawfully allowing the patient 
to die would alleviate the family’s suffering,99 while still acknowledging the 
difficulties in reconciling the difference between a positive act to end Anthony Bland’s 
life and a mere omission to preserve it:
…the conclusion I have reached will appear to some as almost irrational. How can it be lawful to 
allow a patient to die slowly though painlessly, over a period of weeks from lack of food but 
unlawful to produce his immediate death by a lethal injection, thereby saving his family from yet 
another ordeal to add to the tragedy that has already struck them?100
96 Ibid 831.
97 Ibid.
98 Kuhse, above n 5, 23. See also, Helga Kuhse, ‘Debate: Extraordinary Means and the Sanctity of Life’ (1981) 7(2) Journal of 
Medical Ethics 74–82.
99 In Bland, Lord Browne-Wilkinson considered that allowing treatment to be withdrawn from Anthony Bland would perhaps 
ease some of the distress his family experienced with his prolonged PVS state. However, Amareskara and Bagaric promote that 
in cases of active euthanasia, a slow dying process allows for ‘a last minute change of mind … [that is not possible] in the case 
of active euthanasia and we can be more certain of the patient’s commitment to the decision to die’. See, Amarasekara and 
Bagaric, above n 6, 98.
100 Airedale NHS Trust v Bland [1993] AC 789, 885.
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Lord Mustill concurred:
Unlike the conscious patient he [Bland] does not know what is happening to his body, and cannot 
be affronted by it; he does not know of his family’s continuing sorrow. By ending his life the 
doctors will not relieve him of a burden become intolerable, for others carry the burden and he has 
none.101
In dealing with the distinction between acts and omissions, the judges were required 
to consider the manner in which Anthony Bland’s life could be brought to an end. The 
issue raised some discomfort, as it did not concern the withdrawal of medical treatment 
but the withdrawal of hydration and nutrition.102
Does withdrawal of nutrition and hydration amount to starving to death?
Lord Keith began by considering that artificial feeding amounted to medical treatment 
and care. He considered nourishment to be a form of ‘medical technique’ because of 
the way it was administered.103
Lord Goff extended the point, addressing the concept of futility of treatment: ‘when 
such treatment has no therapeutic purpose of any kind, as where it is futile because the 
101 Ibid 897.
102 It should be noted that in some jurisdictions such as New South Wales, Australia omissions may still give rise to culpability. 
For discussion about withdrawal of feeding tubes (artificial nutrition and hydration) in Victoria, Australia, see the landmark 
decision in Gardner; re BMV [2003] VSC 173, in which Justice Morris of the Supreme Court of Victoria ruled that the appointed 
guardian in the case had authority under the Victorian Medical Treatment Act 1988 to refuse artificial nutrition and hydration via 
percutaneous endoscopic gastrostomy (PEG) from a 69-year-old unconscious female patient with advanced stage dementia. See, 
eg, Michael A Ashby and Danuta Mendelson, ‘Gardner; re BWV: Victorian Supreme Court Makes Landmark Australian Ruling 
on Tube Feeding’ (2004) 181(8) Medical Journal of Australia 442–445; Christopher Zinn, ‘Court Rules Food and Hydration are 
Treatment’ (2003) 326(7401) British Medical Journal 1233.
103 Airedale NHS Trust v Bland [1993] AC 789, 858. 
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 patient is unconscious and there is no prospect of any improvement in his condition’.104
Further, ‘in a case such as the present, it is the futility of the treatment which justifies 
its termination’;105 it is ‘no longer in his best interests’106 for such treatment to 
continue. He concluded that, to ‘terminate’ such futile treatment, continuation of 
artificial feeding would have to cease. He did not understate the ethical and highly 
emotive nature of the discontinuation, stating:
…it can be said that the patient will as a result starve to death; and this may bring before our eyes 
the vision of an ordinary person slowly dying of hunger, and suffering all the pain and distress 
associated with such a death. But here it is clear from the evidence that no such pain or distress 
will be suffered by Anthony, who can feel nothing at all.107
The medical perspective on the withdrawal or withholding of artificial feeding was 
discussed in the international medical journal The Lancet in the early 1990s, where 
Ahronheim and Gasner commented:
The use of the word ‘starvation’ is especially provocative when applied to clinical consequences 
of withholding or withdrawing artificial feeding … such images disturb our well-fed society but
… are irrelevant to discussions of feeding patients who are hopelessly ill.108
104 Ibid 869.
105 Ibid.
106 Ibid 867.
107 Ibid 870.
108 Judith C Ahronheim and M Rose Gasner, ‘The Sloganism of Starvation’ (1990) 335(8684) The Lancet 278, 278. Similar 
terminology was inaccurately applied in the case of Maria Korp in Victoria, Australia in 2005. Maria Korp was reported missing
in February 2005 and found alive but in a state of post-coma unresponsiveness four days after her disappearance. Victorian public 
advocate Julian Gardner authorised the withdrawal of artificial hydration and nutrition and for palliative care to be implemented. 
The case aroused much controversy and publicity, and the withdrawal of tube feeding was sensationalised by the press media as 
‘starving her to death’. See especially, Julian Gardner, ‘Dilemmas in End-of-life Care: The Maria Korp Case’ in Simon 
Barraclough and Heather Garner (eds), Analysing Health Policy: A Problem Orientated Approach (Elsevier, 2008) 166–176.
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 Not surprisingly, as the majority of judges in Bland relied heavily on medical opinion 
to justify their decisions to allow Anthony Bland to die, Lord Hoffman made reference 
to the American coined terms ‘sloganism and emotional symbolism’: 
I do not think one should make light of these deeply intuitive feelings, which derive, as I have said, 
from a principle of kindness which is a badge of our humanity. But like the principle of the sanctity 
of life, they cease to provide true guidance in the extreme case.109
A recent Victorian pilot study found that the provision of proper palliative care 
facilitates a natural body response, reporting ‘terminal dehydration is seen as part of 
the homeostatic process involving an adaptive physiological response when the dying 
body goes into multi-system failure’.110 Arguably, responsible doctors would contend
that they are simply facilitating this adaptive physiological response and allowing 
nature to take its course while managing the pain. They may dispute they are hastening 
the process, and it is likely they would have the support of the courts in this regard. 
The judges in Bland wrestled with semantics to allow doctors to withdraw nutrition 
and hydration lawfully, renaming it as the withdrawal of medical treatment that no 
longer served Anthony Bland’s best interests, and was thus futile. Arguably, one of 
the issues of contention in Bland was the application of the doctrine of causation. All 
parties concerned with Bland’s care (including the Catholic priest) agreed that 
continuation of treatment was not in his best interests. The central issue was whether 
discontinuation amounted to an act or an omission and the court considered this to be 
an omission rather than an act. 
109 Airedale NHS Trust v Bland [1993] AC 789, 832.
110 Pamela Van der Riet, Denise Brooks and Michael Ashby, ‘Nutrition and Hydration at the End of Life: Pilot Study of a Palliative 
Care Experience’ 2006 14(2) Journal of Law and Medicine 182, 185.
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 Given the time, energy and painstaking efforts spent wrestling with the phraseology of 
what essentially amounted to euthanasia, the courts would have been better served by 
dealing directly with the life and death issues that confronted them. This reluctance to 
be seen as sanctioning any form of euthanasia has compelled recent judgments to 
invoke obscure and sometimes indefensible principles, standards and criteria, which 
are explored and illustrated in the case judgments discussed below. The next section 
of this chapter considers the relevant case law and manner in which judges apply the 
imprecise best-interests test to cases of incapacitated neonates and young infants in a 
way that is arguably a smoke screen for what would otherwise be considered as passive 
euthanasia. 
VIII: Seminal English decisions involving neonates and young infants: The Re: J
and Re: C cases
The case law considered in this section is critiqued sequentially for ease of 
understanding of the evolution and development of judicial thought regarding the best-
interests principle and its application in end-of-life decisions concerning incapacitated 
neonates or young infants.
The following cases from the 1990s examine the court’s application of the best-
interests principle to allow the lawful withdrawal or withholding of life-sustaining 
treatment. The cases also highlight the recurring reluctance of the courts to oppose 
medical opinion in making end-of-life decisions.
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 In the case of Re C (a minor) (wardship: medical treatment),111 a neonate suffered a
congenital hydrocephalus, a blockage of cerebral spinal fluid to the brain and brain 
malformation. The neonate was diagnosed as severely and irreversibly brain 
damaged.112 The local authority sought a declaration from the court to determine ‘what 
treatment should be given in the best interests of C if, as sooner or later was inevitable, 
she suffered some infection or illness over and above the handicaps from which she 
was already suffering’.113
The medical practitioner responsible for the care of the neonate recommended that the 
objective of treatment should be to ease her suffering and pain rather than to prolong 
her life. For such an objective to be met, medical practitioners stated it was 
unnecessary to provide antibiotics, intravenous infusions or nasogastric feeding 
mechanisms. 
Interestingly, in the Court of Appeal judgment, Lord Donaldson MR was required to 
clarify what he referred to as a ‘misleading phrase’ in Justice Ward’s initial judgment.
In the first instance, in concluding that the hospital authority could lawfully withhold 
further treatment, Justice Ward had stated, ‘I direct that leave be given to the hospital 
authorities to treat the ward to die, to die with the greatest dignity and the least of pain, 
suffering and distress’.114
111 Re C (a minor) (wardship: medical treatment) [1989] 2 ALL ER 782. 
112 Ibid 783.
113 Ibid 784.
114 Ibid 787. 
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 Referring to Justice Ward’s initial ‘failure to express himself with his usual felicity’,115
Lord Donaldson MR was quick to ‘revise’ the sentence in the judgment to: ‘I direct 
that leave be given to the hospital authorities to treat the ward in such a way that she 
may end her life and die peacefully with the greatest dignity and the least of pain, 
suffering and distress’.116 This illustrates a rare occasion in which the court was 
originally overly frank in its judgment. However, the higher court was quick to turn 
the statement in question away from anything bordering the controversial. 
As noted already in this chapter, judges do make decisions to allow the lawful 
withdrawing or withholding of life-sustaining treatment leading to inevitable death.
While this is arguably euthanasia by another name, it is masked in terms such as best 
interests or futile treatment. This highlights the contention of this thesis: that there is a
need for an objective, transparent and tangible approach to end-of-life decision making 
for incapacitated neonates. As will be further evidenced below, given that decisions to 
allow life-sustaining treatment to be lawfully withdrawn or withheld have such 
absolute consequences, the best-interests test should be informed by clear criteria,
rather than continuing the arbitrary manner in which decisions are currently made. 
One of the leading cases of the early 1990s was Re J (a minor) (wardship: medical 
treatment).117 This case illustrates the preparedness of courts to equate best interests
with probable death. In this case, Baby J was born prematurely at 27 weeks’ gestation,
and due to a shortage of oxygen and impaired blood supply, received severe brain 
damage. The neonate subsequently suffered recurring convulsions and periods during 
115 Ibid. 
116 Ibid. 
117 Re J (a minor) (wardship: medical treatment) [1990] 3 All ER 930.
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 which he stopped breathing, and on various occasions, the neonate was placed on 
ventilation. However, the neonate was diagnosed as neither dying nor near the point 
of death; although the prognosis was made that the neonate would develop spastic 
quadriplegia.
The medical practitioners sought the approval of the court to pursue the course of 
action that, in the event the neonate suffered another collapse and stopped breathing, 
a mechanical ventilator should not aid him. Again, the courts agreed with the doctors
declaring that it would be lawful for doctors not to provide mechanical ventilation that 
was ‘intrusive and painful and palliative care could be offered.118 The decision in Re 
J is important and influential to later decisions in that, although Baby J would never 
lead a ‘normal’ life in the sense of seeing and hearing, the baby was neither dying nor 
likely to die if given the appropriate medical treatment and support. 
In the Court of Appeal, Lord Donaldson MR discussed the likely prognosis:
…It is debatable whether he will ever be able to sit up or to hold his head upright. J appears to be 
blind, although there is a possibility that some degree of sight may return. He is likely to be deaf. 
He may be able to make sounds which reflect his mood, but he is unlikely ever to be able to speak, 
even to the extent of saying ‘Mum’ or ‘Dad.’ It is highly unlikely that he will develop even limited 
intellectual abilities. Most unfortunately of all, there is a likelihood that he will be able to feel pain 
to the same extent as a normal baby, because pain is a very basic response. It is possible that he 
may achieve the ability to smile and to cry.119
118 Skene, above n 26, 351.
119 Re J (a minor) (wardship: medical treatment) [1990] 3 All ER 930, 933.
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 Balcombe LJ explained the medical procedures that the neonate would be subjected 
to:
He would have to be fed by a nasogastric tube or intravenously; the latter method would probably 
be the safer. Drips have to be re-sited from time to time. Constant blood sampling is necessary to 
ensure that the oxygen levels are neither too high nor too low. External cardiac massage may be 
necessary with the injection of drugs directly into the heart. There are no half measures to intensive 
support and the evidence was that there is a risk that these procedures may cause significant 
distress to J. who is thought to feel pinpricks and other forms of pain.120
The fact that the neonate was not dying but that he would be subject to invasive 
medical treatments and, more importantly, would suffer pain, created a greater 
dilemma for the judges in the appeal court. The prognosis and decision by the court to
allow the lawful withdrawal of future ventilation provides a clear illustration of the 
dilution of the sanctity of life principle. Although the judges were reluctant to declare 
overtly that the principle was redundant, this was evident in the significant
contradictions by their honours in the case. 
Lord Donaldson MR referred to an established point of law when he stated, ‘we know 
that the instinct and desire for survival is very strong. We all believe in and assert the 
sanctity of human life’.121 Taylor LJ also acknowledged the doctrine of the sanctity of 
life: ‘the court’s high respect for the sanctity of human life imposes a strong 
presumption in favour of taking all steps capable of preserving it, save in exceptional 
circumstances’.122 Further:
120 Ibid 940.
121 Ibid 938.
122 Ibid at 943.
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 As a corollary to the second principle, it cannot be too strongly emphasised that the court never 
sanctions steps to terminate life. That would be unlawful. There is no question of approving, even 
in a case of the most horrendous disability, a course aimed at terminating life or accelerating 
death.123
It would appear that Taylor LJ had firmly accepted the fundamental stance of the law 
concerning life and death issues, and may have opposed the decision to allow the child 
to die in any future instances of breathing difficulties. However, he then progressed, 
‘the court is concerned only with the circumstances in which steps should not be taken 
to prolong life’.124
This is a considerable volte-face from his previous acknowledgment of the doctrine of 
the sanctity of life, made within the same paragraph of his judgment. That such a 
cardinal principle or ideal can be defeated based on such a fine distinction as the 
difference between accelerating death and not prolonging life demonstrates a lack of 
real commitment to it in the first place.125
It is apparent from the judgments in Re J that each of the judges in turn attempted to 
justify the prevention of further ventilation based on the child’s future quality of life.
The judges in Re J adopted a patently paternalistic approach, by providing that the 
prevention of further treatment would provide some form of ‘salvation’ for the child 
123 Ibid.
124 Ibid. 
125 Several commentators have considered the distinction between not prolonging life and accelerating death as a ‘legal fiction’. 
See, generally, Len Doyal, ‘Dignity in Dying Should Include the Legalization of Non-Voluntary Euthanasia’ (2006) 1(2) Journal 
of Clinical Ethics 65–67; John Finnis, ‘Euthanasia, Morality, and Law’ (1997) (31) Loyola Los Angeles Law Review 1123–1145. 
For further discussion of the illusory nature of the acts and omissions doctrine, see Amarasekara and Bagaric, above n 6. 
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 from a life that the judges and medical practitioners considered ‘intolerable’. The 
courts found it necessary to employ such benevolent terms to mask the reality that best 
interests overwhelmingly equates to death. Where the withdrawal or withholding of 
life-sustaining treatment is in the best interests of a critically ill neonate or young 
infant, such discussion should be guided by greater transparency and based on clearer 
criteria. 
Taylor LJ’s statement is illustrative of this benevolence:
Despite the court’s inability to compare a life afflicted by the most severe disability with death, 
the unknown, I am of the view that there must be extreme cases in which the court is entitled to 
say: The life which this treatment would prolong would be so cruel as to be intolerable.126
In Re J, the courts seemingly applied a deemed autonomy role that if Baby J were able 
to express his own free will and patient autonomy, he would have reached the same 
decision as the judges and medical practitioners.
Further, Taylor LJ asserted:
At what point in the scale of disability and suffering ought the court to hold that the best interests 
of the child do not require further endurance to be imposed by positive treatment to prolong its 
life? I consider the correct approach is for the court to judge the quality of life the child would 
have to endure if given the treatment and decide whether in all the circumstances such a life would 
be so afflicted as to be intolerable to that child. I say ‘to that child’ because the test should not be 
126 Re J (a minor) (wardship: medical treatment) [1990] 3 All ER 930, 944.    
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 whether the life would be tolerable to the decider. The test must be whether the child in question, 
if capable of exercising sound judgement, would consider the life tolerable.127
The Court of Appeal judgment illustrates a position of deemed autonomy taken by the 
judges:
…where a ward of court suffered from physical disabilities so grave that from his point of view 
be so intolerable if he were to continue living that he would choose to die if he were in a position 
to make a sound judgement, the court could direct that treatment without which death would ensue 
from natural causes need not be given to the ward to prolong his life, even though he was neither 
on the point nor dying.128
Thus, the judges in the appeal court rejected the outright primacy of sanctity of life in 
favour of appreciating the ‘quality’ of life that the incapacitated neonate would be 
subject to, to establish what would be in his best interests.
However, there is no reference within the judgments in Re J of how the ‘quality’ of a 
handicapped neonate’s life is to be measured. There is a strong presumption in favour 
of withdrawing treatment when the patient’s life will be ‘intolerable’ or considerably 
‘awful’; but a clear lack of precision is evident in defining what should be considered
as a life that lacks substantial ‘quality’.
This provides another example of the ineffectiveness of the best-interests principle and 
the additional concepts that have been introduced by the courts to allow the lawful 
withdrawal or withholding of life-sustaining treatment. This thesis does not contend 
127 Ibid 945.
128 Ibid 931.
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 that life must be preserved at all costs; however, life and death decisions should be 
made with greater objectivity, transparency and tangibility, rather than continuing to 
be based on subjective and undefined concepts. 
The imprecision and ambiguity evident in the judgments regarding the ‘quality of life’ 
argument is considered by Gostin:
It is difficult to argue with the premise underlying the ‘quality of life’ position, for there must 
come a point for most of us where life is so devoid of meaning and contentment that it is not worth 
living. As a philosophic position, its weakness is that the factors that would justify forsaking 
continued life are seldom, if ever, specified. If one accepts that continued life is not in the infant’s 
interests, then those who make this decision must be clear about the criteria adopted. Yet the basis 
for identifying and measuring those interests under a ‘quality of life’ standard is unclear. 129
Two years later, another case, also named Re J (a minor) (wardship: medical 
treatment),130 went before the courts. The second Re J case concerned a 16-month-old 
infant who, because of a fall, had sustained severe brain damage and was left mentally 
and physically handicapped. He suffered severe cerebral palsy, epilepsy (43 epileptic 
attacks lasting between 10 minutes to 2.5 hours)131 and had to be predominantly fed 
through a nasogastric tube. His life expectancy was considered short and uncertain. In 
light of this, the treating doctor was of the medical opinion that ‘it would not be 
medically appropriate to intervene with intensive therapeutic measures such as 
artificial ventilation if [J] were to suffer a life threatening event’.132
129 Larry Gostin, ‘A Moment in Human Development: Legal Protection, Ethical Standards and Social Policy on the Selective 
Non-Treatment of Handicapped Neonates’ (1985) 11 American Journal of Law and Medicine 31, 40.
130 Re J (a minor) (wardship: medical treatment) [1992] 4 ALL ER 614.
131 Ibid 617.
132 Ibid 615. 
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 Lord Donaldson MR reaffirmed his position in the earlier Re J case of 1990, stating
that ‘no one can dictate the treatment to be given to the child, neither courts, parents 
nor doctors. There are checks and balances’.133 This stands in contrast to Justice 
Balcombe’s statement in the same judgment, which unquestioningly accepted the right 
of the medical fraternity to make such decisions:
…I can conceive of no situation where it would be a proper exercise of the jurisdiction to make 
such an order as was made in the present case: that is to order a doctor, whether directly or 
indirectly, to treat a child in a manner contrary to his or her clinical judgement.134
Finally, Leggatt LJ concluded his judgment by stating that ‘the court has not given to 
doctors any right that they did not previously have: it merely declined to deprive them 
of a power which it is for them alone to exercise’.135 This contradicts the view of Lord 
Donaldson MR, and many individuals may have grave concerns that, according to 
Leggatt LJ, it is a doctor’s ‘right’ and ‘power’ to make life and death decisions.
As a final important note from this judgment, Balcombe LJ openly emphasised the 
importance of resource allocation,136 which is rarely discussed by judges. Lord 
Balcombe stated:
I would also stress the absolute undesirability of the court making an order which may have the 
effect of compelling a doctor or health authority to make available scarce resources (both human 
133 Ibid 623.
134 Ibid 625.
135 Ibid 626.
136 Discussed in greater detail in Chapter Five of this thesis. 
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 and material) to a particular child, without knowing whether or not there are other patients to whom 
those resources might more advantageously be devoted.137
The statement above supports the contention of this thesis: that there is a need for a 
greater objectivity and transparency in decision making for incapacitated neonates and 
young infants. This can be facilitated by the allocation of limited health resources as 
the cardinal factor in decisions to withdraw or withhold life-sustaining treatment from 
extremely premature and severely impaired neonates.138
The final case examined in this section is Re C (a minor)139, which concerned a 16-
month-old infant suffering from spinal muscular atrophy and placed on ventilation to 
support her breathing. Her doctor concluded that it would not be in her best interests 
to continue indefinite ventilation, and that, as it was highly probable that the infant
would suffer a further respiratory relapse, it would not be in her best interests to be re-
ventilated. The hospital sought a declaration to withdraw ventilation. The infant’s 
parents were prepared to allow the withdrawal of ventilation to see whether their infant
could breathe independently. However, they wished the ventilation to be reinstated in 
the event of further breathing difficulties. The declaration was granted. Sir Stephen 
Brown concluded:
I believe that in this case I should assent to the course, which is proposed by the Hospital Trust. I 
do so with a feeling of grave solemnity because I realise that the parents themselves will be greatly 
disappointed. It is a sad feature of this matter that there is, in fact, no hope for C, and what has to 
137 Re J (a minor) (wardship: medical treatment) [1992] 4 ALL ER 625.
138 This thesis argues that limited health resources are a factor in decision making in healthcare, but should be discussed more 
openly. This issue is taken up in greater detail in Chapter Five of this thesis. 
139 Re C (a minor) (1997) 40 BMLR 31 (Fam Div). 
66
 
                                                          
 be considered is her best interests to prevent her from suffering as would be inevitable if this course 
were not to be taken.140
From the case law examined so far, it can be concluded that the courts consider the 
withdrawal or withholding of life-sustaining treatment to be in the best interests of 
premature, imperilled neonates or young infants. In the second Re J case and Re C, the 
courts determined that medical practitioners could not be compelled to treat a neonate 
or young infant, whether by the court in the exercise of its wardship jurisdiction, or by 
the parents. Further, the decision as to whether to provide medical treatment is
dependent on the judgment of medical practitioners in accordance with their 
profession.141
The decisions in both Re J and Re C established the strong judicial belief in medical 
practitioners’ autonomy to decide the best interests of an incapacitated neonate. 
Montgomery correctly asserts that ‘important moral judgements are being clothed with 
the mystique of professional expertise and appropriated by medicine from their proper 
place as social and political problems’.142 Seemingly, end-of-life decisions that equate 
to certain death founded on the best-interests principle are not publicly expressed as 
such, and should instead be understood as judicial reasoning cloaked by clinical 
opinion.
140 Ibid 38.
141 Richard S Harper, Medical Treatment and the Law: The Protection of Adults and Minors in the Family Division (Jordan 
Publishing, 1999) 19.
142 Anne Morris, ‘Selective Treatment of Irreversibly Impaired Infants: Decision Making at the Threshold’ 2009 17(3) Medical 
Law Review 347, 353. 
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 The next section of this chapter continues the critique of case law and its application 
of the best-interests principle and the introduction of further concepts applied by the 
courts to allow for the lawful withdrawal or withholding of life-sustaining treatment 
from incapacitated neonates or young infants. The cases examined below once again
illustrate that the outcomes of legal decisions are nearly always consistent with the 
opinion of medical practitioners.
IX: The turn of the millennium: Re A (Conjoined Twins)
At the turn of the millennium, the case of Re A (children) (conjoined twins: surgical 
separation)143 made news around the world. It concerned conjoined twins, Mary and 
Jodie, joined at the lower abdomen. It was predicted that Jodie’s circulatory system 
would collapse within a matter of weeks under the strain of supporting herself and 
Mary.
In light of medical testimony, the High Court ordered the twins to be separated against 
the wishes of their devout Catholic parents and the Archbishop of Westminster, 
Cormac Murphy-O’Connor. Mary and Jodie’s parents believed that the twins were a 
gift from God, and that their fate and best interests should remain in God’s hands. 
However, religion or morals were given no consideration when the matter went before 
Ward LJ, who stated that ‘this court is a court of law, not of morals, and our task has 
been to find, and our duty is then to apply, the relevant principles of law to the situation 
before us, a situation which is quite unique’.144
143 Re A (children) (conjoined twins: surgical separation) [2000] 4 ALL ER 961.
144 Ibid 969.
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 Bound under Section 1 (1) Children’s Act 1989, which provides that the ‘welfare of 
the child shall be the court’s paramount consideration’, in addition to the competing 
best interests of the twins, the court’s task was undoubtedly complex.
The court acknowledged that, if it acted in the best interests of Mary, then Jodie would 
also die after an estimated six months. If the court acted in the best interests of Jodie,
then Mary would die immediately. After much deliberation and legal debate the Court 
of Appeal authorised the separation of the twins. Ward LJ discussed the competing 
interests of the twins stating:
The reality here—harsh as it is to state it, and unnatural as it is that it should be happening—is that 
Mary is killing Jodie. That is the effect of the incontrovertible medical evidence and it is common 
ground in the case. Mary uses Jodie’s heart and lungs to receive and use Jodie’s oxygenated blood. 
This will cause Jodie’s heart to fail and cause Jodie’s death as surely as a slow drip of poison. How 
can it be just that Jodie should be required to tolerate that state of affairs? 145
Referring to Keown’s assertion about the sanctity of life, Ward LJ emphasised that 
‘human life is created in the image of God and therefore possessed of an intrinsic 
dignity, which entitled it to be protected from unjust attack’.146 However, he then 
concluded:
Mary may have a right to life, but she has little right to be alive. She is alive because and only 
because, to put it bluntly, but nonetheless accurately, she sucks the lifeblood of Jodie and she sucks 
the lifeblood out of Jodie. She will survive only so long as Jodie survives. Jodie will not survive 
145 Ibid 1016.
146 Ibid 999.
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 long because constitutionally she will not be able to cope. Mary’s parasitic living will be the cause 
of Jodie’s ceasing to live.147
Ward LJ considered that ‘the sanctity of life doctrine does, however acknowledge that 
it may be proper to withdraw or withhold treatment … the question is whether 
treatment is worthwhile not the patient’s life’.148 Here, the judge attempted the 
impossible, to marry the sanctity of life principle and the concept of futile treatment.
As discussed earlier in this chapter, the religious and philosophical underpinnings of 
the sanctity of life principle are that all life is sacred; decisions to withdraw or withhold 
futile treatment, even when a neonate is not dying, do not protect or save all life. 
Ward LJ continued by applying the ‘substituted judgement’ approach that was rejected 
in Bland: ‘if Jodie could speak, she would surely protest, “Stop it, Mary, you’re killing 
me”. Mary would have no answer to that’.149
The Court of Appeal concluded that it would be in the best interests of the twins to 
give Jodie a chance of survival, even at the cost of another life. Ward LJ attempted to 
justify the separation as a form of self-defence: ‘the reality here, harsh as it is to state 
it and unnatural as it is that it should be happening, is that Mary is killing Jodie.150
Justice Ward also made reference to the American term ‘unjust aggressor’, in which 
he drew an analogy to a six-year-old boy on a shooting spree in a school playground. 
Although in law that six-year-old is innocent, it is lawful to kill that child in self-
147 Ibid 1010.
148 Ibid 1000.
149 Ibid. 
150 Ibid 1016.
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 defence.151 However, in arguing that the same situation applied in this case, Justice 
Ward was incorrect. Mary was not deliberately trying to harm Jodie, and the harm that 
Jodie suffered was through no choice of Mary’s. Both twins were ‘harmed’ by genetic 
malformation, a sad state that neither of them had chosen. 
In this case, the Court of Appeal again demonstrated reverence to the medical 
profession, and Ward LJ appeared to confer a quasi-judicial role upon them:
Faced as they are with an apparently irreconcilable conflict, the doctors should be in no different 
position from that in which the court itself was placed in the performance of its duty to give 
paramount consideration to the welfare of each child. The doctors must be given the same freedom 
of choice as the court has given itself and the doctors must make the choice along the same lines 
as the court has done.152
Their lordships referred to texts including Aristotle and Cicero,153 to justify in law 
killing one twin to allow the other to live. However, these texts did not supply the 
answer; instead, the judgment in Bland was used, in which the House of Lords found 
the doctor’s withholding or withdrawing of treatment lawful in cases of certain death.
As considered earlier in this chapter, a person who omits to act is said to let the patient 
die of a pre-existing illness or injury, whereas a person who acts is deemed to have 
killed the patient. In Bland, life-sustaining treatment in the form of artificial nutrition 
and hydration was withdrawn, and the doctor’s conduct was held to be an omission. 
The judgments by Lord Browne-Wilkinson and Lord Mustill highlighted that both 
151 Ibid 1017.
152 Ibid 1016.
153 Ibid 1041.
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 judges doubted the morally and intellectually dubious distinction between acts and 
omissions. The decision in Bland was significant as far as accepting as lawful conduct 
with an aim or objective resulting in death. In so doing, the House of Lords shifted the 
boundary between what is and what is not murder.
By contrast, the Court of Appeal in Re A (children) (conjoined twins: surgical 
separation) cannot be accused of hiding behind the act or omission, killing or letting 
die dichotomy. The judges acknowledged that any procedure to separate the twins 
would be a positive act, leaving the judges in a quandary as to how the treating doctors 
would not be guilty of a charge of murder. Thus, in addition to the terms futility, quality 
of life, intolerability and best interests, the judges introduced legal terms applied in 
criminal and family law to justify killing Mary to keep Jodie alive.
Ward LJ preferred to base his decision on a balancing exercise between Mary’s right 
to life and the breach of duty to save Jodie’s life. Justice Walker sought to distinguish 
Mary’s death as a foreseen consequence as opposed to an intended killing. Further, the 
court resurrected the much-debated doctrine of necessity, to justify the separation in 
law.
Justice Brooke based the justification of the lawfulness of the separation on the 
doctrine of necessity, which has been inapplicable in previous murder cases, and is not 
available as a defence to homicide.154 A striking aspect of this judgment was his 
reference to a quote by Sir James Stephen, who acted as one of the commissioners on 
the Criminal Code Bill 1897, stating:
154 R v Bournewood Community and Mental Health NHS Trust Ex Parte: L [1998] 3 ALL ER 289; Dudley v Stephens (1884) 14 
Q.B.D. 273; R v Howe [1987] 1 AC 417.
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 Compulsion by necessity is one of the curiosities of the law, and so far as I am aware is a subject 
on which the law of England is so vague that, if cases raising the question should ever occur the 
Judges would practically be able to lay down any rule which they considered expedient.155
Primarily, the application of the common law defence of necessity relates to tortious 
or criminal charges, and in extreme situations. In particular where the necessity to kill 
another is the only way to save a life. In this instance, it was applied to the lawful 
separation of conjoined twins that would result in the death of one of them. The next 
section of this chapter considers recent judicial reasoning and case law from the UK.
X: Recent decisions—Scoreboard of benefits and burdens 
The case of An NHS Trust v OT 156 went before the courts in 2009. Baby OT had a rare 
metabolic disorder and suffered brain damage and respiratory problems. His parents 
went to the High Court to prevent doctors from stopping treatment. When this proved 
unsuccessful, the parents appealed against the decision of the doctors and the High 
Court that it was in OT’s best interests for treatment to be stopped. However, Justice 
Ward and Justice Wilson did not overturn the decision. OT’s parents noted: 
155 Re A (children) (conjoined twins: surgical separation) [2000] 4 ALL ER 961, 1036. Some commentators suggest that the 
principle of necessity is a tenable consideration in end of life decision making. Magnusson supports the application of the defence 
of necessity and the principle of double jeopardy in Re A (children) (conjoined twins: surgical separation) and in general palliative 
care. See especially, Roger S Magnusson, ‘The Devil's Choice: Re-Thinking Law, Ethics, and Symptom Relief in Palliative Care’
(2006) 34 (4) Journal of Law, Medicine and Ethics 559-569. See also, Glenys Williams, Intention and Causation in Medical Non-
Killing: The Impact of Criminal Law Concepts on Euthanasia and Assisted Suicide (Routledge-Cavendish, 2006). However there 
are other factors that require consideration when applying the doctrine of necessity to end of life decision making for impaired
neonates. Such factors include community consideration and the allocation limited financial resources and poor health prognosis. 
This is considered in greater detail in R v Cambridge Health Authority; ex p B [1995] 1 WLR 898 – see chapter five. 
156 An NHS Trust v OT [2009] EWCA Civ 409 (14 May 2009).
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 That was the real argument between us and the doctors—they think his life is intolerable and that 
his disability is such that his life has little purpose; but we, along with some of the nurses, believed 
that he experiences pleasure and that he has long periods where he was relaxed and pain free.157
The tensions that arise between medical teams and parents are discussed further in 
Chapter Four of this thesis. However, this case again illustrates the reliance placed on 
medical opinion by the courts. 
Also in 2009, Justice McFarlane in the Royal Courts of Justice was required to 
consider the case of Re: Baby RB (A Child).158 Born on 10 October 2008, RB suffered 
from a rare genetic disorder, congenital myasthenic syndrome. Justice McFarlane 
described RB as:
…profoundly disabled by a defect which prevents the effective transmission of messages from his 
brain and nerves to his muscles. It affects every aspect of his physical life. Apart from being able 
to make small movements of his lower arms and hands, he has little control over his limbs. His 
face is incapable of expression and his eyelids hang low and are not often open. A tube through 
which air passes to his lungs passes through one nostril and a feeding tube in the other nostril. His 
need for breathe [sic] is now such that, unless the machine delivers air one every three seconds, 
his body will go into crisis and decline.159
By the age of 13 months, medical practitioners were of the opinion that ventilation 
should be stopped and that RB should be allowed to die. A doctor caring for Baby RB,
referred to as Doctor F, stated that Baby RB was ‘living on a knife edge’.160
157 ‘Couple’s Distress at Baby Ruling’, BBC News, 21 March 2009 <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/7956450.stm>. 
158 Re: Baby RB (A Child) [2009] EWHC 3269 (Fam) (10 November 2009).
159 Ibid [2].
160 Elizabeth Day, ‘Baby RB: Heartbreak in Court 50 as Life of a One-year-old Hangs in the Balance’, The Guardian (Online), 8 
November 2009 <http://www.guardian.co.uk/society/2009/nov/08/baby-rb-court-case>. 
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 The infant’s parents could not agree as to what was in the child’s best interests. RB’s
mother agreed with medical opinion and supported the application to withdraw 
ventilation from RB. However, the baby’s father believed strongly that a surgical 
procedure should be performed to create space in his airway for him to breathe without 
ventilation and he should be allowed to be cared for at home. The views of Baby RB’s
father were supported by Professor Kirkham, a neurologist at Southampton Hospital,
who considered that ‘a cure’ for Baby RB’s medical condition could possibly be found 
in the ‘foreseeable future’, thus allowing him to operate a mechanical wheelchair in 
later years.161
At the beginning of the hearing, Baby RB’s father set out his extensive knowledge of 
his son’s condition and needs, and had recorded a video showing Baby RB playing 
with a rattle and banging a drum; activities that practitioners had stated RB would not 
be able to enjoy.162
Throughout the hearing, evidence was provided by leading experts regarding RB’s 
condition, future development and treatment options. Justice McFarlane was satisfied 
with the majority medical evidence provided, stating he had ‘total confidence’ that 
both parents and the medical team ‘had done all that they possibly could have to make 
RB’s life as viable, comfortable and enjoyable as it could be’.163 Arguably, the judge 
had already decided it was in RB’s best interests that ventilation be stopped. 
161 Ibid. 
162 Ibid. 
163 Re: Baby RB (A Child) [2009] EWHC 3269 (Fam) (10 November 2009) [8]. 
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 Presumably, with some relief to the court, within a week of the hearing commencing,
RB’s father returned having changed his mind, and agreed that ventilation should be 
discontinued in his son’s best interests.164 Justice McFarlane stated, ‘I suspect that the 
father and I have travelled a similar path down the evidential road and have now 
reached the same conclusion’.165
Again, demonstrating the courts deference to medical opinion, with particular 
gratitude for Professor B’s opinion, and referring to Professor B as an ‘independent 
voice’ discussing the ‘burdens and benefits’ of RB’s life in the future,166 the court 
adopted a scoreboard approach, measuring RB’s life in terms of burdens, benefits, 
futility and worthwhileness.
Thus far, it has been illustrated that, in addition to the nebulous concept of best 
interests, the courts have, over time introduced other subjective and indefinable 
concepts to allow the lawful discontinuation of life-sustaining treatment. Terms such 
as worthwhileness, futility and burdens and benefits of treatment are subjective and 
each stakeholder may measure their importance differently.167
164 Cameron Stewart, ‘Withdrawal of Treatment from a Newborn with Congenital Myasthenic Syndrome’ (2010) 7(1) Journal of 
Bioethical Inquiry 3, 3. 
165 Re: Baby RB (A Child) [2009] EWHC 3269 (Fam) (10 November 2009) [9]. 
166 Ibid. 
167 By way of example, John Keown suggests that the central issue is not whether the patient’s life is ‘worthwhile’, but rather
whether treatment would be ‘worthwhile’. See especially, John Keown, ‘Restoring Moral and Intellectual Shape to the Law after 
Bland’ (1997) 113(3) Law Quarterly Review 481, 481. Further, both Harris and Freeman separately state that the most important 
factor is a ‘worthwhile’ life, and the secondary factor must be whether ‘treatment is worthwhile’ to allow the patient to enjoy a 
particular quality of life. See especially, Michael Freeman, ‘Whose Life is it Anyway?’ (2001) 9 Medical Law Review 259 and 
John Harris, ‘Human Beings, Persons and Conjoined Twins: An Ethical Analysis of the Judgements in Re A’ (2001) 9(3) Medical 
Law Review 221, 225.
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 The deficiencies of this approach are further illustrated in the 2004 case of Portsmouth 
Hospital NHS Trust v Wyatt,168 which made global headlines. The case concerned 
Charlotte Wyatt, and was the first to consider withdrawal or withholding of treatment 
from a minor in an open court, without the anonymity of the parties’ names.169 This 
approach was taken at the request of her parents, who believed that transparency in the 
decision-making process was important. 
Although the transparency was welcomed from a societal and community point of 
view; from a legal viewpoint, the court’s decision to allow doctors to discontinue 
treatment lawfully was not revolutionary. Predictably, the courts placed considerable 
weight and reliance on medical opinion.
Charlotte was born prematurely and suffered considerable disabilities, including poor 
kidney function, difficulty breathing and brain damage. At the time the case went 
before the law, Charlotte was 11 months of age and her chances of survival for another 
12 months were estimated at 5 per cent. The medical opinion of those caring for her 
was that, in the event of respiratory failure, it was not in her best interests to continue 
to survive on mechanical ventilation. 
However, Charlotte’s parents strongly maintained that it was their duty to preserve her 
life and that it was not her time to die. Considering medical opinion and evidence that 
Charlotte experienced pain and possibly little or no pleasure, Justice Hedley concluded 
168 Portsmouth Hospital NHS Trust v Wyatt [2004] EWCA 2247 (Fam) (7 October 2004).
169 In Re C (a minor) (wardship: medical treatment) [1989] 2 ALL ER 782, 783. In this case, Lord Donaldson MR addressed the 
issue of an injunction to protect the parents as well as local and health authorities from harassment because of the sensitive nature 
of the case. 
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 that, in the event that Charlotte needed ‘invasive treatment’ that would be ‘intolerable’, 
the medical team could withhold the use of mechanical ventilation. 
This declaration was made for a six-month period. However, after six months,
Charlotte’s parents returned to the court, contending that she was no longer considered 
terminally ill and that the declaration should be removed. Justice Hedley did not 
remove the declaration and continued to rely on the medical opinion that Charlotte’s 
health had not improved. Justice Hedley boldly began his judgment in the High Court 
stating, ‘on the basis of the unanimous medical evidence in this case, the issue in all 
probability is not whether this baby should live or die but how and when she should 
die.170
Similar to in Re A (Conjoined Twins), in which Ward LJ began his judgment that ‘this 
court is a court of law, not of morals’,171 Justice Hedley began: 
What is the role of the court in all this? Any civilised society must have the means by which 
intractable disputes, whether between the state and the citizen or between citizens themselves are 
to be resolved. That is the purpose of the courts and the system of civil and family justice in this 
country. This kind of dispute is to be resolved by a Judge of the Family Division and whilst the 
judge will be more aware than anyone of his own limitations in deciding as profound an issue as 
this, decision there simply has to be. It may well be that an external decision is in the end a better 
solution than the stark alternatives of medical or parental veto.172
170 Portsmouth Hospital NHS Trust v Wyatt [2004] EWCA 2247 (Fam) (7 October 2004) [1]. 
171 Re A (children) (conjoined twins: surgical separation) [2000] 4 ALL ER 961, 969. 
172 Portsmouth Hospital NHS Trust v Wyatt [2004] EWCA 2247 (Fam) (7 October 2004) [4].
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 However, such profound statements about the authority and impartiality of the courts
could be deemed redundant, given that judges habitually defer to medical opinion to 
reach their final decisions. 
The judge considered the burdens and benefits of treatment, and concluded that three 
things would benefit Charlotte and presumably be in her best interests: comfort and 
little pain, as much time as possible in the presence of her parents, and that she meets 
her end surrounded by the love and affection of those around her.173 After ‘deriving 
considerable assistance’174 from the judgment of Lord Donaldson MR in the first Re J
case of the 1990s, Justice Hedley found:
Helpful though these passages are, it is in my view essential that the concept of ‘intolerable to that 
child’ should not be seen as a gloss on, much less a supplementary test to, best interests. It is a 
valuable guide in the search for best interests in this kind of case.175
Although Justice Hedley found passages from the judgment of Re J to be of some 
benefit, it was not the most relevant authority on the matter of best interests. Instead,
the judgment of Thorpe LJ in Re A (Male Sterilisation)176 concerning an adult male
patient lacking capacity, was preferred:
There can be no doubt in my mind that the evaluation of best interests is akin to a welfare appraisal.
… Pending the enactment of a checklist or other statutory direction it seems to me that the first 
173 Ibid [38]. 
174 Ibid [24]. 
175 Ibid. 
176 Re A (Male Sterilisation) [2000] 1 FLR 549.
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 instance judge with the responsibility to make an evaluation of the best interests of a claimant 
lacking capacity should draw up a balance sheet.177
Interestingly, the ‘balance sheet’ to weigh up the benefits and burdens of treatment 
considered by Thorpe LJ in Re A was endorsed and applied by the Court of Appeal in 
Wyatt. Justice Wall’s concluding comments on the best-interests test are particularly 
pertinent:
In our judgment, the intellectual milestones for the judge in a case such as the present are, 
therefore, simple, although the ultimate decision will frequently be extremely difficult. The judge 
must decide what is in the child's best interests.178
The ‘intellectual milestones’ referred to by Justice Wall are by no means revolutionary.
They are simply an amalgam of key statements made by judges in previous decisions 
to withdraw or withhold life-sustaining treatment. Milestones were considered at 
paragraph 87 of the judgment:
In making that decision, the welfare of the child is paramount, and the judge must look at the 
question from the assumed point of view of the patient (Re J). There is a strong presumption in 
favour of a course of action which will prolong life, but that presumption is not irrebuttable (Re 
J). The term ‘best interests’ encompasses medical, emotional, and all other welfare issues (Re A).
The court must conduct a balancing exercise in which all the relevant factors are weighed (Re J) 
and a helpful way of undertaking this exercise is to draw up a balance sheet (Re A).179
177 Portsmouth Hospital NHS Trust v Wyatt [2004] EWCA 2247 (Fam) (7 October 2004) [26]. 
178 Ibid [87].
179 Ibid.
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 Justice Wall failed to provide any detail or elaboration of the ‘milestones’ in Wyatt.
Arguably, this was a lost opportunity to clarify the vague nature of the best-interests
test and end-of-life decision making for critically ill patients. By expanding on these 
milestones, the best-interests test could have been injected with further structure and 
precision. 
The Wyatt case was followed by Re L (Medical Treatment: Benefit),180 which 
concerned Baby Luke, who was born with Edwards Syndrome, a chromosome 
abnormality that has an average two-month life expectancy. Luke suffered serious 
cardiac problems and had experienced several cardiac arrests that required 
resuscitation. While the doctors caring for Luke believed it to be in his best interests 
not to resuscitate him in the event of another cardiac arrest, his mother disagreed and 
wanted treatment continued. Dame Butler-Sloss ruled in favour of the medical team, 
and Luke died soon after the case was concluded in the High Court. Dame Butler-Sloss 
followed previous authority, stating that the preservation of life is most favourable, 
‘but not where treatment would be futile’.181
Based on the case law considered thus far, it is noted that, in the UK, decisions to 
withhold or withdraw treatment from seriously ill neonates and young infants are often 
based on the court’s deference to medical opinion.
As has been evinced, it is uncommon for a judge to rule against medical opinion.
However, in the case of An NHS Trust v MB,182 Justice Holman held that the 
180 Re L (Medical Treatment: Benefit) [2004] EWHC 2713 (Fam). 
181 Jane Fortin, Children’s Rights and the Developing Law (Cambridge University Press, 3rd ed, 2009) 379.
182 An NHS Trust v MB [2006] EWHC 507 (Fam) (15 March 2006). 
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 discontinuation of medical treatment was not in the infant’s best interests. Born on 25 
August 2004, Baby M appeared ‘normal’. However, at seven weeks, he was diagnosed 
with type 1 spinal muscular atrophy (the most severe) and had since remained 
hospitalised. At the time of the judgment, M was 18 months old. Justice Holman 
described M’s condition as:
…degenerative and progressive, i.e. it can only get worse. It may in some sufferers reach a plateau, 
but it cannot get better. It affects the voluntary muscles (but not the involuntary muscles such as 
those of the heart) which become progressively weaker and may ultimately cease to work at all.183
In addition, M suffered epilepsy, could not breath unassisted and was fed via a 
gastrostomy tube. The medical opinion of his treating doctors was:
…quality of life for M is now so low and that the burdens of living are now so great that it is 
unethical (the word ‘cruel’ has been used) to continue artificially to keep him alive, and that his 
endo-tracheal tube should be withdrawn. By the use of sedatives, he could have a peaceful, pain 
free and dignified death, but he would die almost immediately, probably within a few minutes.184
His parents disagreed and sought support from the courts. His mother asserted that he 
showed marked cognitive function: 
M does indeed show pain or distress by frowns and by tears. She says that he similarly displays 
pleasure to her by his eyebrows going up slightly rather than going down, and she can see the 
merest movement upwards of the side of his lips as if he is trying to smile. She says that his eyes 
fix on her and will follow her until, because he cannot move his head, he cannot see her any more. 
183 Ibid [5].
184 Ibid [10].
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 She says that when his brother and sister are there, which they very frequently are, he shows 
recognition of them and his eyebrows and corner of his mouth will move slightly upwards. If she 
touches his thumb it will move. She is convinced that he sees, hears and takes in certain TV and 
DVD programmes and music on CDs.185
Justice Holman considered the concepts of ‘quality of life’ and ‘burdens and benefits’ 
that have become regular legal discourse. After considering the medical evidence,
Justice Holman decided that M should continue on ventilation, as he demonstrated 
cognitive function and was able to interact and bond with his family.
His Honour disagreed with the treating doctor’s opinion that Baby M’s quality of life 
was ‘so low that the burdens of living are now so great that it is unethical to keep him 
alive’.186 The judge applied a linear approach based on his cognitive abilities:
…M is not unconscious, still less in a permanent vegetative state. He is conscious. He is awake 
most or all of the day, and then sleeps at night. It is probable, and must certainly be assumed, that 
he continues to see and to hear and to feel touch; to have an awareness of his surroundings and in 
particular of the people who are most close to him, his family; and to have the normal thoughts 
and thought processes of a small child of 18 months … But people talk to him and stories are read 
to him; he is shown TV and DVDs and music is played to him on CDs; and it must be assumed 
that he processes all these sights and sounds in his mind like any other child of his age and gains 
pleasure from them.187
The decision in this case represented an important change in tenor to previous 
judgments. However, as illustrated in the case law examined thus far, Justice Hoffman 
185 Ibid [43].
186 Ibid [10].
187 Ibid.
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 failed to critique or examine the effectiveness or efficiency of the best-interests
principle, stating that ‘the law around this topic is now well established and tolerably 
clear.188 Justice Holman ambitiously created ‘ten propositions’, which he believed did 
not require the ‘need for copious reference to authority’.189 These ‘propositions’ were 
largely based on the ‘intellectual milestones’ in Wyatt, which, as noted above, were a 
montage of parts of previous judgments. This case provided the court with another 
opportunity to consider a normative basis upon which the best-interests principle could
have been established but failed to do so. 
Although stating that the law in relation to end-of-life decisions for critically ill 
neonate or young infants was ‘well established and tolerably clear’, Justice Holman 
proceeded to create and discuss additional propositions. The propositions laid down 
by Justice Holman were in no way novel, and merely re-stated legal principles and 
referred to other judgments.190
Nevertheless, some of the propositions merit consideration: proposition four stated that 
withdrawal or withholding of life-sustaining treatment decisions ‘must be decided by 
the application of an objective approach or test’.191 However, this objectivity was
contradicted by proposition five:
Best interests are used in the widest sense and include every kind of consideration capable of 
impacting on the decision. These include, non-exhaustively, medical, emotional, sensory 
(pleasure, pain and suffering) and instinctive (the human instinct to survive) considerations.192
188 Ibid [16].
189 Ibid.
190 See proposition 6–8 at [16].
191 Ibid.
192 Ibid.
84
 
                                                          
 Proposition five is simply a re-phrased version of part of Justice Wall’s vague 
intellectual milestone of ‘medical, emotional, and all other welfare issues’ from the 
Wyatt case.
In conclusion, Justice Holman decided that although not immediately, in the event that 
Baby M required invasive treatment, the doctors did not have to provide resuscitation 
and that Baby M would, therefore, die naturally. It would appear that the judge in this 
case did not allow himself to become embroiled in medical opinion and academic 
debate regarding quality of life issues, as is evident in his closing paragraph:
Every day some parents somewhere, in consultation with doctors, have to make agonising 
decisions about the best interests of children with severe SMA or similar disorders. I hope that this 
judgment and decision will neither deter doctors from commencing ventilation when they consider 
it should be tried; nor lead any parent who has taken or may take, on the advice of doctors, the 
agonising decision not to start, or to discontinue, ventilation, to feel that their decision was 
mistaken.193
The final case to be examined in this section is that of NHS Trust v Baby X and 
others.194 Baby X was born a healthy child in 2011, but later suffered an accident at 
home that led to irreversible brain damage. The treating consultant described Baby X’s
condition as being comatose, showing no interaction with his parents or carers. He did 
not recognise touch, voice or his surroundings. Both the treating physicians and other 
hospital staff concluded that artificial ventilation was no longer in Baby X’s best 
interests. Further, continuing treatment with no signs of improvement was futile. 
193 Ibid [109].
194 NHS Trust v Baby X and others [2012] EWHC 2188 (Fam) (30 July 2012).
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 The case for withdrawal of treatment was heard before Justice Hedley. Both parents 
opposed the medical opinion with which they were presented. They believed that their 
son should be given every possible chance of improvement, and their faith prevented 
them from giving consent to withdraw treatment that would inevitably lead to Baby 
X’s death.
Justice Hedley’s judgment was brief at eight pages. In a forthright fashion, he stated,
‘the question in this case is whether a baby known as X should be removed from a 
ventilator and made the subject only of palliative care’.195
In the judgment, the ‘scoreboard’ approach of burdens and benefits was again 
highlighted. However, this was not considered worthy of any real discussion: ‘given 
the enormity and chronicity of the brain damage suffered in this case, the conventional 
list of burdens and benefits is not very extensive’.196
Justice Hedley suggested that caring and nurturing for their infant was in itself a burden 
upon Baby X’s parents, given that ‘they come from a faith tradition in which the 
obligations of parenthood are clear: they are to give lifelong care to X whatever in fact 
the burden upon them doing so may be’.197
Untypically, the minority medical opinion of Professor Vloeberghs was that greater 
weight should be given to the views and opinions of the parents.198 This was a 
195 Ibid [1]. 
196 Ibid [20].
197 Ibid [16].
198 Ibid [21].
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 considerable change from previous cases considering that, as previously argued, most 
decisions concerning neonatal withdrawal of treatment are substantially guided and 
influenced by medical opinion. The role of medical practitioners and their relationship 
with parents and the judiciary in decision making will be considered in greater detail 
in Chapter Four of this thesis.
However, while Justice Hedley concluded that it would be lawful for the medical team 
to withdraw ventilation and provide palliative care for Baby X, as in previous 
judgments considered above, his honour also stated that ‘in those circumstances issues 
surrounding death must be faced now in a way that otherwise would be quite 
unwarranted’.199 This ensures the decision is not considered euthanasia, which the 
English courts fervently avoid.
In concluding this section, the trend of judicial decisions demonstrates that the courts 
place great weight on medical opinion, and justify decisions to allow the lawful 
withdrawal or withholding of life-sustaining treatment by applying nebulous terms 
such as intolerability, futility and a scoreboard of benefits and burdens. The courts 
decide that inevitable death equates with best interests, even in cases in which the 
neonate or young infant is not dying but is severely handicapped due to physical and/or 
mental trauma. This thesis argues that, where such decisions are made, there is a need 
for greater transparency and objectivity; decisions should not continue to be made 
under the guise of a sense of benevolence by applying the ill-defined best-interests
principle. The case law that has been examined thus far has derived from the UK.
Comparatively few cases have required legal or coronial intervention in Australia. 
199 Ibid [26]. 
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 XI: Australian case law concerning incapacitated neonates or young infants
The Australian approach to the withdrawal or withholding of treatment from patients 
is similar to that of the UK and often follows decisions from English cases. However, 
in the first case to be considered, Justice Vincent in the Victorian Supreme Court
affected a radical departure from the line of English legal thought in his dismissal of 
the concept of ‘quality of life’.
Re F: F v F200 concerned a neonate suffering spina bifida. The father sought an 
application from the court, alleging that the neonate was being deprived of food for it 
to starve to death. An order was made that the neonate be fed until a thorough 
examination of the case could take place. Unlike in a majority of cases, no medical 
evidence was brought before the court, nor did the hospital attend the hearing. The 
issue before Justice Vincent was the application from the child’s father that the child 
was being denied ‘sustenance’. The judge simply ordered that the ‘hospital take 
reasonable and necessary steps to pursue good medical practice’.201
The order made by Justice Vincent in this case was vague and ambiguous in light of 
there being no medical evidence about the neonate’s prognosis and only the allegation 
that the neonate was being ‘starved’. His honour was extremely cautious not to make 
a decision that could have compounding consequences for any future cases. As such,
Justice Vincent ‘sat on the fence’ somewhat in this case:
200 Re F: F v F (Unreported, Supreme Court of Victoria, Vincent J, 2 July 1986).
201 Ibid 20.
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 …no parent, no doctor, no court, has any power to determine that the life of any child, however 
disabled that child may be, will be deliberately taken away from it … [the law] does not permit 
decisions to be made concerning the quality of life, nor does it enable any assessment to be made 
as to the value of any human being.202
Justice Vincent’s decision and judgment in this case is strikingly different from that of 
his colleagues in the UK some five years earlier. For example, in Re B,203 Lord 
Templeman found:
…at the end of the day it devolves on this court in this particular instance to decide whether the 
life of the child is demonstrably going to be so awful that in effect the child must be condemned 
to die, or whether the life of this child is still so imponderable that it would be wrong for her to be 
condemned to die.204
Returning to Justice Vincent’s statement, it is questionable as to who has the ‘power’ 
to make such decisions, if not the law, parents or doctors. Ultimately, his honour 
ordered the medical team to ‘take necessary and reasonable steps’ and to ‘pursue good 
medical practice’, which could include ensuring that a patient does not suffer pain or 
discomfort, by means of withdrawal or withholding of treatment. 
Some years later, the case of Baby M in Victoria was considered in a coronial 
inquest.205 In this example, the medical team worked in conjunction with the parents 
of a severely ill neonate. Some of the facts of this case, and the situation in which the 
202 Ibid 9.
203 Re B (a minor) (wardship: medical treatment) [1990] 3 All ER 927. 
204 Ibid 929.
205 Baby M (Victorian State Coroner’s Office, Record of Investigation into Death, Case No 3149/89, 29 October 1991) VIC.
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 doctors and the parents of Baby M found themselves, mirror the 1981 English case of 
R v Arthur. In the case of Baby M, recently identified as being named Allison,206 the 
neonate was born on 14 July 1989 with serious abnormalities, including wasting of the 
muscles, inability to walk, incontinence and no sexual function.207
Allison’s parents were devout Catholics who sought regular advice from Roman 
Catholic spiritual advisors. However, they agreed with the opinion of the medical team 
that invasive treatment or surgery should not be administered. Baby M was given pain 
relief and an open crib, dying some 12 days after the decision was made. Baby M’s
great aunt informed a right to life organisation of this matter, who then informed the 
police. It was alleged that the doctors, in conjunction with Baby M’s parents, had 
decided to allow her to die due to her quality of life being considered so poor that it 
was not worthy of preservation.208
The central issue considered by the doctors and the coroner in this case surrounded 
Baby M’s quality of life. Where the pattern in English case law has insisted upon giving 
the utmost regard and preference to medical opinion, it would seem that in this case,
the coroner, Wendy Wilmoth, took on the role of an impartial adjudicator. Albeit in 
contradiction to Lord Donaldson’s judgment in the first Re J case and, it would seem, 
outside the remit of her duties as coroner, she stated:
206 Kate Hagan, ‘Doctors Tread Ethical Minefield, 21 Years On’, The Age (Victoria), 14 August 2010, 4. 
207 Helga Kuhse, ‘A Report from Australia: Quality of Life and the Death of Baby M’ (1992) 6(3) Bioethics 233, 234.
208 Ibid 235.
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 This gives recognition to the role of quality of life considerations, and recognises the lack of 
absolutes in life, whilst still upholding principle … that no parent or court can judge the quality of 
a person’s life to be so low as not to be deserving of continuance.209
The two treating doctors in this case, Drs Loughman and McDougall, discussed their 
decision to withdraw treatment publically in a newspaper article in 2010.210 Dr 
McDougall reported having ‘wrestled with the decision for years’ and remained 
concerned about the ‘impact on Allison’s family’. However, he felt he had ‘closure at 
last’ after her parents sought a reunion with the doctors in 2008.211
At the time of the coronial report, the treating doctors were provided with considerable 
support and solace by virtue of the final coroner’s report that stated that the decisions 
made by the parties involved were ‘reasonable and appropriate’.212 The coroner found: 
The decisions made by Baby M’s doctors and parents, and the careful steps taken to ensure these 
decisions were legally, ethically and morally sound, have been tested and found entirely reasonable 
and appropriate. The community’s interest is best served by … leaving the decision-making with 
doctors and their respective advisers, conscientiously determining the best course for their 
child.213
Until 2011, no other cases in Australia concerning withdrawal or withholding of 
treatment from critically infants have required legal or coronial intervention. However,
209 Ibid 242.
210 Hagan, above n 206, 4. 
211 Ibid. 
212 Skene, above n 26, 353.
213 Hagan, above n 206, 4.
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 this is not to say that such decisions have not been, and do not continue to be,
considered daily in Australian hospitals.214
Although a significantly smaller number of cases have gone before Australian courts
as compared to in the UK, there is healthy academic debate and an exceptional body 
of literature in the field of end-of-life decision making for incapacitated patients in 
Australia. This is supported by Faunce and Stewart, who correctly assert that ‘the 
discussion about what Australian courts would do has been largely confined to legal 
academia’.215 Willmott, White and Cooper also acknowledge that ‘traditionally, 
decisions in Australia to withhold or withdraw life-sustaining medical treatment have 
not been brought before the courts’.216
There have been a small number of cases since the millennium involving the
withdrawal or withholding of treatment deemed futile concerning incapacitated 
adults.217 An examination of two seminal adult patient cases highlights the application 
of the best-interests principle in Australia. 
In 2000, in Northridge v Central Sydney Area Health Authority,218 the New South 
Wales Supreme Court was required to consider whether life-sustaining treatment 
should be withdrawn or withheld from an adult patient. In this case, the patient had 
214 A possible explanation for this may be the smaller population of individuals in Australia compared to in the UK. 
215 Thomas A Faunce and Cameron Stewart, ‘The Messiha and Schiavo Cases: Third-party Ethical and Legal Interventions in 
Futile Care Disputes’ (2005) 183(5) Medical Journal of Australia 261, 261.
216 Lindy Willmott, Ben White and Donna Cooper, ‘Interveners or Interferers: Intervention in Decisions to Withhold and 
Withdraw Life-Sustaining Medical Treatment’ (2005) 27(4) Sydney Law Review 597, 621. The authors note that there has been a 
‘small but steady stream’ of cases involving incapacitated adult patients. 
217 Also see, Re BWV [2003] VSC 173; Re MC [2003] QGAAT 13; Slaveski v Austin Health [2010] VSC 493 and the New Zealand 
case of Auckland Area Health Board v Attorney General [1993] NZLR 235.
218 Northridge v Central Sydney Area Health Authority (2000) 50 NSWLR 549.
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 suffered brain damage as a result of a cardiac arrest after a heroin overdose. Less than 
a week after his hospital admission, the treating medical team were of the opinion that 
medication and artificial nutrition should be stopped and, in the event of another 
cardiac arrest, that the patient should not be resuscitated. However, the court held that 
the hospital had been ‘premature’ in their decision to withdraw life-sustaining 
treatment.219 This contrast to the English court’s reverence of medical opinion is 
illustrated in the judgment of Justice O’Keefe:
What constitutes appropriate medical treatment in a given case is a medical matter in the first 
instance. However, where there is doubt or serious dispute in this regard the court has the power 
to act to protect he life and welfare of the unconscious patient.220
Some years later, in 2004, the case of Messiha v South East Health 221 provided another 
opportunity for an informative Australian discussion on futile treatment issues. The 
New South Wales Supreme Court was required to decide whether treatment could 
lawfully be withdrawn from Mr Messiha, as his medical practitioners were of the 
opinion that it was no longer in his best interests.
Mr Messiha, aged 75, suffered a cardiac arrest at his home and was deprived of oxygen 
for some 25 minutes while waiting for the ambulance services to arrive. As a result, 
he fell into a deep coma, resulting in him becoming brain damaged and needing to be
fed via a nasogastric tube and requiring mechanical ventilation. The medical opinion 
was that a ‘do not resuscitate’ order should be applied in the event of another cardiac 
219 Ibid 569.
220 Ibid 554.
221 Messiha v South East Health [2004] NSWSC 1061.
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 arrest. However, his family rejected this opinion and ‘believed that the patient had 
spontaneously opened his eyes to voice and demanded that everything possible be 
done’.222
Unlike in Northridge, in this case, Justice Howie concluded that continuation of 
treatment for Mr Messiha, who was in a comatose state, would be burdensome on him. 
The judge held that where expert medical practitioners deemed further treatment to be 
futile, with very little prospect of improvement and a poor quality of life, it would be
in the patient’s best interests to withdraw treatment.
Returning to treatment decisions concerning neonates and young infants in Australia,
within a space of two years following a 20-year hiatus, two cases have reached the 
Australian courts. These recent cases may herald a change in the Australian legal 
landscape, with future cases potentially requiring judicial intervention or sanction.
Although it is too early to predict what decisions and reasoning the Australian courts 
will make in future cases, an examination of the application of the best-interests
principle in Australian cases involving neonates or young infants continues below.
In 2011, the Australian courts were required to consider the case of Baby D (No 2),223
a twin born at 27 weeks in Melbourne. Neither twin was born suffering physical or 
intellectual abnormalities. However, Baby D was the weaker of the two, with her 
sibling making a strong and full recovery and no longer requiring ventilation.
222 Faunce and Stewart, above n 215, 261. 
223 Baby D (No 2) [2011] Fam CA 176. See also, Ian Kerridge, Michael Lowe and Cameron Stewart, Ethics and Law for Health 
Professions (Federation Press, 4th ed, 2013) 602.
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 Baby D continued to have breathing difficulties and, due to the insertion of breathing 
equipment, began to suffer with airway inflammation. Her treating doctors, with the 
use of steroids, removed the tubes, assisting her to breathe. However, her respiratory 
problems remained. Due to a lack of oxygen for a period of 35 minutes during an 
emergency resuscitation, Baby D suffered brain damage. Her brain stem, which 
controls basic function, was undamaged, and she could respond to touch and feel;
however, she also felt pain and distress. Although the tube remained in place to ensure 
her airways were open, she breathed independently and did not require such intensive 
care. After five months in this state, both her doctors and her parents began to consider 
removal of the tube. However, they were uncertain as to the best course of action 
should Baby D suffer similar distress in the future.
With such uncertainty, the medical team referred to the hospital ethics committee to 
consider whether palliative care, in the form of pain relief and sedation, would be more 
appropriate if Baby D suffered respiratory distress in the future. The committee 
believed that the question required legal resolution, and as such directed Baby D’s 
parents to seek advice from the courts. Stewart highlighted that the key issue requiring 
consideration by the courts was whether the parents could consent to the removal of 
the tube and whether such removal and palliative care were in Baby D’s best 
interests.224
Under the Family Court’s jurisdiction, Justice Young considered this issue. He referred 
to the Australian case of Department of Health v J.W.B and S.M.B (Marion’s Case),225
224 Stewart, above n 164, 227, 228.
225 Department of Health v J.W.B and S.M.B (1992) 66 ALJR 300. In Marion’s case the High court were required to consider at 
length the scope of parental responsibilities and the rights of the child. Following the case at the High Court, in the case of Re 
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 which concerned the lawfulness of the non-therapeutic sterilisation of an intellectually 
disabled girl. Here, the High Court considered the role of her parents in making such 
decisions and concluded, ‘parental rights do not extend to permitting a substantial
operation that is unnecessary for the clinical treatment of an illness or condition’.226
Regarding Baby D, Justice Young determined that the decision to extubate fell within 
the remit of parental responsibility and that her parents could lawfully consent to the 
procedure. Unfortunately, Baby D had since died.
Seemingly, the Australian approach to end-of-life decision making for critically 
impaired neonates and young infants remains as unclear as in the UK. This is evinced 
in Justice Young’s judgment in the case of Baby D, which carried a similar sentiment
to that expressed by the UK courts concerning best interests: 
The consensus amongst all of the very experienced and qualified medical practitioners … is that 
any future life for Baby D must, with certainty, be seen to be one that is, at the least, very 
burdensome and futile with no expectation of any enjoyment of life and without sight and any 
meaningful brain capacity.227
Marion (No 2) (1992) 17 Fam LR 336 the Family Court were required to consider the circumstances in which a sterilisation 
could be authorised taking into account what was in the child’s best interests. The two Re Marion highlight to application of the 
best interests principle in Australia in a different construct, with different variables. However for the purposes of this thesis the 
cases do not provide a strong relevance.  See also the Family Law Rules- which define ‘a medical procedure’, further Rule 2.01 
details who can seek a medical procedure application. Rule 4.09 specifies the requirements for expert medical evidence that must 
support an application for a medical procedure.
226 Michael Williams, John Chesterman and Philip Grano, ‘Challenging Australia’s “Closed” Model of Neonatal Care: The Need 
for Reform Following Re Baby D (No 2)’ (2012) 19(4) Journal of Law and Medicine 835, 837. 
227 Baby D (No 2) [2011] Fam CA 176, 215.
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 The final case examined in this section is the recent case of TS & TD v Sydney 
Children’s Hospital (‘Mohammed’s case’).228 Notwithstanding the case of Baby D (No 
2), Mohammed’s case was the first in which the Australian courts had to consider the 
withdrawal or withholding of life-sustaining treatment with a similar gravity to that 
with which the English courts have been tasked over the past three decades. 
Mohammed’s parents sought a court order to compel the hospital to ‘mechanically 
ventilate Mohammed and not to leave him breathing either naturally, or else only with 
oxygen being delivered to him, as at present, by the non-invasive method of CPAP’.229
Mohammed was born in March 2012 with mosaic trisomy 21, commonly known as 
Down syndrome. Shortly after birth, he was also diagnosed with a cardiac defect, 
medically known as Patent Ductus Arteriosus (PDA). At two and a half months of age, 
he was admitted to hospital and, ‘with the exception of two day visits home, and one 
overnight visit’, had not left the hospital since.230 The prognosis for sufferers of PDA, 
which chiefly involves the collection of lactic acid in the body, includes:
…nausea, vomiting, severe breathing problems, and an abnormal heartbeat. The neurological 
problems which are a feature of PDD include delayed intellectual development and delayed 
development of motor skills, such as sitting and walking. Other neurological problems can include 
intellectual disability, seizures, weak muscle tone or hypotonia, poor coordination, and difficulty 
walking. 231
228 TS & TD v Sydney Children’s Hospital (‘Mohammed’s case’) [2012] NSWSC 1609 [11].
229 See further, Kerridge, Lowe and Stewart, above n 223, 602.
230 TS & TD v Sydney Children’s Hospital (‘Mohammed’s case’) [2012] NSWSC 1609 [25]. 
231 Ibid [28]. 
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 Mohammed suffered with profound developmental delay, seizures, blindness, 
deafness and cardiac failure, requiring continuous positive airway pressure. In
addition, he was unable to move, as he had no control over his muscles, and did not 
respond to touch, other than pain.232 Doctors advised against further invasive treatment 
on the basis that the condition was incurable and mechanical ventilation was not in his 
best interests. 233
Justice Garling ruled in favour of the doctors that mechanical ventilation would cause 
pain and discomfort, would provide only temporary benefit and would not alleviate his 
condition. Rather, his best interests were to receive pain relief and palliative care.234
The judge was careful to consider Mohammed’s parents’ views that their son was ‘a 
fighter’.235 His honour went on to say, ‘I entirely accept the genuineness and sincerity 
of the submissions of Mohammed’s parents. I accept that it is their view that 
Mohammed’s best interests are that he be placed on a ventilator’.236
Due to the lack of cases for neonatal end-of-life treatment decisions in Australia, 
Justice Garling sought guidance from the English case of Re C (a minor) (wardship: 
medical treatment) and the first Re J case discussed earlier in this chapter.
Arguably, as the first Australian case of its kind, it provided a timely opportunity for 
the court to explore and critically analyse the effectiveness and arbitrary nature of the 
best-interests principle, seemingly driven by the sentiments of the medical team and
232 Ibid [33–34].
233 Ibid [76].
234 For a discussion on palliative care, see, Ben White and Lindy Willmott, ‘How Should Australia Regulate Voluntary Euthanasia 
and Assisted Suicide?’ (2012) 20(2) Journal of Law and Medicine 410, 414. 
235TS & TD v Sydney Children’s Hospital (‘Mohammed’s case’) [2012] NSWSC [73].
236 Ibid [74].
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 endorsed by the courts. However, Justice Garling took a conservative stance and 
followed the judicial reasoning of the English courts, stating:
Mohammed’s life is to be measured in the short term. He should not be subjected to pain and 
discomfort for the remainder of his life by being placed on mechanical ventilation from which he 
will not be weaned. It is for these reasons that I agree with the expert opinions of Mohammed's 
doctors that it would be better for him to be treated by pain relief and palliative care than by the 
invasive procedure of mechanical ventilation. That is what is in his best interests. This conclusion 
is sufficient to warrant a rejection of the parents’ application.237
Justice Garling, followed the direction of the English courts and relying heavily on
medical opinion, stated:
…it is not the role of the court to interfere in such a professional relationship and to compel action 
by an unwilling participant which would have the consequence of placing that individual in the 
position, in good conscience, of choosing between compliance with a court order and compliance 
with their professional obligations.238
Further, Justice Garling’s reluctance to make a decision contrary to medical advice
was concerning. As he said, ‘regardless of my opinion, I would not have been prepared 
as a matter of discretion to order them to do something with which they did not 
agree’.239 In concluding, Justice Garling stated:
237 Ibid [90–91]
238 Ibid [93]. 
239 Ibid [94]. 
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 …the court’s responsibility is to assess what is in Mohammed’s best interests and not to allow its 
judgment to be swayed by sympathy, and the attractive ease of requiring the medical practitioners 
to provide mechanical ventilation for Mohammed.240
Arguably, it was less confronting for the court to agree with medical opinion, and in 
doing so conform to English precedent, rather than enter into any robust and 
explorative debate concerning the nature and effectiveness of the best-interests
principle. In doing so, the courts again implicitly endorsed that, in principle, best 
interests equates to certain death. This thesis contends that end-of-life decisions for 
extremely premature or very young infants afflicted by severe impairment should be 
discussed with greater transparency, rather than under the guise of best interests, and 
that the efficient allocation of finite resource should be a prime consideration in such 
cases. 
XII: The effectiveness of the best-interests principle 
This chapter has examined case law from the UK and Australia in which the central 
determinant for discontinuation of life-sustaining treatment has been the application 
of the best-interests principle. In addition to the indeterminate best-interests concept,
the courts have introduced additional nebulous terms such as ‘futility’ and ‘a
scoreboard of benefit or burdens of treatment’, without expressly stating that in such 
cases the best interests of the neonate or young infant nearly always equates to death.
In the case of incapacitated premature or critically ill neonates, who are unable to 
express their treatment choices, the courts are asked to act and apply the best-interests 
240 Ibid [96]. 
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 principle—that the courts ‘prime and paramount consideration must be the best 
interests of the child’. 
What is truly in the best interests of the neonate? Any answer to this question would 
be too speculative. Courts seemingly use the term ‘best interests’ to cloak decisions 
that will result in death for the patient. Arguably, the courts apply best interests to 
convey a sense of benevolence and to transform into an honourable act what is 
essentially state-sanctioned taking of a life.
This chapter has highlighted that the best-interests test is not sufficiently definable and 
is ineffective as the central determinant for decisions to withdraw or withhold life-
sustaining treatment from neonates or young infants. The only clarity that applies in 
this area is not doctrinal; rather, it is in the outcome of cases. With an inconsequential 
number of exceptions, the outcome of the best-interests tests is that judges make 
decisions consistent with the weight of medical advice, with this advice being
consistent with that choice that will end life most rapidly of the available options. 
There are no clear answers to the circumstances in which neonates should be permitted 
to die. Analysis of the case law has demonstrated that many important, often 
competing, interests are at stake, with no clear reference point against which these
should be evaluated. This has resulted in the current situation in which determinations 
are clouded in obscure and vague principles.
Judges appear to pay lip service to doctrines such as sanctity of life and parental 
opinion. The emphasis and importance placed on medical advice and opinion allows 
judges to abdicate themselves of any real responsibility for making life and death 
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 decisions by simply legitimising medical practitioner’s conduct. The legal judgments
considered in this chapter highlight the court’s reluctance to enter into informed and 
robust discussion about the withdrawal or withholding of life-sustaining treatment 
from critically ill neonates or young infants. 
XIII: Conclusion
This chapter has highlighted the first of several current subjective and speculative 
practices that are currently central features in decision making for critically premature 
and critically impaired neonates.
The reason that discussion in this area is often so emotive and controversial is that it 
relates to paramount human interests, and the consequences of the decisions are both 
considerable and absolute. The role of moral or legal luck or happenstance in relation 
to outcomes that define the destiny of human beings and the values that underpin a 
society must be limited.241 The unpredictable nature of human experience must 
accommodate for some degree of flexibility. However, even allowing for this, the best-
interests principle is an uncharacteristically vague legal standard, so much so that it 
has been described by one commentator as ‘vacuous’.242
This situation is unsatisfactory for a number of reasons that extend beyond the well-
known rule of legal virtues that require the law to be knowable and clear.243 This thesis 
241 For further examination of the concept of moral luck, see, Thomas Nagel, Mortal Questions (Cambridge University Press, 
1979). 
242 Natasha Cica, ‘Sterilising the Intellectually Disabled: The Approach of the High Court of Australia in Department of Health v 
J.W.B. and S.M.B’ (1993) 1(3) Medical Law Review 186. 
243 Joseph Raz, The Authority of Law (Oxford University Press, 1979) 211, 214–216. See also, Joel Finnis, Natural Law and 
Natural Rights (Oxford University Press, 1980) 270–276.
102
 
                                                          
 contends that matters of significant importance, of which life and death is of the 
highest importance, should be governed with a greater degree of objectivity, 
transparency and tangibility. If the best-interests test is to be preserved, it should be 
informed by clearer criteria. A wholesale re-evaluation is required. The criteria, if they 
are to be established, need to be developed and debated by a body with a popular 
mandate to do so; that is, Parliament. 
The next chapter of this thesis examines the second subjective and speculative factor 
currently being considered in end-of-life decisions for premature and critically 
impaired neonates—the role, effectiveness and utilisation of clinical guidelines 
available to medical practitioners in the hospital setting.244
244 See, James Tibballs ‘The Legal Basis for Ethical Withholding and Withdrawing of Life Sustaining Medical Treatment in 
Children’ (2006) 14(2) Journal of Law and Medicine 244, 244. 
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 CHAPTER THREE: DO CLINICAL GUIDELINES PROVIDE 
CONSISTENCY AND UNIFORMITY TO DECISIONS TO END-
OF-LIFE DECSION MAKING?
I: Summary
Chapter Two examined the best-interests principle as applied by the English and 
Australian courts in deciding whether treatment should lawfully be withheld or 
withdrawn from critically ill neonates or young infants. An analysis of the relevant 
case law and judicial reasoning over the past three decades was presented, highlighting 
the imprecision of the best-interests principle and its inherent subjectivity when 
applied to end-of-life decision making. 
Chapter Two highlighted that the courts place excessive weight on medical opinion, 
often against parents’ wishes. In addition, courts were found to have developed and 
adopted additional terms to the principle of best interests to allow the lawful 
withdrawal or withholding of treatment resulting in death. In light of this, the chapter 
concluded that the current best-interests test is too nebulous and idiosyncratic to 
constitute a coherent assessment, and that there is thus a need for a fundamental 
framework based on objective grounds to assess whether to withdraw or withhold life-
sustaining treatment. 
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 II: Introduction
This chapter examines some of the key clinical guidelines and frameworks drafted by 
a range of bodies that have been used to assist practitioners to make end-of-life 
decisions. The effectiveness and consistency of clinical guidelines as applied in the 
hospital setting are also considered. This chapter begins by discussing the earliest 
possible gestational age at which an extremely premature neonate born alive is likely 
to be resuscitated and provided with life-sustaining treatment. It is important to briefly 
discuss gestational age, as it is of particular importance and relevance in the application 
of clinical guidelines.
III: The threshold of viability
Generally, end-of-life treatment decisions are made within the parameters of the 
hospital setting by doctors in collaboration with parents. As discussed in the previous 
chapter, cases that require legal intervention in the UK and particularly in Australia 
are infrequent.1
It has previously been noted in this thesis that premature birth is not a new 
phenomenon. Moreover, although technological advancement in medical science has 
allowed pre-term neonates to survival outside the womb, many of those that do survive 
do so with severe abnormality or disability.2
1 Particularly in Australia. See especially, Baby D (No 2) [2011] Fam CA 176 and TS & TD v Sydney Children’s Hospital 
(‘Mohammed’s case’) [2012] NSWSC 1609.Associate Professor of Neonatal Medicine, Dr Dominic Wilkinson has discussed a 
threshold framework concerning the withdrawal or withholding of life sustaining treatment. See especially Dominic Wilkinson, 
Death or Disability? The ‘Carmentis Machine’ and decision making for critically ill children (Oxford University Press, 2013).
2 This is discussed in greater detail in Chapters Four and Five of this thesis.
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 Advancements in healthcare have been unable to decrease the number of pre-term 
births, and there has even been an increase in premature births in the UK and Australia 
in the past two decades.3 Contributing factors to premature births in the UK include 
high rates of teenage pregnancy (the highest in Europe)4 and the decision by women 
to delay pregnancy until later in life. Another significant contributor is in-vitro fertility 
treatment (IVF), which can often result in multiple pregnancies and pre-term births as 
a consequence of the implantation of several embryos simultaneously.5
The definition of pre-term birth in its crudest form refers to neonates born before a 
pregnancy has come to full term, between 37–42 weeks. However, the variation in 
development and likelihood of survival outside the womb differs drastically for those 
born between 22 weeks and 26 weeks onwards. At these earlier stages, the uncertainty 
of the chance of any life, or a life with severe disability, is considerably ambiguous for 
medical practitioners.
In its 2006 report, The Nuffield Council on Bioethics (NCOB) discussed the survival 
rates and possible treatment outcomes of babies born at varying gestational ages.6 In 
3 See generally Anna White, ‘Premature Babies: The Pregnant Elephant in the Room is Stress’, The Telegraph (Online), 17 
December 2012 <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/women/womens-life/9748592/Premature-babies-The-pregnant-elephant-in-the-
room-is-stress.html>. For a discussion on the increase of premature birth in Australia see, Tracy et al, ‘Spontaneous Preterm Birth 
of Liveborn Infants in Women at Low Risk in Australia over 10 Years: A Population-Based Study’ (2007) 114(6) BJOG: An 
International Journal of Obstetrics & Gynaecology 731–735.
4 Although the UK has tended to have the highest teenage pregnancy rates in Western Europe, in 2011, the lowest number of 
teenage pregnancies (under the age of 18) were recorded since 1969. See especially, Office for National Statistics, Teenage 
Pregnancies at Lowest Levels Since Records Began (2 April 2013) <http://www.ons.gov.uk/ons/rel/vsob1/conception-statistics--
england-and-wales/2011/sty-conception-estimates-2011.html>. 
5 See generally, Pat Doyle, Valerie Beral and Noreen Maconochie, ‘Preterm Delivery, Low Birthweight and Small-for-gestational-
age in Liveborn Singleton Babies Resulting from In-vitro Fertilization’ (1992) 7(3) Human Reproduction 425–428. 
6 Nuffield Council on Bioethics, Critical Care Decisions in Fetal and Neonatal Medicine: Ethical Issues (Nuffield Council on 
Bioethics, 2006). The report and the work of the Nuffield Council is discussed later in this chapter. 
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 particular, the report considered the likely outcomes of babies born at the ‘borderline 
of viability’—up to and including 25 weeks + 6 days’ gestation.7 Babies born at this 
stage in England account for ‘0.3 per cent of all deliveries, both born alive and 
stillborn, their survival rate is much less than 50 per cent’.8
The Nuffield report, which is discussed later in this chapter, found that babies born in 
the UK at up to 22 weeks + 6 days’ gestation are highly unlikely to survive, or even to 
leave the intensive care unit; thus, resuscitation is usually rejected.9 The chances of 
survival marginally increase when a baby remains in the womb until at least 23 weeks 
+ 6 days. Often, only at this period do doctors begin to consider the possibility of 
providing life-sustaining treatment to extremely premature neonates. The Nuffield 
report asserted that ‘where there is greatest uncertainty about the outcome for an 
individual baby and where the decision on whether treatment is in his or her best 
interests is most difficult to make’.10
From 24–26 weeks’ gestation the chances of survival, albeit with some disability,
improve. Neonates born during this period are admitted, treated and given medical 
support following normal neonatal practice in the UK. Neonates born at 23 weeks pose 
the greatest medical and ethical challenge for doctors, and this situation is emotionally 
confronting for parents.
The next section of this chapter examines the core clinical guidelines and frameworks 
that have been published to assist and reassure doctors that the legally and ethically 
7 Ibid 33 [3.8]. 
8 Ibid 33[3.8]. 
9 Ibid 156 [9.16]. 
10 Ibid 75 [5.16].
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 charged decisions they make concerning neonates are supported by the medical 
profession and the law. 
IV: Clinical guidelines: United Kingdom
In recent years, several sets of clinical guidelines on end-of-life treatment and care 
have been published in the UK. It is arguable that this high rate of activity in the 
production and publication of guidelines is positive and encouraging in ensuring that 
end-of-life decisions are considered in the most appropriate manner. However, on
closer analysis, these guidelines are simply a discretionary tool available to medical 
practitioners to assist them with decisions to begin, withdraw or withholding life-
sustaining treatment from critically ill or extremely premature neonates. 
The proliferation of guidelines and frameworks is perhaps a symptom of the variance 
of thought and treatment approaches in the area of neonatal care. This is reflected in 
the differing measures applied to pregnancy itself. The Confidential Enquiry into 
Maternal and Child Health (CEMACH), published in 2009 in the UK, studied perinatal 
periods internationally. In Australia and New Zealand, the perinatal period begins at 
20 weeks’ gestation; in Canada, it begins at 22 weeks; and in the UK, data is collected 
on fetal losses from 20 weeks’ gestation.11
This thesis contends that end-of-life decisions for premature neonates, particularly 
those born extremely premature, at the edge of viability, should be driven by an 
objective, transparent and tangible criteria. Seemingly, the greater the number of 
11 Confidential Enquiry into Maternal and Child Health, Perinatal Mortality 2007 (CEMACH, 2009) 2.
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 clinical guidelines, frameworks and policies published in the UK and Australia, the 
less clarity, impact and authority any of them will possess. 
V: Royal College of Paediatrics and Child Health: Withholding or withdrawing 
life-sustaining treatment in children: A framework for practice
Following a first edition in 1997, in May 2004, the Royal College of Paediatrics and 
Child Health (RCPCH) published the second edition of their framework in the UK.
The preface of the document notes that the title had been changed from ‘life saving 
treatment to life sustaining treatment to reflect the fact that treatment this is often given 
is not curative but supportive’.12 This statement perhaps indicates the value placed by 
the authors on the philosophical tenets that ‘all life is sacred’ and that ‘life must be 
preserved at all cost’.13
Warrick et al provide a concise summary of the dilemmas faced by doctors when a 
baby is born with severe congenital abnormality or at less than 25 weeks:
1. To institute life saving measures at the extremes of viability, commencing a prolonged 
course of intensive care, with the knowledge that most survivors incur severe and/or 
moderate disability.
2. To provide intensive management for a serious antenatally diagnosed condition, thereby 
delaying death.
3. To withhold life saving measures from the outset and offer palliative care.
12 Royal College of Paediatrics and Child Health, Withholding or Withdrawing Life Sustaining Treatment in Children: A 
Framework for Practice (RCPCH, 2nd ed, 2004) 8.
13 As considered in Chapters One and Two of this thesis. 
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 4. To initiate treatment and withdraw later.14
The RCPCH framework states five situations in which it is both legal and ethical to 
consider termination of life-sustaining treatment:15
1. Brain Dead Child—it is agreed within the profession that treatment in such circumstances 
is futile and the withdrawal of current medical treatment is appropriate.
2. Permanent Vegetative State—following trauma or hypoxia, is reliant on others for all 
care and does not react or relate with the outside world. It may be appropriate to withdraw 
or withhold life sustaining treatment. 
3. No Chance—child has severe disease that life-sustaining treatment simply delays death 
without significant alleviation of suffering: treatment to sustain life is inappropriate.
4. No Purpose—child may be able to survive with treatment; the degree of physical or 
mental impairment will be so great that it is unreasonable to expect them to bear it.
5. Unbearable—the child and/or family feel that in the face of progressive and irreversible 
illness, further treatment is more than can be borne. They wish to have a particular 
treatment withdrawn, or to refuse further treatment irrespective of the medical opinion 
that it may be of some benefit. 
Generally, the first two categories raise little ambiguity.16 However, the final three 
‘situations’ documented above are open-ended and as such can be interpreted 
subjectively and with a significant amount of discretion, as they do not conform to a
bright line rule.17 This view is supported by Morris, who noted the overlap between 
the categories in determining the prognosis of an incapacitated neonate: ‘the blurring 
14 Warrick et al, ‘Guidance for Withdrawal and Withholding of Intensive Care as Part of Neonatal End-Of-Life Care’ (2011) 
98(1) British Medical Bulletin 99, 100. 
15 Royal College of Paediatrics, above n 12, 10–11.
16 Although the Nuffield Report (2006) does raise the issue of the difficulty of diagnosing brain stem death in neonates.
17 For further discussion on the origins and development of the bright line rule, see especially, Edward L Glaeser and Andrei 
Shleifer, ‘Legal Origins’ (2002) 117(4) The Quarterly Journal of Economics 1193–1229. 
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 of “no purpose” and “no chance” raises important questions about the notion of 
“futility” as it is used in a medical—and also in a judicial—context’.18
Tibballs further reinforces this point, asserting the categorisation is ‘somewhat 
misguided and confused’:
Although both the ‘no purpose’ situation and ‘the unbearable’ situation may be the basis for 
withholding or withdrawal of treatment, the ‘no purpose’ situation is also described, confusingly, 
in terms of the child being unreasonably expected to ‘bear the situation.19
Examined in its entirety, the RCPCH framework echoes the voice of the law, and 
although it is a clinical guideline, the document assumes much of the same language 
as would a legal judgment. A considerable section of the framework focuses on legal 
and ethical considerations, including a brief discussion on the unlawfulness of 
euthanasia.20
The burdens and benefits scoreboard discussed in Chapter Two in relation to legal 
judgments is also evident in the framework: ‘there is substantial evidence that it is 
common and accepted practice to withdraw life-sustaining care where parents and 
medical staff believe that the distress incurred by such care outweighs the benefits’.21
18 Anne Morris, ‘Selective Treatment of Irreversibly Impaired Infants: Decision Making at the Threshold’ 2009 17(3) Medical 
Law Review 347, 357.
19 James Tibballs, ‘The Legal Basis for Ethical Withholding and Withdrawing of Life Sustaining Medical Treatment in Children’ 
(2006) 14(2) Journal of Law and Medicine 244, 246.
20 Royal College of Paediatrics, above n 12, 15–21. 
21 Ibid 13.   
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 The framework also sounds a cautionary tone as to the role and involvement of the 
courts in treatment disputes between parents and doctors:
If a doctor wishes to continue treatment of a very ill child, but there is room for reasonable doubt 
about the benefit, the doctor may be in a difficult position if he continues when the parents have 
withheld or withdrawn consent. A court might say that the doctor did not act in the best child’s 
interests.22
The RCPCH framework includes some legislation; for example, the Children Act 1989
and the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child 1989 (which cannot be 
applied by the UK courts), and then summarises the key findings of relevant 
judgments:
1. There is no obligation to give treatment which is futile and burdensome
2. Treatment goals may be changed in the case of children who are dying
3. Feeding and other medical treatment may be withdrawn from patients who are thought to 
be in a state of PVS
4. Treatment may be withdrawn form patients where continued treatment is not in their best 
interests.23
This thesis recognises that guidelines must be broad in nature to ensure some discretion 
for individual circumstances. However, as will be highlighted through this chapter, the 
guidelines are often vague or incoherent that they allow for arbitrary decision making. 
Doyal and Larcher support this view, stating ‘such documents can be criticised as 
22 Ibid 19.
23 Ibid 16–17. 
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 being too general to be useful, stigmatising to some individuals or groups, and striking 
the wrong balance between law and morality’.24
The difficulty of non-prescriptive frameworks is illustrated in the RCPCH’s discussion 
on intolerability. Considered at length in the case of Re J (a minor) (wardship: medical 
treatment),25 the concept was merely touched on in the framework in the statement 
that ‘a severe/intolerable disability is undefinable’.26 The framework suggests:
1. Intolerable may mean ‘that which cannot be borne’ or ‘that which people should not be 
asked to bear’.
2. An individual may believe that he/she is an intolerable burden.
3. An impossibly poor existence may not be recognised by the individual, depending on that 
person’s cognition’.27
Arguably, the RCPCH framework would have been better served by refraining from 
defining what had previously been declared undefinable. The first suggestion merely 
provides a textbook definition of the term intolerable. The second and third 
suggestions are also unhelpful, as most children, and particularly neonates, cannot 
express their wishes, desires or self-awareness. 
24 L Doyal and V F Larcher ‘Drafting Guidelines for the Withholding or Withdrawing of Life Sustaining Treatment in Critically 
Ill Children and Neonates’ (2000) 83(1) Archives of Disease in Childhood: Fetal and Neonatal 60, 60.
25 Re J (a minor) (wardship: medical treatment) [1990] 3 All ER 930. See Chapter Two for case details. 
26 Royal College of Paediatrics, above n 12, 25.     
27 Ibid.
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 The RCPCH framework and other guidelines are aimed at providing doctors with 
reassurance that the decisions they make are both lawful and ‘Bolam-ised’; that is, ‘in 
accordance with a responsible body of medical opinion’.28
The framework is likely to prove reassuring to junior doctors confronting ethically and 
potentially legally charged decisions. This is reflected in the RCPCH framework, 
which holds that juniors should ‘administer life sustaining treatment until senior, more 
experienced doctors take over’.29 McHaffie and Fowlie make the interesting statement
that medical practitioners may find comfort and solace in end-of-life decision making
by receiving ‘reassurance and peace of mind from other competent consultants with 
expert knowledge of neonatology similarly concluding that treatment should be 
withdrawn’.30
The RCPCH framework is only one of many guidelines that have been created and 
published in the UK. An examination of another set of guidelines follows. As will be 
evinced below, there is a considerable amount of overlap between the clinical 
guidelines. That there is a need for several documents to assist medical practitioners 
in end-of-life decision making is questionable. 
VI: British Medical Association: Withholding and withdrawing life-prolonging 
medical treatment: Guidance for decision making
28 Bolam v Friern Hospital Management Committee [1957] 1 WLR 582. The Bolam test is discussed in Chapter Two of this 
thesis. 
29 Royal College of Paediatrics, above n 12, 1. 
30 Hazel E McHaffie and Peter W Fowlie ‘Withdrawing and Withholding Treatment: Comments on New Guidelines’ (1998) 79(1) 
Archives of Disease in Childhood: Fetal and Neonatal 1, 2.
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 The BMA amended and published its third edition of its guidelines in 2007, three years 
after the RCPCH framework. The BMA handbook provides guidance for the 
withdrawal or withholding or life-prolonging treatment. It states its main focus as 
‘decisions to withdraw or withhold life-prolonging treatment from patients who are 
likely to live for weeks, months or possibly years, if treatment is provided but who, 
without treatment, will or may die earlier’.31 The BMA guidance is not exclusive to 
neonates and focuses on:
…the process through which decisions are made to withdraw or withhold life-prolonging treatment 
from all types of patients—adults with capacity, adults lacking capacity, young people with 
capacity and children and young people who lack capacity.32
Although the remit of these guidelines is wide, unlike the RCPCH framework, the 
BMA guidance considers the ‘legal and ethical considerations’ of decision making in 
some depth, citing case law and legal judgments.
Unsurprisingly, the BMA guidance merely reflects the law with regard to the 
withholding or withdrawing of medical treatment, making reference to Bland in stating
that ‘although psychologically it may be easier to withhold treatment than to withdraw 
that which has been started, there are no necessary legal or morally relevant differences 
between the two actions’.33
31 British Medical Association, Withholding and Withdrawing Life-prolonging Medical Treatment: Guidance for Decision 
Making (Blackwell Publishing, 3rd ed, 2007) 1 [1.2].
32 Ibid 2.
33 Ibid 19.
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 Part eight of the guidance considers decision making for children and young people 
who lack capacity, with an emphasis on the role of parents in the decision-making 
process. The guidance again echoes the law, in that although treatment decisions must 
be discussed with parents, parents’ requests for certain treatments do not have to be 
satisfied.34 The section then proceeds with a discussion of the situations in which there 
is a conflict regarding the acceptance or refusal of treatment and care that is deemed 
to be in the child’s best interests.35
Compared to the RCPCH framework, the BMA guidance is set on more of a legal 
footing. The familiar concepts of best interests, futility and the burdens and benefits 
scoreboard introduced in Chapter Two are present in the BMA guidance. The High 
Court judgment in Wyatt is also discussed as a ‘reminder of the difficulty of accurately 
assessing prognosis in seriously ill young children and the importance of keeping 
treatment decisions constantly under review’.36 Additionally, it raises the relationship 
between intolerability and best interests and the balance sheet approach that the courts 
are increasingly applying in decisions to withdraw or withhold treatment. 
The BMA guidance highlighted that, ‘in reaching a judgement about best interests, the 
courts are increasingly using the “balance sheet” approach and this can be a useful 
exercise for health professionals to consider in the event of disagreement’.37 This 
statement suggests that the BMA were considering more than just clinical guidance 
when authoring their document. Rather, they appear to have been intending to provide 
34 Ibid 97 [47.5].
35 Ibid 98 [47.6].
36 Ibid 103 [48.1].
37 Ibid 34 [22.2].
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 doctors with an advance understanding of factors considered by judges when parental–
doctor treatment conflicts end up at the doors of the court. 
In taking such pains to ensure that doctors are legally aware, the BMA are simply 
reflecting current legal approaches to decision making in life or death matters, where 
the courts have actively promoted the legal and ethical transfer of responsibility to the 
medical fraternity. The BMA guidance fails to provide any significant contribution to 
the area of end-of-life decision making, and seemingly provides a ‘reference point’ for 
medical practitioners as to the currency of the law in decisions to withdraw or withhold 
life-sustaining treatment. 
The lack of clarity, consistency and the potential for subjective, discretionary decision 
making is further illustrated by the narrow guidelines produced by the General Medical 
Council (GMG).
VII: General Medical Council: Treatment and care towards the end-of-life: Good 
practice in decision making
The GMG guidelines came into effect on 1 July 2010 in the UK. They are very basic,
such that end-of-care decisions concerning neonates and young children are discussed 
in only two pages. 
The guidelines adopt more regimented language and read more like a set of ‘rules for 
doctors’ as opposed to the legal stance of the BMA guidelines. In this set of guidelines,
the issue of ‘quality of life’ is not discussed in any great detail and any discussion of 
the ethical or moral quandaries in determining quality of life are avoided. They state,
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 ‘you must be careful not to make judgements based on poorly informed or unfounded 
assumptions about the impact of a disability on a child or young person’s quality of 
life’.38
However, the guidelines do define best interests and use the same concepts as the 
courts: ‘decisions about treatment for children and young people must always be in 
their best interests. This means weighing the benefits, burdens and risks of treatment
for the individual child’.39 Further, medical practitioners are advised that if:
…you conclude that, although providing treatment would be likely to prolong life, it would cause 
pain, suffering and other burdens that would outweigh any benefits and you reach a consensus 
with the child’s parents and healthcare team that it would be in the child best interests to withdraw, 
or not start treatment, you may do so.40
The GMC guidelines fail to provide anything new or robust, and they lack substance.
Due to the vague nature of clinical guidelines, there is room for considerable 
subjectivity. Although the guidelines examined thus far do not expressly consider the 
allocation of limited health resources as an important criterion, there is nothing that 
prevents doctors basing their decisions to discontinue treatment on available 
healthcare funds. This thesis contends that allocation of finite healthcare funds should 
be an objective factor in decisions to withdraw or withhold treatment from extremely 
premature, critically impaired neonates. As such, this should be documented in one 
38 General Medical Council, Treatment and Care Towards the End of Life: Good Practice in Decision Making (General Medical 
Council, 2010) 47 [96]. 
39 Ibid 45 [92].
40 Ibid 50 [106].
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‘universal’ set of uniform clinical guidelines that are utilised by all hospitals in the 
UK.
Before considering the final set of guidelines from the UK, it is appropriate to critique 
the EPICure studies. 
VIII: EPICure Studies 
Two ‘population based studies of survival and later health status in extremely 
premature infants’,41 known as the EPICure studies, have been conducted in the UK.
On its website, the team of three neonatal paediatricians describe the aims and scope 
of their work as, ‘the whole point of EPICure … [is that] it allows us to quantify the 
outcomes and shows us where we need to target our care’.42
EPICure Study 1: 1995
The initial study, known as EPICure 1 was conducted between March and December 
1995. Data were collected from all 276 maternity units in the UK and the Republic of 
Northern Ireland.43 The study was exclusively concerned with the births of babies born 
between 20–25 weeks + 6 days’ gestation, recorded by the respective hospitals. A full 
record was generated for those that required neonatal admission after birth. 
41 EPICure, EPICure: Population Based Studies of Survival and Later Health Status in Extremely Premature Infants
<http://www.epicure.ac.uk/>. 
42 Ibid.
43 Kamini Yadav and David Field, ‘The Limit of Viability: Should We Lower It?’ (2011) 100(3) Neonatology 295.
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 The study recorded 4004 births up to 25 weeks + 6 days’ gestation. Of those, 811 were 
admitted to intensive care and 314 survived, to be later discharged to go home. The 
study identified that ‘survival ranged from 2 babies (9% of admissions) at 22 weeks, 
26 babies (20%) at 23 weeks, 100 babies (34%) at 24 weeks, to 186 babies (52%) at 
25 weeks’.44
The results indicate that survival of infants born earlier than 24 weeks was rare. 
Although important, the EPICure team were unable to provide information about end-
of-life decisions to ‘provide active care or whether a decision had been made that the 
risks were too high and the doctors and midwives would simply make the baby 
comfortable after birth and not intervene’.45 Such information was unlikely to be 
provided given the very real risk of criminal proceedings against doctors.46 The 1995 
study was an ambitious ongoing project, monitoring and recording the health status of 
those born and those that survived. Local paediatricians reported at one year of age:
…there were continuing medical problems for a proportion of the children at one year of age, 95 
(31%) of the children had significant problems in areas such as development, neurology and need 
for oxygen. 40 children had two or more of these disabilities.47
The follow-up questionnaire was conducted by local paediatricians at two and a half 
years of age. Of the 314 survivors at birth, six had died after hospital discharge, and 
several others had moved overseas. Further studies were conducted to assess the 
progress and development of those born in 1995 when they reached the age of 5.5–7,
44 EPICure, EpiCure 1995 <http://www.epicure.ac.uk/epicure-1995/>. 
45 EPICure, Survival <http://www.epicure.ac.uk/overview/survival/>.
46 R v Arthur (1981) 12 BMLR 1, see Chapter Two for case details. 
47 EPICure, EPICure at One Year <http://www.epicure.ac.uk/epicure-1995/epicure-at-one-year/>. 
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and again at age 11. However, many families and children were untraceable and many
more had moved overseas. 
The EPICure study was highly publicised as the largest study examining neonates born 
at less than 26 weeks’ gestation. Its findings were reported in several English 
newspapers and medical journals, and exclusive access to interviews with the 
researchers was given to the BBC.48
EPICure Study 2: 2006
The findings of the 1995 EPICure study supported the contention that advancements 
in medical science and technology have improved standards in neonatal care, resulting 
in neonates surviving longer. In 2006, a similar study was conducted to determine 
whether, 10 years on, pre-term neonates were surviving for longer, and whether there 
had been any improvements in the risk of those born premature, consequently suffering 
severe disability. The second EPICure study aimed to:
…tell us how effective advances in Neonatal care have been. It will also tell us more about the 
lung development of very tiny babies. The professional approach of different baby units will also 
be considered. This will build on the knowledge gained through the hard work of the EPICure 
families and study group in the original study.49
48 See especially, K L Costeloe et al, ‘The EPICure Study: Outcomes to Discharge from Hospital for Infants Born at the Threshold 
of Viability’ (2000) 106(4) Pediatrics 659–671. See also, BBC One, Miracle Baby Grows Up (17 September 2004) 
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/programmes/panorama/3655050.stm>. 
49 EPICure, EPICure 2 <http://www.epicure.ac.uk/epicure-2/>. 
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 Data were collected on births throughout England of neonates born between 22 and 26 
weeks + 6 days. The second study also considered mothers and their pregnancies, rather 
than exclusively monitoring the development of neonates born alive and being 
discharged. In addition, microscopic evidence of cord attached to the placenta in the 
womb was examined, to look for inflammation and infection prior to birth.50 The 
extension of the study to include pre-natal health of the neonate and mother is 
supported by this thesis. As will be considered in greater detail in Chapter Five, 
preventative measures against premature birth, by focusing on the health and wellbeing
of mothers, is crucial in reducing extremely premature birth.
The aims and continued focus of the research team are commendable. The task of a 
co-ordinated national effort in data collection and clinical observation in collaboration 
with maternity and intensive care units represented a significantly challenging task. 
This comprehensive view was represented in the results, which reflected the reality of 
pre-term births—while the survival rate of those born between 22 and 26 + 6 days had 
improved by 13 per cent (up from 40 per cent in 1995); of the 152 babies born at 22 
weeks, only three survived.
The findings, published recently in the British Medical Journal, are invaluable and 
provide a stark lesson in the limits of medical science, which, while advancing rapidly,
often cannot totally defy nature.51 As the vice president of the RCPCH, Dr Simon 
50 Ibid. 
51 See generally, Moore et al, ‘The Epicure Studies: Better Survival, Better Outcomes?’ (2011) 96(Suppl 1) Archives of Disease 
in Childhood-Fetal and Neonatal Edition 16.
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 Newell, poignantly said, ‘we can only protect so much from the effects of 
immaturity’.52
This thesis contends that there is a need for greater transparency in end-of-life decision 
making for neonates. Although the results of the EPICure studies highlight a
pessimistic outlook for those born at the edge of viability, the publication of and 
intense media attention surrounding the findings is a positive step towards public 
awareness of the realities that extremely premature neonates and their families face.53
The impact on those surviving with severe disability, for example, is profound, 
affecting the individual, their families and society through the continued financial 
demands involved in satisfying the day-to-day requirements of such individuals.54
Professor Marlow asserts that, ‘as the number of children that survive pre-term birth 
continues to rise, so will the number who experience disability throughout their 
lives’.55 Professor Marlow also highlights that ‘intensive care for small babies is 
expensive, and providing care for children with disabilities as they grow up is also 
expensive, impacting the demand for health, education and social care services.56
52 James Gallagher, Severely Premature Babies: More Survive Being Born Early (5 December 2012) BBC 
<http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/health-20583678>.
53 This is discussed in greater detail in Chapter Four of this thesis. 
54 The allocation of finite health resources is examined in Chapter Five of this thesis. 
55 Dennis Campbell, ‘Premature Babies Study Shows Survival Rates on Rise’ The Guardian (Online), 5 December 2012 
<http://m.guardian.co.uk/society/2012/dec/05/survival-rates-premature-babies-rise>. The cost associated with the upbringing of 
severely disabled neonates and infants is discussed in detail in Chapter Five of this thesis. 
56 Thomas Moore, Premature Babies: Dilemmas Over Care Grows (5 December 2012) Sky News 
<http://news.sky.com/story/1020756/premature-babies-dilemma-over-care-grows>.
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 While the allocation of finite health resources is an uncomfortable topic in regard to 
making life and death decisions, serious discussion in this area is important. It is 
necessary to break the taboo on putting a ‘price’ on life, to have a pragmatic and honest 
debate about these decisions. 
This thesis argues that end-of-life decisions concerning critically ill neonates should 
be made in the most efficient manner, by encouraging public discussion and awareness 
of the rising cost involved in treating those with severe disability due to prematurity. 
A final examination of the clinical guidelines utilised in the UK is provided below. 
IX: British Association of Perinatal Medicine: The management of babies born 
extremely pre-term at less than 26 weeks’ gestation—A framework for clinical 
practice at the time of birth
Published in 2008 with the stipulation that it was not ‘a set of instructions, but a 
framework to highlight the range of evidence and opinion that needs to be considered 
by staff and parents’,57 the British Association of Perinatal Medicine (BAPM) began 
on an encouraging note.
Relying heavily on the statistics following the EPICure studies, the BAPM framework 
provided the following recommendations to assist doctors on end-of-life decision 
making for critically ill neonates:
57 Wilkinson et al, ‘Management of Babies Born Extremely Preterm at Less Than 26 Weeks of Gestation: A Framework for 
Clinical Practice at the Time of Birth’ (2009) 94(1) Archives of Disease in Childhood: Fetal and Neonatal 2.
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 1. Babies born with certain gestational age of less than 23 weeks—in the best interests of 
the baby and standard practice, resuscitation not to be carried out: based on the 1995 
EPICure study only two survived, one suffering severe disability. The 2006 study 
revealed a high occurrence of major morbidity.
2. Babies born with certain gestational age of 23–23 + 6 days—where a fetal heart is heard 
and a professional experienced in resuscitation should be available. However express 
parental express wishes not to resuscitate should be honoured: based on the 1995 EPICure 
study 80% of those born at this gestational age died in hospital. The 2006 study revealed 
the survival rate had not significantly improved.
3. Babies born with certain gestational age of 24–24 + 6 days—resuscitation should be 
commenced unless both parents and practitioners consider that the baby will be severely 
compromised. The critical issue is the baby’s lung and heart response using a mask: based 
on the 1995 EPICure study of those born at this age, given intensive care 66% died. The 
2006 study found survival increased by 12%.
4. Babies born with certain gestational age of 25 weeks or more—survival is greater than of 
those born in 1995, therefore resuscitation is appropriate: base on the 1995 study 48% 
died, but 27% survived with no identifiable impairment at the age of six years. The 2006 
study revealed an increase of 13% in survival from 54% to 67%.
Considered holistically, the BAPM framework does not advance the existing 
discussion about end-of-life decision making for critically impaired neonates in any 
meaningful way. It fails to address concerns that doctors may have in managing the 
expectations and discussions about end-of-life care with parents and families of pre-
term neonates. 
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 The guidelines and frameworks considered thus far can be viewed as often repetitive.
By their very nature, these guidelines carry no significant weight or authority. Doctors 
retain absolute discretion to make decisions without reference to them and, as noted in 
Chapter Two of this thesis, where withdrawal or withholding of treatment 
considerations go before a court of law, judges overwhelmingly support this discretion. 
The next section of this chapter examines some more initiatives and the much-
publicised NCOB 2006 report. 
X: Bliss and the National Institute of Clinical Excellence
The charitable organisation Bliss, which operates throughout England, Wales, 
Scotland and Northern Ireland, aims to provide families of premature babies with 
information and support, rather than to provide clinical guidelines for doctors 
regarding the withdrawal or withholding of treatment.58 The charity works with the 
key stakeholders, parents and doctors, to provide services to assist with the best 
possible care for such infants. Bliss produces information booklets and parent packs 
that address issues from birth through to care after discharge. The booklets include 
information and recommendations from the BAPM, RCPCH and the 2006 Nuffield 
report.
The Bliss website contains information on the care standards and frameworks that have 
been published across the UK. Given the audience, the documents detail the general 
standards that parents should expect from healthcare providers, rather than the clinical 
practices of treatment withdrawal. However, since the wealth of material available 
58 Bliss, About Us < http://www.bliss.org.uk/about-us/>. 
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 through the website is considerable, it does risk further confusing already distressed 
parents.
The National Health Service and Department of Health jointly published their ‘Toolkit 
for High Quality Neonatal Services’ in 2009 with assistance from Bliss. This ‘toolkit’ 
proves eight principles to determine high-quality neonatal care, and aims to provide a 
standardised practice across neonatal care, including staffing for the care of infants in 
intensive care, family involvement in the care of pre-term babies and best practice for
transferring neonates to other units.59
On its website, Bliss states that the ‘toolkit is the best opportunity in 30 years to make 
much-needed improvements in neonatal care in England’.60 Arguably, however, the 
‘toolkit’ is yet another document that lacks any serious depth or discussion about 
pressing issues surrounding neonatal care. 
The repetition of information is further evinced in the National Institute of Clinical 
Excellence (NICE) publication, ‘Quality Standards in Neonatal Care’, which is similar 
to the NHS standard.61 NICE also based its document on nine guiding statements 
ambitiously aimed at a wide range of stakeholders, including the neonate, parents, 
clinicians, public health practitioners, commissioners and service providers.62
59 Department of Health, Toolkit for High Quality Neonatal Services NHS <http://publications.nice.org.uk/specialist-neonatal-
care-quality-standard-qs4/list-of-statements>.
60 Bliss, Toolkit for High Quality Neonatal Services <http://www.bliss.org.uk/improving-care/care-standards/toolkit-for-high-
quality-neonatal-services/>.
61 National Institute for Health Care and Excellence, Specialist Neonatal Care Quality Standard
<http://publications.nice.org.uk/specialist-neonatal-care-quality-standard-qs4>. 
62 Bliss, NICE Quality Standard for Specialist Neonatal Care <http://www.bliss.org.uk/improving-care/care-
standards/nice_quality_standard/>. 
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 The principles of the quality standard are as widely cast as the target audience, ranging 
from breastfeeding and encouraging parental involvement in care, to data audit and 
research.63 The NICE standards also fail to provide any detailed recommendations to 
any of the targeted stakeholders, and potentially could leave parents feeling confused 
and actually less intimately involved in the treatment and care of their newborn. 
The final consideration in this section is the 2006 Nuffield report, which also failed to 
meet the expectations with which it was conceived.
 
63 Other guiding quality statements include: care pathways, annual needs assessment, skilled and multidisciplinary staff, neonatal 
transfer services, coordinated transition to community care and health outcomes. See further, Department of Health, above n 59.
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 XI: Nuffield Council on Bioethics: Critical care decisions in fetal and neonatal 
medicine: Ethical issues 2006: A missed opportunity
The NCOB is a multi-disciplinary, independent body in the UK. The council was 
established by joint funding and co-operation of the Nuffield Foundation,64 the 
Wellcome Trust and the Medical Research Council. The council aims to ‘advise policy 
makers and stimulate debate in bioethics’, and its work has been recognised 
internationally.65
The council consists of several eminent professors from disciplines such as medicine, 
science, philosophy and law. It has successfully completed several projects on topics
of significance to societal development and medico-ethical debate, including an 
examination of ethical dilemmas in dementia, public health, research involving 
animals and, most currently, the disclosure of information in relation to donor 
conception. For the purposes of this thesis, the 2006 report entitled Critical Care 
Decisions in Fetal and Neonatal Medicine: Ethical Issues is of most relevance and 
importance to this thesis.
The report examined ‘ethical, social and legal issues that arise when making critical 
care decisions’.66 Although the report is to be commended for reintroducing the issues 
surrounding end-of-life decision making into the public domain, it has produced little 
reform since its publication seven years ago. The 2006 report arose out of an 
64 Hereafter referred to as the NCOB. The Nuffield Foundation is a charity founded by Lord Nuffield in 1943 and William Morris 
to contribute to and improve issues of societal importance such as education and social wellbeing. Nuffield Foundation, About 
the Nuffield Foundation <http://www.nuffieldfoundation.org/About-the-foundation>.
65 Nuffield Council on Bioethics, About <http://www.nuffieldbioethics.org/about>.
66 Nuffield Council on Bioethics, above n 6, 3 [1.4].
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 impressive multi-disciplinary working party chaired by Professor Brazier. Other 
members of the party included eminent professors in medicine, nursing and
philosophy, as well as a disability commissioner, an economist and a lawyer.
Although the nine chapter report was primarily ‘targeted at policy makers’, it was 
written with a broad audience in mind.67 The report examined ethical, social and legal 
issues concerning end-of-life decision making for neonates. The fact that the report 
and the further exploration of the issues were deemed necessary in 2006 indicates that 
existing practices and published guidelines are insufficient, ambiguous and need 
reform. This thesis argues that, seven years on, there has been little development, and 
the need for clarity, transparency and uniformity in end-of-life decision making for 
neonates remains. 
As the NCOB is an independent body, their 2006 report provided an ideal platform for 
candid and clear discussion on neonatal end-of-life decision making. The report 
presented the opportunity to introduce coherent recommendations for legislative 
reform, and the public interest and media attention attracted by the findings of the 
report could have been beneficial in discussing the issue of resource allocation.
However, the report avoided the robust reforms necessary to inject the clarity required. 
Instead, the report endorsed the current abundance of clinical guidelines published by 
national bodies and supported existing key legal concepts such as best interests, futility 
and intolerability. 
67 Ibid 5 [1.10].   
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 The report emphasised the need for a continued ‘partnership of care’ between key 
stakeholders, parents and the healthcare team, as recommended by the RCPCH and the 
BAPM.68 It also strongly endorsed the guidelines and recommendations of the RCPCH
and BAPM and the EPICure study findings. The NCOB working party rejected the 
need for legislation on decision making for neonates born at the edge of viability, 
despite commenting that ‘clearer guidance would be helpful to both parents and 
professionals’.69
Further, the NCOB produced another set of guidelines and best practice as to 
thresholds for resuscitation and withholding or withdrawing of treatment from 
critically ill neonates based on their gestation age. The report suggested: 70
At 25 + weeks—intensive care should be initiated as babies born at this time have a high survival 
rate, unless it is known that the infant will be affected by a severe abnormality.
At 24–24 + 6 days—normal practice should be that the baby will be offered full intensive care and 
support from, birth unless the parents and clinicians agree that such treatment is not in the baby’s 
bets interests.
At 23–23 + 6 days—future outcome predictions are difficult and precedence should be given to 
the wishes of the parents regarding resuscitation and intensive care. 
At 22–22 + 6 days—standard practice should be not to resuscitate, unless it is considered to be in 
the baby’s best interests.
68 Ibid 23 [2.48]. 
69 Ibid 154 [9.14].
70 Ibid 155 [9.16].
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 At below 22 weeks—no baby should be resuscitated unless experimental reasons, and for approved 
research studies.71
The Nuffield report suggested that intensive care should not be offered at certain 
gestational periods, but did not present any new recommendations. Morris noted that
the gestational periods at which the report recommends that neonates not be 
resuscitated almost mirror those of the RCPCH framework. The Nuffield report 
categorises neonates born before 25 weeks’ gestation and affected by abnormality as 
having ‘no chance’. This is similar to the ‘no purpose’ or ‘unbearable’ categories in 
the RCPCH framework. In these instances, the neonate is judged to have a quality of 
life that makes treatment the least best option.72
The report generated a range of responses from national medical bodies highlighting 
the variance of opinion on guidelines, their effectiveness and requirements. Some 
members of the BMA considered the proposed guidelines to be ‘too restrictive, 
undermining of professional judgement’,73 and argued that they set out ‘blanket 
rules—smothering clinical discretion’.74
In contrast, the Royal College of Obstetricians and Gynaecologists (RCOG) stated that 
the working party should seriously consider ‘the role of active euthanasia in neonatal 
critical care’. Where the BMA considered greater subjectivity in approach appropriate, 
71 Ibid 156 [9.19].
72 Morris, above n 18, 347, 356. 
73 Carolyn April and Michael Parker, ‘End of Life Decision-making in Neonatal Care’ (2007) 33(3) Journal of Medical Ethics
126, 126.
74 Margaret Brazier and David Archard, ‘Letting Babies Die’ (2007) 33(3) Journal of Medical Ethics 125, 125.
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 the RCOG may have welcomed a more objective test, similar to that of the Groningen 
protocol used in the Netherlands, which allows babies to be euthanised.75
However, the working party ‘unreservedly rejected active ending of neonatal life, even 
when such a life would be considered to be intolerable’.76 Any discussion on active 
euthanasia was avoided by applying the ‘slippery slope’ argument that such would 
open the flood gates to adult euthanasia.77 In taking this stance, the Nuffield report 
echoed the law, stating that there is ‘no reason to distinguish between withdrawing 
treatment and decision not to start it, provided the decision is made in the best interests 
of the baby’.78
The report continued to endorse the law relating to the concept of ‘double effect’,
concluding that, ‘provided treatment is guided by the best interests of a baby, and had 
been agreed in the joint decision making process, potentially life-shortening but pain 
relieving treatments are morally acceptable’.79
Although the report acknowledged the ‘frequently cited resource constraints of the 
National Health Service’80 associated with the treatment of neonates born at 23 weeks, 
it avoided any further discussion by disclaiming that such decisions should be made 
not on the basis of economic considerations, but on clinical judgments based on the 
best interests of the baby.81 This thesis argues that, given the repute of the multi-
75 This will be considered in Chapter Five. 
76 Nuffield Council on Bioethics, above n 6, 157 [2.37].
77 Brazier and Archard, above n 74, 125, 125. 
78 Nuffield Council on Bioethics, above n 6, 154 [9.14].
79 Ibid 20 [2.38].
80 Ibid 84 [5.45].
81 Ibid 22 [2.43].
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 disciplinary working party and the media platform on which the report was presented, 
an open and thorough discussion about the efficient application of medical resources 
would have been invaluable. 
Overall, the report adopted an inoffensive approach to issues that required, and 
continue to require, robust discussion. This was likely a strategic decision to avoid any 
condemnation from the public or from statutory bodies. Brazier and Archard, both 
members of the working party, ‘felt it right to respect the feelings of those most 
intimately involved in decisions about premature babies and who may want the 
opportunity to spend time caring for a dying baby’.82
In its foreword, the party stated that it ‘embarked on its task with some trepidation’.
This was evident throughout the report, which, as a result, failed to discuss the issues 
surrounding end-of-life decision making concerning neonates or to offer any robust 
reform or recommendations, thus confirming the status quo. 
While Brazier and Archard believed the report attempted to ‘start an honest debate 
about these issues’,83 this thesis contends that the report was ineffective in its aim: an 
honest and open debate, by its very nature, challenges established ideas. In this case,
this would have involved discussing matters that were ethically and morally repugnant.
As mentioned, this was not the case.
Next, having highlighted the abundance of repetitive and ineffective guidelines being 
used in the UK, the paucity of guidelines in Australia is discussed.
82 Brazier and Archard, above n 74, 125, 126. 
83 Ibid.
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 XII: The Royal Australasian College of Physicians—Paediatrics and child health 
division: Decision making at the end-of-life in infants, children and adolescents 
(2008)
To date, no guidelines published by any national body that exclusively consider 
withdrawal or withholding of treatment in neonates are available in Australia. In its 
guidelines, the Royal Australasian College of Physicians (RACP) emphasise the role 
of the family and the shared role of parents and doctors in the decision-making process: 
Collaborative decision making is the safest and most robust model, incorporating and balancing 
the observation, knowledge and insights of both the family/whanau and the members of the 
treating team. This model allows a variety of responses and can adapt to most circumstances. It 
also provides an inherent system of ‘checks and balances’ against extremes in decision making, 
while providing support and validation for the conclusions of the decision making.84
The RACP document establishes the role of the health team as:
…to care for the family/whanau, while facilitating the process of decision making around the 
child’s care and maintaining a relationship of trust and respect … Health professional have a duty 
to argue their views concerning management choices but there is also an obligation to respect 
group decisions and the decisions of the family, regardless of personal beliefs.85
The emphasis on ‘collaborative decision making’ with families is evidenced in the 
RACPs acknowledgment of the best-interests principle:
84 Royal Australasian College of Physicians, Decision Making at the End of Life in Infants, Children and Adolescents (Royal 
Australasian College of Physicians, 2008) 11. 
85 Ibid 8.
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 Clinicians and guardians, usually parents, have a duty to make all key decisions in the best interests 
of the child. The treating team must always see itself as the advocate for the interests of the child 
and be prepared to manage differences with the parents from this perspective.86
Similar to the guidelines from the UK, the RACP guidelines state that there are ‘no 
legal or morally relevant differences between withholding or withdrawal of 
treatment’.87 However, unlike the RCPCH framework, the RACP guidelines describe 
only three conditions in defining scenarios in which continuing treatment is 
appropriate:
1. Where death is imminent
2. Treatment would be ineffective making life intolerable because of pain and suffering
3. Life would be shortened regardless of treatment and non-treatment would allow for 
increased comfort.88
These three situations apply the seemingly ‘standardised’ terms of intolerability and 
relief of pain and suffering as considered in clinical guidelines and used by the courts. 
The guidelines state, ‘in the circumstances of infants with an extremely small chance 
of survival it may be appropriate not to offer treatment such as with infants at 22–23 
weeks gestation particularly in poor condition’.89 Further, ‘there is no legal obligation 
to offer treatment which is not medically indicated or which is futile, although taking 
86 Ibid 6.
87 Ibid 9.
88 Ibid 9.
89 Ibid 21.
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 this step in the absence of agreement should be considered only after all avenues have 
been exhausted’.90
The guidelines fail to explain what the ‘other avenues’ that must be exhausted are. 
Overall, the RACP guidelines are basic and provide little clinical guidance. Although 
worthy, the emphasis on parental involvement does not negate the need for more 
prescriptive guidelines to assist doctors with end-of-life treatment decisions.
In marked contrast to in the UK, with its abundance of information and the repetitive 
and intersecting guidelines freely accessible to all, in Australia, approaches to end-of-
life decision making for premature neonates appear to be specific to individual 
hospitals. Guidelines within hospitals on withdrawing or withholding life-sustaining 
treatment are often confidential and internal, and are unavailable to the public. Further, 
they vary between hospitals, even within the same state. This thesis argues that a more 
uniform approach is required with regard to clinical guidelines; that is, a universal set 
of guidelines is needed, for application by all hospitals. 
During the course of this thesis, unsuccessful attempts were made by the researcher to 
access and examine hospital clinical guidelines in Victoria and South Australia. Access 
was attempted via hospital websites and correspondence with a leading children’s 
hospital in Victoria. However, in all cases, end-of-life clinical guidelines were 
restricted to hospital staff only.
90 Ibid 21.
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 This lack of access to examine the documents that guide doctors on end-of-life
decisions is arguably symptomatic of the high level of autonomy of hospitals to set 
their own guidelines. It also highlights the lack of uniformity in clinical treatment for 
neonates. Moreover, such careful guarding of these policies provides little 
transparency for parents, who may be seeking information and understanding about 
decisions that are being made about their child. 
The variation between hospital clinical guidelines means that there is a lack of 
consistency in end-of-life decision making in Australian neonatal care units. This may 
lead to confusion, ambiguity and a lack of confidence in treatment management on the 
part of parents, who may consider that a different hospital would treat their neonate 
more in line with their own views of appropriate treatment.91
Further, the lack of any uniformity in clinical guidelines allows for an inappropriate 
level of medical discretion and autonomy in end-of-life decision making for neonates. 
Alongside the insufficiently defined best-interests principle applied by the courts, as 
discussed in Chapter Two, clinical guideline variation illustrates the potential 
subjectivity and ambiguity in current decision making to withdraw or withhold life-
sustaining treatment from critically impaired neonates. 
 
91 Parental and medical opinion, views and the role and impact of key stakeholders is discussed in Chapter Four of this thesis. 
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 XIII: Perinatal care at the borderlines of viability: A consensus statement based 
on New South Wales and Australian Capital Territory consensus workshop
(2005): Another missed opportunity? 
Lui et al acknowledged the number of international guidelines on end-of-life treatment 
decisions for premature neonates, and the associated ‘grey zones’ of uncertainty at 
which end-of-life decisions are the most complex.92 The authors considered the need 
for such guidelines in Australia, with a consensus workshop being held with 
participants from New South Wales (NSW) and the Australian Capital Territory 
(ACT). The aims of the workshop were two-fold:
1. To produce consensus statements to supply clinicians and parents dealing with 
challenging scenarios encountered at the borderlines of viability.
2. To agree on accurate, meaningful and consistent information across NSW and the ACT 
for clinicians, parents and prospective parents of extremely premature infants.93
The workshop was attended by nominated representatives from each of the 10 NICUs
across NSW and the ACT, across the disciplines of obstetrics, midwifery, neonatology, 
neonatal nursing and allied health. In addition, representatives from parents’ groups, 
medical and nursing colleges and rural and regional practices were invited to 
participate. 
The focus of the discussions in the workshop was based on data gathered between 
1998–2000 from 897 births of pre-term babies between 22–25 weeks + 6 days gestation 
92 Lui et al, ‘Perinatal Care at the Borderlines of Viability: A Consensus Statement Based on a NSW and ACT Consensus 
Workshop’ (2006) 185(9) Medical Journal of Australia 495, 498.
93 Ibid 495.
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 in NSW and ACT. The findings, published in the Medical Journal of Australia, stated 
that those neonates not admitted to the NICU died, and that as the gestational period 
increased, the number of babies born with severe disability decreased.
Overall, the findings of the workshop did not differ to those of the EPICure studies, or 
other work conducted in the UK. The group concluded that ‘at gestational ages 
between 23–25 weeks + 6 days treatment is discretionary’.94 Members of the group 
were divided as to the initiation of treatment at 23–26 weeks + 6 days, and concluded:95
1. At 24 weeks + 6 days—option of non- resuscitation offered.
2. At 25 weeks + 6 days—active treatment is offered, although this may be discretionary 
based on poor prognosis and severe abnormality.
3. At 26+ weeks—High obligation to treat, unless there are exceptional circumstances.96
The consensus statement also asserted that, where the family of a pre-term neonate 
opts for non-intervention at 23–25 weeks’ gestation, the following should be available:
1. All hospitals should have guidelines for communication with parents in situations in 
which the family had opted for no intervention.
2. Counselling should be done by, or at least in consultation with senior clinical staff.
3. If the birth occurs in a non-tertiary centre, access to senior staff in a tertiary centre for 
consultation should be available.
94 Brian Darlow, ‘The Limits of Perinatal Viability: Grappling with the Grey Zone’ (2006) 185(9) Medical Journal of Australia
477, 478.
95 Ibid. The statistics from the consensus highlighted that 72 per cent of participants agreed that at 25–25 weeks + 6 days treatment 
should not be initiated.
96 C Vavasseur, A Foran and J F A Murphy, ‘Consensus Statements on the Borderlands of Neonatal Viability: From Uncertainty 
to Grey Zones’ (2007) 100(8) Irish Medical Journal 561, 562.
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 4. Clinical staff should be well versed in preparing parents for palliative care.97
The group were unanimous on the need for a good partnership of care between parents 
and doctors, and determined that good communication was of key importance.98 The 
group discussed the importance of non-directive counselling offered to parents of those 
born in the ‘grey zone’ (at the borderline of viability). Commendably, the group did 
candidly discuss the varying attitudes and views of stakeholders: parents, doctors and 
nurses. The group agreed that ‘consistent, transparent information should be shared 
between parents and members of the perinatal team’.99
The creation and publication of this consensus is important, particularly given the 
absence of any national guidelines in Australia. This thesis contends that the workshop 
was an ideal opportunity for developing consensus statements at a state level, as a base 
from which national guidelines could have been developed.
Boneh et al acknowledged that the issue of withdrawing and withholding treatment in
newborns ‘remains unclear, due to the lack of cases reaching the courts in Australia, 
and resulting in the absence of any judicial discussion or authority on such matters’.100
Given that the first case concerning end-of-life decision making for a critically ill 
neonate (Baby D) was considered by the court in 2011, this thesis asserts that it is now 
timely for both medical and legal institutions to consider the development of a national 
and unified framework.
97 Lui et al, above n 93, 495, 498.
98 Darlow, above n 95, 477, 478.
99 Lui et al, above n 93, 495, 499. 
100 Boneh et al, ‘Clinical, Ethical and Legal Considerations in the Treatment of Newborns with Non-Ketotic Hyperglycaemia’
(2008) 94(2) Molecular Genetics and Metabolism 143, 145.
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 In this regard, there are lessons to be learned from the UK, where, over the past 30
years, an increasing number of end-of-life decisions have required judicial 
intervention. In light of this, Australia has the opportunity to create unified practices 
nationally, to prevent any potential increase in withdrawal or withholding of life-
sustaining treatment requiring court intervention.101
XIV: Conclusion
As set out in Chapter Two, the law places great emphasis on medical opinion and has 
relied on the clinical guidance of medical bodies when making end-of-life decisions. 
In Bland, Lord Goff relied on the Bolam test—which holds that a doctor will act with 
the benefit of guidance from a responsible and competent body of relevant professional 
opinion—and the advice and guidance of the BMA ethics committee to reach his
conclusion to withdraw and withhold treatment.102
In addition, in Re C,103 the judicial decision to withdraw treatment from a neonate born 
with spinal muscular atrophy was made after careful analysis of the RCPCH 
guidelines. Sir Stephen Brown highlighted the need to make a decision with the child’s 
best interests as the paramount consideration.104
101 As noted in Chapter Two of this thesis, there have been two cases within the space of 2001–2012 that have required legal 
intervention in Australia. Although it is too early to establish whether the number of cases requiring legal intervention will 
increase, national standardised guidelines would create greater clarity and uniformity.
102 Airedale NHS Trust v Bland [1993] AC 789. 
103 Re C (a minor) [1997] 40 BMLR 31 (Fam Div).
104 See further, Michael Fertleman and Adam Fox, ‘The Law of Consent in England as Applied to the Sick Neonate’ (2003) 3(1) 
The Internet Journal of Pediatrics and Neonatology <http://archive.ispub.com/journal/the-internet-journal-of-pediatrics-and-
neonatology/volume-3-number-1/the-law-of-consent-in-england-as-applied-to-the-sick-
neonate.html#sthash.pX6ODMbI.uRnuOQGt.dpbs>.
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 Somewhat aberrantly, it appears that judges rely on medical opinion and doctors rely 
on case law decisions when developing guidelines to assist doctors in decision making. 
Like the case law and judicial deference to medical opinion considered earlier, 
guidelines provide yet another non-prescriptive or directional formality to medico-
legal dilemmas concerning end-of-life decision making for neonates.
This is a highly charged ethical and moral quandary, fraught with controversy. The 
reliance demonstrated by both the medical and legal professions on each other in 
guiding and deciding life and death decisions is an illustration of both professions’
unwillingness to take the lead in any real or meaningful dialogue towards decisions in 
this area. Medical practitioners and judges both apply ill-defined terms such as best 
interests, futility and benefits and burdens, and both have demonstrated inconsistent 
and loose application of such.
The abundance of information and frameworks in the UK is confusing, and one unified 
guidance document that is applied nationally is required. Both the UK and Australia 
have either missed or deliberately avoided taking the opportunities to have frank 
discussions about more robust decision-making reforms.
Several commentators support the contention of this chapter that greater consistency 
in guidelines is needed. In his paper in the Singapore Medical Journal, Foo highlights 
that the paediatrician Whitelaw recommends ‘near certainty of death or no meaningful 
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 life’ as the benchmark for decision making. He also states that ‘no meaningful life is a 
virtual certainty of complete incapacity not just a handicap’.105
Other academics have suggested proposals and frameworks to address the ambiguity 
and low impact of clinical guidelines that have been published. Lamb suggests a more 
robust approach, employing the term ‘slippery slope’ to describe situations in which a
specific course of action that may be seen as ethical, actually leads to other courses of 
action that are unethical.106 Pinter agrees with this ‘slippery slope’ concept in relation 
to guidelines, and noted that without ‘sharp and precise boundaries’, there will be a 
deterioration of ethical decision-making.107
Further, Zutlevics proposed a ‘co-operative discursive’ framework with essential 
features such as ample time (where possible), a diverse and inclusive group of moral 
decision makers who have an equal opportunity to contribute to the discussion 
informing decision-making, and rational and principled decision making.108
In contrast, McHaffie et al assert that there is no need for stringent guidelines to clarify 
roles and responsibilities, and instead recommend a ‘flexible package of care, tailored 
to specific need’.109 While it cannot be denied that every individual case has its own 
unique characteristics, this thesis argues that this does not negate the need for a unified 
105 K B Foo ‘Medico-legal and Ethical Problems Associated with Treatment of Children Born with Congenital Malformations’ 
(1994) 35(2) Singapore Medical Journal 184, 188. 
106 David Lamb, Down the Slippery Slope: Arguing in Applied Ethics (Routledge, 1988). 
107 A B Pinter, ‘End-of-life Decision Before and After Birth: Changing Ethical Considerations’ (2008) 43(6) Journal of Pediatric 
Surgery 430–436.
108 Tamara Zutlevics, ‘Pursuing the Golden Mean—Moral Decision Making for Precarious Newborns' (2009) 27(1) Australian 
Journal of Advanced Nursing 75–81. 
109 McHaffie et al, ‘Deciding for Imperilled Newborns: Medical Authority or Parental Autonomy?’ (2001) 27(2) Journal of 
Medical Ethics 104–109.
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 national framework. On the contrary, such a framework would allow the intricacies of 
each case to be given a thorough examination against a common denominator. This is 
of key importance to moving forward to a better system of decision making with 
greater transparency and uniformity. 
Premature neonates cannot express their inherent right to autonomy or advocate their 
treatment wishes. Thus, the roles and relationships between other key stakeholders
(that is, chiefly, doctors, parents and the judiciary) in decision making for critically 
impaired neonates are imperative. This issue is examined in the next chapter of this 
thesis. 
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 CHAPTER FOUR: THE ROLE, IMPACT AND IMPORTANCE 
OF KEY STAKEHOLDERS IN DECISIONS TO WITHDRAW OR 
WITHHOLD LIFE-SUSTAINING TREATMENT
I: Summary
Chapter Three considered the role of clinical guidelines in the context of end-of-life
decision making for critically ill neonates. It examined the guidelines and frameworks 
created and implemented in hospitals in the UK, and their lack in Australia.
In the UK, the guidelines are not exclusive to critically ill neonates, and are general in 
nature, thus leaving much room for interpretation, with a resulting variance of 
outcome. In examining these sources of information and the available guidelines, 
Chapter Three also critiqued the 2006 Nuffield Council of Bioethics Report and its 
missed opportunity to make any robust recommendations to improve the existing, and 
repetitive, wealth of guidelines and frameworks in the UK.
Regarding Australia, it was concluded that each hospital exercises an unhealthy degree 
of autonomy, with life and death decisions made based on internal policies,
inaccessible to the wider public.
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 II: Introduction
This chapter considers the roles and weight afforded to other key stakeholders in the 
end-of-life decision-making process. Chapter Four begins by examining the tangled 
dynamic that exists between parents and doctors in decision making. It then considers 
how the dynamic changes when the decision making is taken out of the hospital setting 
and transferred into the court. 
Discussion in the area of end-of-life decision making for neonates is invariably
emotive and controversial due to the final consequences of such decisions. Neonates 
cannot express their free will and are entirely dependent on others to decide their fate. 
Stakeholders (that is, doctors, judges and parents) must therefore assume this authority, 
and they occasionally take actions that detract from the rights and interests of the 
neonate. In some cases, these actions lean towards the perceived duties and interests 
of the stakeholder. Dunn acknowledged this, stating:
In defending the patient’s rights, whether it be to have a prenatal diagnosis or to have a caesarean 
section or to submit to life-saving interventions, we must never lose sight of that most fundamental 
right of all, the right to choice, and the right not to have what doctors sometimes naively assume 
our patients will or should want.1
There is a wealth of material in this area that could comfortably accommodate a PhD 
in its own right. Many medical journals provide global empirical research in the form 
of surveys, questionnaires and polls that have been conducted to ascertain medical 
professionals’ attitudes and perceptions towards end-of-life decision making for 
1 Peter Dunn, ‘Appropriate Care of the Newborn: Ethical Dilemmas’ (1993) 19(2) Journal of Medical Ethics 82, 82.
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 neonates.2 Similar studies have also been conducted concerning parents and the wider 
family.3
This thesis contends that the views and opinions of other stakeholders affected by 
decision making concerning treatment for incapacitated neonates should not be 
explicitly or implicitly determinative in life and death dilemmas. In seeking to better 
understand this area, it is first important to identify, in concrete terms, the interests that 
are affected. Then, the respective weight that should be accorded to each of them can 
be discussed. This requires an examination of the ideals and values involved, and also 
a determination of the relevant stakeholders. 
Chapter Four examines parents, doctors, the judiciary and the wider community as the 
stakeholders affected or involved in the decision-making process for critically ill 
neonates. There are often competing rights, duties and interests at play, which means
that this ethical problem will produce different answers depending on who is seeking 
them. Heimer supports this observation:
Each group’s claim has a long and distinguished legal history. Parents stake their claim on their 
right to family autonomy, privacy and freedom of religion and on their ultimate responsibly for 
the child. It is they who must bear the burden of raising a disabled child, balancing its needs against 
those of other family members. Physician claims are based on their traditional rights to make 
2 See, eg, Rebagliato et al, ‘Neonatal End-of-life Decision Making: Physicians’ Attitudes and Relationship with Self-reported 
Practices in 10 European Countries’ (2000) 284(19) The Journal of the American Medical Association 2451–2459; D Duffy and 
P Reynolds, ‘Babies Born at the Threshold of Viability: Attitudes of Paediatric Consultants and Trainees in South East England’ 
(2011) 100(1) Acta Paediatrica 42–46; Cuttini et al, ‘End-of-life Decisions in Neonatal Intensive Care: Physicians’ Self-Reported 
Practices in Seven European Countries’ (2000) 355(9221) The Lancet 2112–2118.
3 See, eg, van der Heide et al, ‘The Role of Parents in End-Of-Life Decisions in Neonatology: Physicians' Views and Practices’ 
(1998) 101(3) Pediatrics 413–418; Berit Støre Brinchmann, Reidun Førde and Per Nortvedt, ‘What Matters to the Parents? A 
Qualitative Study of Parents’ Experiences with Life-and-death Decisions Concerning their Premature Infants’ (2002) 9(4) Nursing 
Ethics 388–404.
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 treatment decisions on possession of arcane medical knowledge and on experience treating other 
infants with similar problems. Other members of the medical community make similar claims. 
And the state, through legislatures, regulatory bodies and courts, argue that its interest in the lives 
and health of its citizens take precedence over parents right to control their own children. As Parens 
Patriae it claims to be a disinterested protector of infant citizens.4
Further, Kerridge, Lowe and Stewart highlight that parens patriae powers in Australia 
‘is the notion of the sovereign as the “father of the nation”’.5 As such, ‘the Supreme 
Courts of the States and Territories have the power to consent to treatments on behalf 
of incompetent adults and children under their inherent jurisdiction’.6
Should certain stakeholders be regarded as functionaries in the process? Is the ad hoc
system currently applied in hospitals to make life and death decisions the most 
effective and efficient? These are some of the key questions addressed in this chapter. 
The next section considers some of the factors that affect parents, who are primarily 
‘one time players’ in decisions to withdraw or withhold life-sustaining treatment from 
their neonates.
III: Parents: Conflicting interests and views
The parents of neonates born severely premature or with severe abnormality are 
affected significantly in decisions about the withdrawal or withholding of life-
sustaining treatment from their children. The period during which such decisions are
4 Carol A Heimer, ‘Competing Institutions: Law, Medicine, and Family in Neonatal Intensive Care’ (1999) 33(1) Law and Society 
Review 17, 31.
5 Ian Kerridge, Michael Lowe and Cameron Stewart, Ethics and Law for Health Professions (Federation Press, 4th ed, 2013) 395.
6 Ibid. 
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made is marked by measures of joy and anguish, as parents are asked to consider the 
loss of a child, and as they grapple with the consequences of their decision in the 
process. For many adults born in the 1970s–1980s, death or dying may be unfamiliar;
this may be their first experience of losing a loved one.7
A study published in the UK by McHaffie in 2001 found that ‘contemplating tragic 
outcomes, watching a baby die, burying their own child, these are extraordinary 
experiences for young people to live through’.8 In addition, many young parents 
‘lamented their lost youth and innocence … they were now permanently separated 
from their peers, and could not regain their carefree approach to life’.9
Ostensibly, parents of premature neonates are the victims in the end-of-life decision-
making process and are deserving of nothing but the utmost sympathy and pity.
However, to rely entirely on such a view would be misguided. Such a one-dimensional 
assessment does not explain the varying reactions of parents in these situations, and 
fails to capture the most complete picture of parents, the emotions they experience and
the decisions they come to make.
The influence of media, development of medical science and technology
There has been a shift in societal attitudes towards the family structure. This has 
corresponded to the increased accessibility of contraception, women’s rights and 
7 For a more in-depth examination of parental experiences after the death of a baby see, Nancy Khoner and Alix Henley, When 
a Baby Dies: The Experience of Late Miscarriage, Stillbirth and Neonatal Death (Pandora Press, 1991). 
8 McHaffie et al, ‘Deciding for Imperilled Newborns: Medical Authority or Parental Autonomy?’ (2001) 27(2) Journal of Medical 
Ethics 104, 106. 
9 Ibid.
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 personal autonomy on matters such as abortion and planned pregnancies.10 Twentieth 
century innovations and developments have allowed neonates to defy nature, and have 
given parents and doctors considerable capacity to play a significant role in a neonate’s 
ultimate destiny. Shelp explains the situation prior to these developments:
Medicine, for all practical purposes, was impotent to effectively intervene to rescue life or 
transform a sick baby into a healthy one. Parents necessarily received what the natural lottery of 
human reproduction delivered. Cure and/or habilitation [sic] to a normal life were beyond the 
control of both parents and medicine.11
Often parents have their dreams, hopes and aspirations tied up in their child. 
Relationships, career choices and life experiences all contribute to parents having a
vested interest in the birth of a child. There are many reasons that people want, need 
and have children. Nearly all of these are admirable, although others may be regarded 
selfish. By way of example of the latter, financial reasons, reasons that uphold notions 
of social status, familial pressures and the internal dynamics of individual relationships 
may contribute to the drive to reproduce.12
10 But see, Rebecca Smith, ‘Women Finding Access to Contraception Difficult’, The Telegraph (Online) 11 May 2012, 
<http://www.telegraph.co.uk/health/healthnews/9257070/Women-finding-access-to-contraception-difficult.html>. See also, 
Mazza et al, ‘Current Contraceptive Management in Australian General Practice: An Analysis of BEACH Data’ (2012) 197(2) 
Medical Journal of Australia 110–114.
11 Earl E Shelp, Born to Die? Deciding the Fate of Critically Ill Newborns (The Free Press, 1986) 77.
12 There may be societal pressures on couple’s to reproduce, see, eg, Christine Crowe, ‘“Women want it”: In-vitro fertilization 
and women’s motivations for participation’ (1985) 8(6) Women's Studies International Forum 547–552. Further, cultural or 
religious reasons may mean that women are under pressure to reproduce. Susan Martha Kahn asserts that Jewish citizens derive 
from immigration, conversion to the Jewish faith or by birth. Thus, ‘Israeli Jewish women are left as the primary agents through 
which the nation can be reproduced as Jewish … Jewish women are under extraordinarily pressure to reproduce, whether they 
are married or unmarried’. See especially, Susan Martha Kahn, Reproducing Jews: A Cultural Account of Assisted Conception in 
Israel (Duke University Press, 2000) 4. 
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 Prospective parents may regularly speculate on the future goals and dreams they wish 
to see their child achieve. During the pregnancy, soon to be parents often begin to 
consider names, the suburbs in which they would like to raise their children, the 
schools their children might attend, and the activities in which they hope their children 
will participate. The thought of a difficult or premature pregnancy, or of bearing a 
child with a severe abnormality, does not sit comfortably alongside the ideals or hopes 
of prospective parents. As Shelp explains:
There may be an awareness of the potential risks and pitfalls of parenting, but they may not be 
expressed in a way that materially connects the risk with the current pregnancy. It is frightening 
for parents to think that this pregnancy might result in the birth of an infant with serious impairment 
that could effectively shatter all the hopes and dreams they have for this child. 13
Scientific and technological progress has enabled significant advances. However, with 
these achievements have come greater expectations as to what can be delivered to the 
patient. Moreover, as technology has advanced, women have been able to embark on 
pregnancy later in life, and those that may once have been considered infertile now 
have the opportunity to become mothers. 
This raises an important question: just because we ‘can’ save imperilled neonates from 
death, does this mean we ‘should’ save all imperilled neonates born at extreme 
prematurity from death or severe disability? Guyer considers the question, stating that
‘some parents push too hard for treatments that are medically inappropriate’.14 Others 
13 Shelp, above n 11, 54.
14 Ruth Levy Guyer, Baby at Risk (Capital Books, 2006) 50.
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 may rely on ‘reproductive technologies in order to conceive a baby and then expect 
that other technologies will rescue and maintain their baby’.15
In the quest of a ‘good story’, the media often publishes stories and bold headlines 
about ‘miracle babies’. Distressed parents often passionately cling to such stories of 
babies surviving against all odds, believing that their baby can do the same. This 
sentiment is candidly echoed by Guyer: 
Sometimes media hyperbole focuses on a single micropremmie—‘The Size of a Coke Can!’—or 
on a baby whose radical surgery—‘Infant Heart, the Size of a Walnut, Rebuilt and Running’—
stands as testimony to a surgeon’s technical prowess but not to what constitutes an appropriate 
reaction to nature’s inevitable anatomical mistakes.16
It can be argued that medical professionals may have become victims of their own 
success. By now being able to save neonates that may have died as little as two decades 
ago, there is often an unrealistic expectation that doctors will keep these critically ill 
neonates alive. Dr Andrew Watkins, Director of the NICU at the Mercy Hospital in 
Melbourne, carries a similar view: 
There is no pleasure in the irony that the NICU is a victim of its own success; 20 years ago, 28 
weeks was the limit of viability for premature babies. Today, sophisticated advances in biomedical 
engineering, with cots that light up like cockpits … the result is that younger than ever babies are 
now surviving … needing beds for longer.17
15 Ibid.
16 Ibid.
17 Kathy Evans, ‘The Edge of Life’, The Melbourne Magazine, The Age (Australia), Issue 90, April 2012, 38, 40.
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 A study conducted in New Zealand highlighting the survival rate of neonates born 
weighing between 501–1500 grams over a 50-year period found marked 
improvements. Neonates born with a birth weight of 501–1000 grams saw a survival 
rate increase from less than 10 per cent in 1959 to 80 per cent in 2009.18 This vast 
improvement in survival rate has not been confined to New Zealand. Both the UK and 
the University of Washington reported increased survival rates for neonates of this 
weight for between 1965 and 1975.19
Given the improvements in survival rates, it is understandable that parents today may 
push for aggressive treatment. This may also be true of situations in which the 
continuation of treatment is futile, but where parents are hoping that their child will 
also be a ‘miracle baby’, as read about in tabloid newspapers.
Although very rarely seen, two such ‘Sunday features’ recently in Australia should be 
commended for attempting to present a more nuanced view of babies born at the edge 
of viability.20 Additionally, 2011 saw the BBC air a documentary by science writer 
Adam Wishart in the UK, entitled The Price of Life. Wishart spent six months in the 
NICU of the Birmingham Women’s Hospital, where he was given unrestricted access 
to interview parents and doctors and, in doing so, document the very different 
experiences of families and medical staff in making end-of-life decisions for babies 
born at 23 weeks.
18 Battin et al, ‘Improvement in Mortality of Very Low Birth Weight Infants and the Changing Pattern of Neonatal Mortality: The 
50-Year Experience of One Perinatal Centre’ (2012) (48) Journal of Paediatrics and Child Health 596, 597. 
19 Ibid 598.
20 Segments of both articles and the documentary will be discussed throughout this chapter. Tracey McVeigh, ‘I Would Have 
Wanted Him to Die in My Arms’, Sunday Herald Sun Magazine, The Herald Sun (Australia) 17 April 2011; Evans, above n 17;
The Price of Life (Directed by Adam Wishart, BBC Production, 2011). 
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 These newspaper articles and documentary present an exception to the rule in 
representing a realistic view of life in, and beyond, the NICU. They will thus be 
discussed later in this chapter and in Chapter Five. However, generally, the bulk of 
media reporting fails to discuss the realities that face neonates and their families. 
Critically, there is often a failure to highlight the real survival rates and discuss the 
denominator against which survival can be measured.21
As highlighted in Chapters One and Three of this thesis, neonates that survive without 
any disability against medical odds are unusual rather than the norm. In representing 
the exception, the media reinforces the contention of this thesis, that there is a need for 
greater transparency and objectivity in relation to end-of-life decision making for 
imperilled neonates. 
Greater public awareness is required to realistically highlight life for neonates born at 
23 weeks’ gestation, removing some of the emotion that is often attached to birth and 
newborn babies. The significant impact of the internet and the media in decision 
making is supported by Moro et al’s recent empirical research, which found:
In one case, the mothers experience raising a foster daughter who was born preterm and a television 
show impacted the way she looked at the loss of her infant since, unlike the woman on the show, 
she would not have wanted her daughter to live only to die weeks later. For another mother, the 
information she gathered on the internet impacted her ability to hold out hope that her daughter 
would survive. 22
21 See further, Jag Ahluwalia, Christoph Lees and John J Paris, ‘Decisions for Life Made in the Perinatal Period: Who Decides 
and on Which Standards?' (2008) 93(5) Archives of Disease Child Fetal, Neonatal Edition 332, 332.
22 Moro et al, ‘Parent Decision Making for Life Support Decisions for Extremely Premature Infants: From the Prenatal through 
to End-Of-Life Period’ (2011) 25(1) Journal of Perinatal and Neonatal Nursing 52, 57.
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Today, due to the media reporting stories of survival and presenting an unbalanced 
view, parents are often surprised to discover that they have a premature neonate and 
that, as a result of its prematurity, it is likely to have severe disabilities. Hammerman 
et al support this point:
Parents in such situations are emotionally vulnerable, still reeling from the shock of not having the 
normal, healthy baby they had heretofore envisaged. They must struggle with many conflicting 
emotions. On the one hand there is the love, concern and hope for their baby’s wellbeing 
counterbalanced by the grief, disappointment and guilt over the reality of their imperfect infant. 23
Religious and cultural beliefs 
Varying religious beliefs affect parental attitudes and views of withdrawal or 
withholding of treatment and death. Hammerman et al conducted a study on attitudes 
of pregnant women towards medical decision making for critically ill neonates. The 
subjects of the study were Israeli-born Muslim and Jewish women in their mid-
twenties to thirties.
Based on the level of religious observance of the women, the research found that 
‘mothers who described themselves as ultraorthodox/fundamentalist constituted a 
higher proportion of those selecting maximally aggressive medical intervention (25% 
v 17% of the total population)’.24 In comparison, mothers who considered themselves 
23 Hammerman et al, ‘Decision-making in the Critically Ill Neonate: Cultural Background v Individual Life Experiences’ (1997) 
23(3) Journal of Medical Ethics 164, 167.
24 Ibid 165.
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 more secular and would select minimal intervention accounted for 31% v 20% of the 
general population.25
The study highlighted that women with more religious and fundamental beliefs 
considered that the principle of sanctity of life was of utmost importance, regardless 
of the child’s disability or handicap. One respondent in the Hammerman-led study 
asserted that ‘even the most severely handicapped child has a soul and all care must 
be taken to ensure his survival. In fact I have heard that “special” children have the 
loftiest souls’.26 Women that considered themselves more secular indicated that the 
key influencing factor in their decision making was the quality of life the neonate 
would have and his or her inability to enjoy life and all it had to offer.
Religious affiliation and decision making for critically ill neonates thus appear to be
commonly linked. Often parents believe that life and death decisions should be left in 
God’s hands. They are of the belief that God is the ultimate decision maker, not them. 
Many parents consider doctors to be ‘representatives of God in the healing process’.27
However, this line of thought is fraught with contradiction: if God is the decision 
maker, how can doctors, medical science and medical equipment, which are ultimately 
‘keeping the baby’ alive, all be held in the hands of a higher power, greater than man?
Paris et al agree with this line of thought, stating ‘the child is trapped in technology 
from which death is the only exit. When the inevitable NICU death does occur, those 
25 Ibid.
26 Ibid 168.
27 Ibid.
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involved assure themselves “We did everything possible. It was God’s decision, not 
ours”’.28
A recent American study published in 2011 indicates a more literal application of God 
as the ultimate referee. One family in the study led by Moro believed that the decision 
as to whether the infant survived should be left entirely in God’s hands, and that the 
only way to allow ‘God to handle it’ was to remove the infant from the ventilator and 
allow God to decide the child fate.29 One religious parent, interviewed for a Melbourne 
newspaper, described having thoughts about the conversations he would have with 
God in the future: ‘I can’t wait to meet him (God)’.30
The common denominator: Hope 
Human beings often make the most important decisions in their lives based on 
emotion. Marriage is a key example of this; those who are about to wed probably do 
not consider divorce statistics or allow information regarding unhappy marriages to 
deter them. Such life-changing decisions are generally made following one’s desires,
rather than based on rational thought processes. Decisions regarding the withdrawal or 
withholding of life-sustaining treatment from critically impaired neonates are 
generally founded on parental emotion and an instinctive desire to protect and 
unconditionally love their newborn. This is illustrated in a case study documented in 
Wishart’s BBC documentary. 
28 Paris et al, ‘Approaches to End-of-life Decision-making in the NUCI: Insights from Dostoevsky’s The Grand Inquisitor’ (2006) 
26(7) Journal of Perinatology 389, 389.
29 Moro et al, above n 22, 52, 56.
30 Evans, above n 17, 38, 43.
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 In this case study, the parents of baby Simone, the only survivor of triplets, born at 23
weeks, spoke of their hope of taking their child home. The baby’s mother, 23-year-old 
Kelly stated, ‘It gives you hope seeing her move, she’s a little fighter’.31 She added 
‘she looks normal, kicking, moving, wriggling about, crying, it’s weird … she’s come 
too far to give up now’.32 In the same documentary, another parent, police officer 
Craig, discussed his fears of setbacks: ‘if you get your hopes up too much you might 
get knocked down—so it’s best to keep it level and don’t get too excited … and then 
good news is good news’.33 The importance of ‘framing’ conversations with parents 
about outcomes in a manner that will be understood rationally has been discussed by 
Janvier, and will be considered later in this chapter.34
For parents, emotions play a very significant role in decision making. Humans 
instinctively desire to love and nurture their loved ones, particularly neonates. These
instinctive desires are enshrined in cultural mores: the creation of a successful family 
unit and good parenting are considered to be worthy goals. This is further demonstrated 
by the abhorrence with which society regards those who harm or kill children.
Many parents of critically ill neonates hold on to hope, even when the prognosis is 
bleak. Arguably, hope is an intangible entity that no doctor or court of law can take 
away from parents, and as such it is something parents may not let go of until the very 
last moment.
31 The Price of Life, above n 20, 00.18.25.
32 Ibid 00.23.54 and 00.24.10.
33 Ibid 00.49.29.
34 Annie Janvier, ‘Can We Improve Parental Decision Making for Perinatal and Neonatal Decisions?’ (Speech delivered at the 
Ethical, Legal and Social Implications of Neonatal Intensive Care Units Conference, Geneva, 4–5 June 2012) 
<http://www.brocher.ch/en/events/ethical-legal-and-social-implications-of-neonatal-intensive-care-units/>. 
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This assertion is supported in one of McHaffie’s 2001 studies, in which it was noted 
that one couple were staunch believers that their child would survive, and ‘not wanting 
to jeopardise her chances, they refused to have her out of the incubator to cuddle her 
until the last few minutes of life’.35 Further, Moro’s empirical study considered ‘hope’ 
as a factor in the decision-making process. Two mothers in the study stated:
In one case, hope that the infant would survive fuelled the mother’s determination to make 
physicians try to save the infant in the delivery room. While this mother thought there was less 
than 1% chance that her daughter would live, she indicated that she had hope until the last moment. 
Another mother of triplets reported feeling hopeful even after the first infant died because there 
were two who survived.36
Parental ethnicity 
Parental ethnicity and cultural beliefs also play a significant role in decision making.
A study conducted in 2004 by Roy et al in the UK found that Jewish and African 
families were more likely to request aggressive treatment. The study further found that 
over a period of 45 months found that, of the 1807 babies that were admitted to the 
NICU, 85 per cent died. Withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment was the cause of death 
for 58 per cent of those imperilled neonates that died. Discussions were undertaken 
with parents before treatment was withdrawn, with 72 per cent of cases agreeing with 
withdrawal:
35 H E McHaffie, A J Lyon and P W Fowlie, ‘Lingering Death after Treatment Withdrawal in the Neonatal Intensive Care Unit’
(2001) 85(1) Archives of Disease in Childhood-Fetal and Neonatal Edition 8, 9.
36 Moro et al, above n 22, 52, 55. 
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 White parents, those from the Indian subcontinent and Afro-Caribbean parents (20 of 23) were 
more likely to agree to withdrawal of LST (life sustaining treatment) than Black African or Jewish 
(8 of 16) parents. Of the 11 sets of parents who refused the option of withdrawal of LST, three 
(including two orthodox Jewish families) gave religion as the primary reason.37
The study also found that only 54 per cent of black African parents, as compared to 
almost all of the white parents, agreed to withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment,
giving their religious and personal beliefs as the key deciding factor.38 Boneh et al,
acknowledging that parental attitudes are often determinative of the decisions they 
make, recommend doctors to:
…be aware of the parents’ cultural attitude to decisions regarding end of life. They need to explore 
the willingness of the family of the newborn to make decisions regarding withholding or 
withdrawing therapy and to counsel families using appropriate terminology.39
Life experience is also a factor in end-of-life decision making for parents. For many 
mothers, life experiences and societal attitudes in their maternal country of origin are
influential factors in decision making. Hammerman noted that women from former 
Soviet Russia, where approximately 10 per cent of women have experienced an 
abortion at least once during child-bearing age, had a less restrictive approach to 
withdrawal of treatment decisions:
37 Roy et al, ‘Decision Making and Modes of Death in a Tertiary Neonatal Unit’ (2004) 89(6) Archives of Disease Child Fetal, 
Neonatal Edition 527, 528.
38 Ibid 529.
39 Boneh et al, ‘Clinical, Ethical and Legal Considerations in the Treatment of Newborns with Non-Ketotic Hyperglycaemia’
(2008) 94(2) Molecular Genetics and Metabolism 143, 147. 
161
 
                                                          
 …immigrant mothers in the USSR, were much less aggressive in their approach to treating 
critically ill, damaged neonates, probably reflecting prevalent attitudes in a country where families 
are generally limited to one to two children and where abortion is considered an acceptable method 
of contraception.40
Thus, the considerations so far suggest that, while parents believe they are the chief 
advocates for their child’s life and its protection, and have the highest authority to 
decide ‘what is best for their child’, parents’ decisions regarding treatment are often 
made based wholly on their own subjective interests and beliefs. 
This is supported by McHaffie et al’s study, which described one scenario in which 
parents felt compelled to leave their dying baby alone due to a cultural belief that 
witnessing their child’s ears turning blue would signify the end of meaningful life.41
Kopelman and Kopelman discussed a case with similar cultural obstacles in 
America.42 The case concerned Baby S, a neonate born at 26 weeks’ gestation to 
graduate student parents from India. The neonate suffered several conditions due to 
premature birth and had a 70 per cent chance of survival with the strong possibility of 
problems (ranging from mild to profound). A week after birth, the parents requested 
that treatment be withdrawn, an opinion that was not shared by the attending 
physicians.
40 Hammerman et al, above n 23, 164, 168. 
41 McHaffie et al, above n 8, 104, 108. 
42 L M Kopelman and A E Kopelman ‘Using a New Analysis of the Best Interests Standard to Address Cultural Disputes: Whose 
Data, Which Values?’ (2007) 28(5) Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics 373, 373. 
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 While doctors were optimistic about the prognosis, the parents believed that once they 
returned to India, they would not have financial access to the level of care their son 
would possibly require. Further, they feared hostility due to a cultural stigma relating 
to abnormalities.43 Ordinarily, such a conflict of opinion would have been referred to 
the courts; however, in this case, doctors, social workers and nurses, independent of 
the courts, concluded that pursuing treatment would not be in the best interests of the 
neonate.
Baby S’s condition deteriorated and he passed away before treatment was revoked.
However, the case provides an example of the impact of cultural beliefs in life and 
death decisions. In most developed countries, laws are not tailored to specific 
cultures.44 While they are, and should be, respectful of the myriad of cultural beliefs, 
they are not dictated by them. However, there may be exceptional instances, such as 
the one discussed above, where too much emphasis could be placed on cultural 
preferences or personal bias.
Looking at Baby S’s case, it is questionable whether the same decision would have 
been reached had the neonate not been born to parents returning to a developing nation, 
particularly given the parents’ reliance on arguments for withdrawal of treatment that 
centred on cultural stigma and limited access to financial resources for further care.
43 Handicap, disability or congenital abnormalities are often viewed as punishment for past ‘sins’ committed in Indian culture. 
See generally, Anita Ghai, ‘Disability in the Indian Context: Post-colonial Perspectives’ in Mairian Corker and Tom Shakespeare 
(eds), Disability/Postmodernity: Embodying Disability Theory (Continuum, 2002) 88–100. See also, Luanne Linnard-Palmer and 
Susan Kools, ‘Parents Refusal of Medical Treatment Based on Religious and/or Cultural Beliefs: The Law, Ethical Principles, 
and Clinical Implications’ (2004) 19(5) Journal of Pediatric Nursing 351–356. 
44 For a discussion about the organisation of society and cultural beliefs see, Avner Greif, ‘Cultural Beliefs and the Organization 
of Society: A Historical and Theoretical Reflection on Collectivist and Individualist Societies’ (1994) 102(51) Journal of 
Political Economy 912–950. 
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Parental bias and judgments may not be physically visible to the outside world, but it
can still affect parental decision making. An example of such personal bias has been 
examined by Shelp, who discussed a case involving a premature neonate born with 
severe respiratory issues, and who also suffered with a non-functioning micro penis,
which could have been removed, allowing the neonate to be raised as female. 
However, Shelp found:
Rather than cope with a perceived failure of his masculinity, the father, with the consent of the 
mother, refused treatment of the infant’s respiratory disease. Treatment nevertheless, was 
undertaken but the baby died anyway … the defect need not be visible to others or affect the brain 
in order to provoke a judgment that death of the newborn is a desirable end.45
Another factor that plays a role in the decision-making process for parents is the pain 
and suffering of the child.
Pain and suffering of the child 
During their initial consultations with medical teams about prognosis, parents may 
instinctively have a firm vision and make an immediate determination that their 
neonate’s life must be preserved at all costs. Moro highlighted that all mothers initially 
indicated ‘they wanted everything done for their infant in the delivery room’.46
Interestingly, Moro also found that neither parents nor doctors explicitly defined what 
‘everything done’ meant.47 This is an important point and further discussion or 
45 Shelp, above n 11, 63.
46 Moro et al, above n 22, 52, 55.
47 Ibid 57.
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 research in this area would be valuable. As will be considered later in this chapter, 
parent and doctor perceptions vary extensively as to what treatments can and should 
be offered to a critically ill neonate. The term ‘everything done’ is highly subjective, 
and for a medical team that has assessed the prognosis for the neonate, ‘everything 
done’ could be interpreted as alleviating pain or suffering and providing the neonate 
with palliative care and comfort.
Conversely, for parents, ‘everything done’ may mean aggressive treatment, even when
there is no positive response by the neonate. Moro found that, ‘despite the mother’s 
insistence that the physician do everything, she felt that they did not provide 
appropriate care … “it seemed like when they, took her to the table to try, they put a 
mask on her and handed her back”’.48 McHaffie similarly found that parents discussed 
a constant need to ‘beg the staff to do all they could in the face of frequent comments 
implying treatment was futile’.49
A key turning point for many parents from wanting the medical team to ‘do everything’ 
to save their neonate to agreeing to the withdrawal of treatment is conversations with 
the medical team regarding the pain and suffering endured by their neonate. In the 
Wishart documentary, parents Lucy and Craig expressed their reservations for 
aggressive treatment for their daughter Matilda, stating ‘she has to have a quality of 
life, if it comes to it we have to let nature takes its course’.50
48 Ibid 55.
49 Hazel E McHaffie, Andrew J Lyon and Robert Hume, ‘Deciding on Treatment Limitation for Neonates: The Parents 
Perspective’ (2001) 160 European Journal of Pediactrics 339, 341.
50 The Price of Life, above n 20, 00.28.48.
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 Both Moro’s study and those conducted by McHaffie highlight the significance of pain 
as a key factor in end-of-life decision making for parents and doctors. In the McHaffie 
study, some parents expressed a desire to ‘ameliorate their child’s suffering’, and one 
mother stated ‘I just wanted the best for my daughter. I didn’t want her to suffer 
anymore’.51
Visible deterioration such as skin colour changes, noises of exasperation and ‘clear 
information’ about prognosis also influenced withdrawal decisions.52 In another study,
McHaffie found that, when neonates were taken off ventilation and began to struggle 
to breathe independently, parents found this distressing.53 One mother described 
withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment from her son:
He was coughing, spluttering, gasping … the minute he (the doctor) was coming over (to check 
that his heart has stopped) he started again. I was just not looking … My arm was numb. They 
were saying, ‘Go and have a lie down, this could go on for hours’, but I couldn’t even move. I was 
just so damned scared. I think it was more his noises that haunt me than the colour of his blue 
hand.54
Doctors may attempt to protect parents from the beginning of the dying process when 
their neonate is removed from ventilation, either due to a sense of paternalism or 
empathy or out of an awareness of the fragile emotional state of parents at this time.
Studies have shown that, as difficult as it may be, parents prefer to be given the facts 
and told in very certain terms exactly what the dying process entails. In failing to do 
so, many parents lose trust in the treating physician. This is explained below. 
51 McHaffie, Lyon and Hume, above n 50, 339, 341.
52 Ibid 342.
53 McHaffie, Lyon and Fowlie, above n 36, 8, 10.
54 Ibid.
166
 
                                                          
  
167
 
The length of the ‘dying process’
McHaffie, Lyon and Fowlie explored parental perceptions of the dying process 
between three to 13 months after neonatal or infant death from treatment withdrawal. 
The study was conducted across three regional units in East Scotland, and its findings 
were published in 2001. The findings are noteworthy. Sixty-eight per cent of those 
interviewed were satisfied with the manner in which the ‘dying process’ was handled, 
while only 8 per cent found the process unsatisfactory. These statistics should provide 
the medical fraternity with reassurance that, generally, the process is perceived to be 
handled with emotional sensitivity. However, 22 per cent of parents expressed 
discomfort about the length of the dying process.55
After grappling with emotionally challenging decisions and accepting that their 
neonate is too imperilled to survive, some parents wanted the ‘dying process’ to be as 
quick as possible. In McHaffie’s study, one couple could not ‘face watching their son 
die’ and simply wanted to be informed if he deteriorated any further.56
Other parents felt the need and duty to be with their neonate or young infant right up 
to the dying moment. However, these parents then risked being traumatised by the 
duration of the dying process and the distress and physical changes that occurred to 
their neonate. As McHaffie explains, one neonate’s parents ‘believed that death would 
be instantaneous when the ventilator was withdrawn and they were completely 
55 Ibid 8.
56 Ibid 9.
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 unprepared for the 21 hours they had with the living child’.57 For other parents, the 
process varied from three to 36 hours.
Although unpleasant for any parent, once their infant had died, 16 per cent of those 
interviewed wished they had made the decision to withdraw treatment sooner and that 
the entire process had been shorter. For some couples, the quick or ‘rapid death, 
reinforced the accuracy of the medical prognosis’.58 Another couple went even further,
stating ‘they wished their child had been “euthanized” early on and they all had been 
spared the agonising experience they had endured’.59 Three other couples ‘found it 
unhelpful when the doctors did not give the child something to end life sooner, to 
lessen the baby’s suffering and their own distress’.60
The neonate’s suffering is not always the foremost consideration. The recent Moro-led 
study highlighted the case of one mother of triplets, who, having endured the death of 
two of them, ‘did not want her last infant to only live for a few weeks or months’. She 
said ‘since I already had to bury the other two … maybe I should let them all go 
together’.61 While this may seem a selfish comment for a mother to make, it reflects a 
necessary form of emotional self-preservation.
This thesis acknowledges that each individual’s life experiences vary. The empirical 
studies undertaken, largely by McHaffie, explore parent perceptions and individual 
opinions or beliefs. Some parents began to doubt their decision to withdraw treatment 
57 Ibid 10.
58 Ibid.
59 Ibid.
60 Ibid 11.
61 Moro et al, above n 22, 52, 55. 
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when the dying process took longer than anticipated. As discussed earlier in this 
chapter, parents continued to hold onto hope and the possibility that their baby was 
going to ‘fight on’ until the very end. Parents’ thoughts revolved around questions like, 
‘if the baby was fighting so hard to live should they give him/her every chance? Was 
he or she trying to tell them that they [sic] wanted to live?’62
Perceptions and realities of disability
The area of disability activism is wide reaching63 and beyond the scope of this thesis.
However, it is necessary to discuss briefly how disability affects individuals and 
families when decisions to continue treatment are made. As has been noted thus far in 
this thesis, there is a strong likelihood of disability when a neonate born at 23 weeks 
survives. The uncertainty of initial survival, and then the severity of the disability the 
neonate is likely to suffer, are just two of the issues that make end-of-life decision 
making for these neonates so controversial and challenging. 
Moral values and interpretations of quality of life vary, and perceptions of disability 
and its severity are also subjective.64 Varying levels of cognition, intellect and 
62 McHaffie, Lyon and Fowlie, above n 36, 8, 10.
63 For a discussion on disability activism in Australia, see generally, Margaret Cooper, ‘The Australian Disability Rights 
Movement Lives’ (1999) 14(2) Disability & Society 217–226. For further discussion on disability activism in the UK, see 
generally, Colin Barnes, ‘Disability Activism and the Struggle for Change Disability, Policy and Politics in the UK’ (2007) 2(3) 
Education, Citizenship and Social Justice 203–221.
64 For further discussion, see also, Saigal et al, ‘Self-perceived Health-related Quality Of Life of Former Extremely Low Birth 
Weight Infants at Young Adulthood’ (2006) 118(3) Pediatrics 1140–1148. For a discussion on the World Health Organisation’s 
International Classification of Functioning (ICF) on Disability and Health and its application to children, see, eg, Simeonsson et 
al, ‘Applying the International Classification of Functioning, Disability and Health (ICF) to Measure Childhood Disability’ 
(2003) 25(11–12) Disability & Rehabilitation 602–610.
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 disability may be given more or less weight, dependent on who is assessing such 
quality of life.65
For example, physical impairment may be less important to an individual than mental 
impairment. Millions of individuals wear corrective lenses in glasses due to a visual 
impairment, but would be unlikely to question their ‘quality of life’ or consider 
themselves limited in choices or lifestyle. In contrast, a lower intelligence quotient 
(IQ) or learning disability is more likely to affect an individual’s life choices, career 
and socio-economic outcomes. Saigal and Tyson’s studies indicate that parents and 
doctors may report a higher level of disability and lower quality of life than the affected 
person. They assert: 
Several studies have shown that proxy respondents tend to report higher morbidity and lower QoL 
(Quality of life) than the individuals whose perceived health status and QoL is being judged. It 
also appears that the perceptions of health professionals and caregivers are often at odds with those 
of patients. Parents’ views on QoL may be negatively influenced by the burden of caregiving, 
stress, and their own mental, social, and economic status. Children generally report they have 
fewer problems and a higher QoL than do their parents and clinicians.66
This is supported by Zutlevics, who argues that ‘the impact on families and particular 
affected individuals from disability is also highly variable’. Disability activists are 
concerned about a ‘general misapprehension that people with moderate or greater 
65 Nicolas Porta and Joel Frader, ‘Withholding Hydration and Nutrition in Newborns’ (2007) 28(5) Theoretical Medicine and 
Bioethics 443, 433.
66 Saroj Saigal and Jon Tyson, ‘Measurement of Quality of Life of Survivors of Neonatal Intensive Care: Critique and 
Implications’ (2008) 32(1) Seminars in Perinatology 59, 62. See also, Saroj Saigal, ‘Quality of Life of Former Premature Infants 
during Adolescence and Beyond’ 2013 89(4) Early Human Development 209–213.
171
 
                                                          
 physical and intellectual disabilities cannot lead lives of quality’.67 Further, Zutlevics
raises the point that ‘more than disability, more crippling is societal attitudes and 
inadequate resources to assist such individuals’.68 This is of particular relevance and 
importance to this thesis, which contends that the allocation of limited public resources 
should be an objective factor applied in end-of-life decision making for critically 
impaired neonates born at 23 weeks. This is discussed in detail in Chapter Five.
Research from the UK in 2010 found that premature neonates were ‘more at risk of 
lower IQ, poorer cognitive function, learning disabilities and behavioural problems 
than full term babies’.69 In the BBC documentary mentioned above, Wishart also 
highlighted that ‘life-saving’ treatments can often cause more harm than good: ‘tubes 
can lead to lung diseases, drugs to assist with development can cause cerebral palsy 
and medication for the heart can cause fragile guts to collapse’.70
In the documentary, Wishart also provided an illustrative example of the first-hand 
experience of an individual born at the edge of viability, at 23 weeks. Twenty-one-
year-old Heather candidly discussed her disabilities and her perception of quality of 
life. Heather could only use her left arm, and unless the ‘carers come to the house she 
is stuck in bed all day.71 Heather suffered severe depression, had considered suicide 
and did not see anything positive in her life.72 Due to her heavy reliance on her parents, 
she feared losing them and worried about what life would be like when they died: ‘I
67 Tamara Zutlevics, ‘Pursuing the Golden Mean—Moral Decision Making for Precarious Newborns’ (2009) 27(1) Australian 
Journal of Advanced Nursing 75, 77.
68 Ibid.
69 McVeigh, above n 20, 17. 
70 The Price of Life, above n 20, 00.30.02.
71 Ibid 00.31.17.
72 Ibid 00.32.08.
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 am massively scared about when my parents die, so, so, so scared, I rely on them so 
much … each year I get more scared’.73
As mentioned, this documentary, which also aired in Australia, is commendable, and 
provided much-needed transparency and a real portrayal of life for those born as, or 
caring for, extremely premature and impaired neonates. Heather continues to be
directly affected by her parents’ decision to push for aggressive treatment to keep her 
alive at 23 weeks, and her parents are just as affected by their decision. 
The birth of her daughter at 23 weeks served as the impetus for Catherine Rutherford 
to become a nurse practitioner in the Birmingham NICU. She discussed the difficulty 
parents face when making such life-changing decisions at the time of birth: ‘at that 
point in time you have no understanding of what people are telling you, because you 
have a baby, your child in front of you and you want that child to survive’.74
While Catherine did not openly discuss any doubts or regrets she may have had about 
her decision not to withdraw treatment, another mother interviewed in an Australian 
Sunday magazine did. Alexia Pearce spoke honestly about her decision to keep her 
premature Nathan alive: ‘if I’d known then what I know now about what extremely 
premature babies have to go through, I wouldn’t have chosen that for my little boy’.75
Alexia expressed guilt over her decision: ‘even though it was made with the best 
73 Ibid 00.33.22.
74 Ibid 00.33.01.
75 McVeigh, above n 20, 16. 
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 intentions … no mother or father wants to see their child suffer. But because of the 
choices I made, I feel he’s suffered, and still does’.76
Gunderman and Engle highlight the varying perceptions individuals have about 
disability and quality of life:
Judgements about what constitutes an acceptable quality of life may vary from physician to
physician and family to family. One family may judge even relatively mild sensory, cognitive and 
motor impairments unacceptable, while another may eagerly welcome a child that others would 
regard as neurologically devastated.77
Eichenwald et al described an opposing view held by some parents, in which doctors 
may decide contrary to initial discussions to continue treatment when a neonate or 
young infant is considered to ‘appear healthy’. The authors found that some parents 
showed anger and frustration that their initial ‘agreement’ to withdraw treatment had 
now been breached. Parents stated that they could not ‘manage an impaired child’ and 
that their doctors had a ‘duty to respect their wishes’.78
However, the competing view is that such selective withdrawal decisions may be 
inequitable. Wilkinson also agrees with this position, that decisions to withdraw 
treatment based on potential disability could be argued to be discriminatory or ‘based 
on a false assessment of the quality of life of those with such disabilities’.79 Both views 
76 Ibid 17. See also, ‘A H Graungaard and L Skov, ‘Why Do We Need a Diagnosis? A Qualitative Study of Parents’ Experiences, 
Coping and Needs, When the Newborn is Severely Disabled’ (2007) 33(3) Child: Care, Health and Development 296–307. 
77 Richard B Gunderman and William A Engle, ‘Ethics and the Limits of Neonatal Viability’ (2006) 236(2) Radiology 427, 429.
78 Eichenwald et al, ‘Physician and Parental Decision Making in Newborn Resuscitation’ (2008) 10(6) Virtual Mentor 616, 616.
79 Dominic Wilkinson, ‘Is it is the Best Interests of an Intellectually Disabled Infant to Die?' (2006) 32(8) Journal of Medical 
Ethics 454, 455.
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reflect the significant levels of subjectivity in both the withdrawal and continuation of 
treatment decisions by parents. 
Relationships of trust and confidence with the medical team
The one certainty in end-of-life decision making for critically ill neonates is the 
uncertainty of the prognosis and survival. Lantos et al note that ‘prognosis will always 
depend on a combination of factors, and will always be somewhat uncertain for any 
particular baby’.80
Critically, at this stage, the lack of certainty of outcomes means that doctors often 
cannot give parents certainty even about the dying process. As discussed earlier, the 
dying process for infants varies considerably. Doctors attempt to communicate clinical 
information in the most sensitive manner to parents. There is a fine line between 
parents trusting the treating doctor and having confidence in his or her medical 
opinion, and parents losing faith and belief in medical judgment when medical 
predictions and probabilities become possibilities. 
Due to the uncertain nature of predicting outcomes for premature neonates, parents 
often doubt their own decisions and those of the medical team, right up to and after 
death. McHaffie highlighted a case in which one family ‘recalled being told three times 
that when successive treatments were withdrawn their child would die. When forecasts 
80 Lantos et al, ‘Withholding and Withdrawing Life Sustaining Treatment in Neonatal Intensive Care: Issues for the 1990s’ (1994) 
71(3) Archives of Disease in Childhood-Fetal and Neonatal Edition 218, 220.
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 proved wrong the parents lost trust in medical expertise and as a result the child’s 
eventual death took them by surprise’.81
There is no clear solution to avoid parental loss of trust in the medical team. Often 
both stakeholders, parents and doctors, tread very carefully, knowing that the decision-
making process will be more harmonious when they work together. However, several 
studies have highlighted that parents prefer open and honest discussion with doctors, 
even when it entails the communication of uncomfortable or confronting information. 
Moro noted one mother that ‘reported that communication and relationship with 
providers impacted ... experiences of decision making’.82 Other mothers have 
expressed similar views.83 Further, ‘parents need more than just information’ and 
‘relationships between both parties can be forged on trust’.84 Moro argued that ‘trust 
can be built by admitting uncertainty’.85 McHaffie echoed a similar sentiment, giving 
the example of one parent who stated: ‘if they had just told us that (there was no hope 
before they resuscitated him on day six), we wouldn’t have had to go through all this 
agony for the next three weeks until he died’.86
However, doctors are often not in a position to make such predictions, and ‘parents 
seem able to tolerate a degree of uncertainty and they demonstrate trust in expertise of 
81 McHaffie et al, above n 8, 104, 106. 
82 Moro et al, above n 22, 52, 58.
83 Ibid.
84 Ibid. 
85 Ibid.
86 McHaffie, Lyon and Fowlie, above n 36, 8, 11.
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 senior clinicians…one of the main contributing factors to their [parents] insecurity is 
a lack of concrete evidence of a bleak outcome’.87
Therein lays the problem. Often there is no concrete evidence, and decisions about 
prognosis and predictions are based on retrospective data and statistics. This also 
explains why, when one neonate ‘survives’ and continues to flourish in his or her life,
he or she is referred to as a ‘miracle baby’. Parents continue to hold onto hope 
throughout the entire process. Moro et al found that ‘hope can be very powerful and 
provide a source of strength for parents even in the most dismal circumstances … [In 
the end,] parents want their health care providers to be honest yet hopeful’.88
In the Wishart documentary, Lucy, mother of Matilda, born at 23 weeks, felt ‘we have 
to trust in what the professionals tell us about how much trauma and pain she will 
suffer’.89 However, a counter point to be made is that, when parents and doctors 
disagree on treatment decisions, there is a likelihood of volatility and distrust of the 
medical team.90 Overwhelmingly, the studies suggest that for parents to trust treating 
doctors, those doctors have to communicate to parents, in a firm and honest manner,
the harsh realities of the neonate’s prognosis, the confronting truth of the dying process 
and what to expect.
 
87 McHaffie, Lyon and Hume, above n 50, 339, 343.
88 Moro et al, above n 22, 52, 58.
89 The Price of Life, above n 20, 00.26.29.
90 Dominic Wilkinson, ‘The Self-Fulfilling Prophecy in Intensive Care’ (2009) 30(6) Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics 401, 
405.
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Do parents carry guilt and the burden of responsibility in decision making?
After being intimately involved in the decision to withdraw or withhold life-sustaining 
treatment to their neonates, parents may feel guilt or carry a heavy sense of burden and 
responsibility during the process itself. For many parents, the thought of ‘giving up’ 
may cause emotional discomfort and does not align with external community ideals.
There may also be familial influences at play.91
Bracegirdle agrees with this view, stating that ‘parents feel pressurised by family, 
friends and the media to allow technology to keep trying, and thus may feel compelled 
to carry on with treatment when they do not feel that the benefit exceeds the harm’.92
In more extreme situations, there may be no parental emotional attachment to a child, 
yet there remains a continued push for medically futile treatment.93
Wishart documented the perception of baby Simone’s father that his role as a father 
was to ‘protect’ his child: ‘I’m supposed to be a dad, supposed to protect her, daddies 
are supposed to look after their little girls’.94 He went on to explain that he would feel 
like he was killing her: ‘if she’s suffering, it’s bad not to (withdraw treatment) but I 
couldn’t do it, I’ve killed my own child, couldn’t live with that’.95
91 Carl A Kuschel and Alison Kent, ‘Improved Neonatal Survival and Outcomes at Borderline Viability Brings Increasing Ethical 
Dilemmas’ (2011) 47(9) Journal of Paediatric and Child Health 585, 588.
92 Karen E Bracegirdle, ‘A Time to Die: Withdrawal of Paediatric Intensive Care’ (1994) 3(10) British Journal of Nursing 513, 
514.
93 Lantos et al, above n 81, 218, 221. 
94 The Price of Life, above n 20, 00.18.33.
95 Ibid 00.22.24.
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 Another couple, Claire and Paul, stated that they had wanted their daughter, Holly,
resuscitated after Claire’s waters broke at 23 weeks. Holly died soon after birth and
was cradled by her parents, who were given the choice to hold her while she remained
attached to tubes and had her heart rate sustained by artificial ventilation, or without 
tubes. Her father Paul asserted: ‘at least we tried, if things don’t pan out at least we 
can say we had the choice and we went for it’.96
Returning to empirical research, McHaffie’s study reported that medical teams of 
doctors and nurses assumed that decisions to withdraw or withhold life-sustaining 
treatment from infants were ‘too weighty a burden for parents to bear … only three 
per cent of doctors and six per cent of nurses thought parents should take the ultimate 
decision’.97 There is much literature that supports the statistics from McHaffie’s study. 
For example, Pinter suggests that ‘to prevent unnecessary guilt, we (doctors) should 
always be careful to avoid giving parents the sense that the decision is completely 
theirs’.98 Tripp and McGregor convey a similar sentiment:
Although both parents and professionals have rights, it is usually going to fall to the professional 
team, to elicit how much of their ‘rights’ parents want to exercise—bearing in mind the 
responsibility and potential for guilt that comes with a right determination.99
Further, a doctor’s ‘willingness’ to take on the responsibility of being the decision 
maker is an ‘important mechanism to ally parental guilt’; ‘parents may actually 
96 Ibid 00.05.06.
97 McHaffie et al, above n 8, 104, 105.
98 A B Pinter, ‘End-of-life Decision Before and After Birth: Changing Ethical Considerations’ (2008) 43(6) Journal of Pediatric 
Surgery 430, 433.
99 Tripp J and D McGregor, ‘Withholding and Withdrawing of Life Sustaining Treatment in the Newborn’ (2006) 91(1) 
Archives of Disease Child Fetal, Neonatal Edition 67, 69.
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 welcome the opportunity to be completely relieved of the decision and turn to the 
courts’.100 Arguably, this is an exception to the norm, and most parents do not turn to 
the courts, or only do so as a last resort. This is particularly true in Australia, given the 
dearth of material in this area, where only two cases have required judicial intervention 
in recent times.101
Contrary to this opinion, many parents feel that the decision falls within their 
responsibility as parents. As discussed further below, 56 per cent of parents in the 
McHaffie study believed that they had made the decision.102 More recently, Moro et 
al’s study in 2011 found that only one out of the five mothers interviewed expressed 
feelings of burden in the decision-making process.103
Although the decision carries much emotional strain, many parents felt that the 
experience, although unpleasant, challenged or changed their previous opinions or 
beliefs. One parent in the study had previously been a devout pro-life supporter, but 
after experiencing her newborn’s suffering, acknowledged that such decisions were 
fraught with uncertainty.
It is noteworthy to consider Paris et al’s summary of parental responsibility in end-of-
life decisions for neonates, conceptualised against the backdrop of Dostoevsky’s 
classic novel The Brothers of Karamazov. In the novel, personal responsibility was not 
considered an option, as ‘collective’ family decisions were made. Paris et al suggest
that a similar approach could be taken by families in decision-making scenarios. This 
100 Ibid.
101 Baby D (No 2) [2011] Fam CA 176; TS & TD v Sydney Children’s Hospital (‘Mohammed’s case’) [2012] NSWSC 1609.
102 McHaffie et al, above n 8, 104, 105. 
103 Moro et al, above n 22, 52, 58. 
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 is often the case in practice: mothers make treatment decisions, taking into account the 
opinions of the neonate’s father and members of the wider family. 
Making life and death decisions is not easy. The difficulties that parents face in 
wanting treatment withdrawn, or in accepting responsibility for the decision, are of 
particular magnitude. The guilt associated with actively requesting that a newborn die 
is a heavy burden, particularly when that newborn is your own child.104
Paris et al illustrate this point, stating:
for parents that choice is not so easy. They look at the physician and ask, Doctor, do you mean 
you want our permission to kill our baby? How could parents agree to that? How could they endure 
the guilt of having given up on their child?105
The authors suggest that life and death decisions for neonates or young infants are best 
made without putting parents in the position such that they feel considerable guilt or
responsibility. They suggest that a more assertive approach on the part of doctors,
without much ‘choice’ or ‘active involvement’ for parents, in the decision-making 
process is better for parents:
Do not ask the parents, ‘If your baby suffers a cardiac arrest, do you want us to try to save him?’ 
Such a question gives parents false hopes and unrealistic expectations, expectations that inevitably 
lead to demands for more and more interventions and the risk of further complications.106
104 Paris et al, above n 28, 389.
105 Ibid 390.
106 Ibid.
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 Interestingly, Shapiro described a darker side to the guilt that parents may carry from
deciding to withdraw treatment. The author described parents feeling that wanting or 
allowing a loved one to die was a ‘dirty secret’ that they carried.107 It is uncommon 
that such feelings would be discussed frankly and openly, and indeed, in the wider 
community, it is considered taboo for parents to express such sentiments. Instead, 
Shapiro asserts that in these cases, family members may do the opposite to what they 
really want, driving out taboo feelings by passionately advocating for treatment to be 
continued. 
Montello and Lantos further suggest that there may be ‘strange communication’,
wherein individuals may feel discomfort in expressing their true desires or wishes.108
This may be considered an unspoken message: the more vehemently parents advocate 
for treatment to continue, the more they may want treatment not to continue. However, 
this is perhaps a dangerous assumption to make, as there is potential for severe 
miscommunication, through a lack of honest communication. A better view may be to 
push for doctors to engage in a more open and honest dialogue and provide clinical 
information, while also maintaining a degree of empathy for parents in making 
treatment decisions.
Perceptions of ‘making the decision’ or being ‘involved’ in the decision-making 
process vary between parents. Gillam and Sullivan point out that ‘involvement in 
107 Martha Montello and John Lantos, ‘The Karamazov Complex: Dostoevsky and DNR Orders’ (2002) 45(2) Perspectives in 
Biology and Medicine 190, 194.
108 Ibid.
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 decision making could lead to guilt and repentance and yet did not regard not being 
involved as a way to resolve the potential difficulty’.109
Parents are thus in a difficult situation: the ‘doctor knows best’ paternalism evident in
some of the cases examined in Chapter Two suggests that in the early 1970s and 1980s,
decision making was predominantly left to the medical professionals.110 Today, while
some parents may find a lack of involvement in the decision-making process easier, 
the majority would probably disagree. Studies conducted by Orfali and Gordon 
involving American and French mothers found:
…on the one hand they want to be involved and became angry if they are not given control over 
many medical aspects of the baby’s care … but no mother in our sample ever requested more 
active involvement in life and death decisions. They seemed to want some control over a dreadful 
situation, but none of them expressed an eagerness to take over the terrible act of deciding.111
As considered earlier in this chapter, parents take several indicators and factors into 
account when making end-of-life decisions. Some rely on religious or cultural beliefs, 
leaving decisions in God’s hands and negating any ‘responsibility’ for making the 
decision. Others make treatment withdrawal decisions based on their neonate’s visual 
deterioration, and a desire to end their newborn’s pain and suffering.
109 Lynne Gillam and Jane Sullivan, ‘Ethics at the End of Life: Who Should Make Decisions about Treatment Limitation for 
Young Children with Life-Threatening or Life-Limiting Conditions?’ (2011) 47(9) Journal of Paediatrics and Child Health 594, 
596.
110 Pinter, above n 99, 430, 433. See also R v Arthur (1981) 12 BMLR 1. 
111 Kristina Orfali and Elisa J Gordon, ‘Autonomy Gone Awry: A Cross Cultural Study of Parents’ Experiences in Neonatal 
Intensive Care Units’ (2004) 25(4) Theoretical Medicines and Bioethics 329, 348. 
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McHaffie et al found that a majority of parents did not feel guilt or doubt about the 
decision to withdraw treatment. Only one mother in their study referred to any feeling 
of guilt, with this being related to her individual feeling, possibly selfishness, in not 
wanting her newborn to die, ‘when she knew it was in his best interests’.112 Further, 
Pignotti asserts that the overwhelming consensus in Europe is that parents play a 
crucial role in decision making for their children, based on the ‘assumption that, in 
exercising their authority, they are acting in their child’s best interests’.113
Pignotti’s study also indicated that, rather than wanting to be ‘spared’ the trauma of 
decision making, parents were ‘appalled’ at the idea that decisions about their 
newborns could be made without their involvement.114 This leads to a final 
consideration about the role and impact of parents as key stakeholders in end-of-life
decision making for critically impaired neonates.
Are parents the ultimate decision maker or is it an illusion? 
Parental autonomy in decision making for their children is important, and the law 
provides parents with a significant amount of discretion on such matters. However, as 
Stewart noted, ‘in the case of minors, the rights of parents to consent or to refuse 
medical treatment are not absolute’.115 This prevailing legal opinion seems to have 
long-standing global consensus. This was evinced in an American president’s 
112 McHaffie, Lyon and Hume, above n 50, 339, 343. 
113 Maria S Pignotti, ‘Extremely Preterm Births: Recommendations for Treatment in European Countries’ (2008) 93(6) Archives 
of Disease Child Fetal, Neonatal Edition 403, 405. 
114 Ibid.
115 Cameron Stewart, ‘Who Decides When I Can Die? Problems Concerning Proxy Decisions to Forego Medical Treatment’ 
(1997) (4) Journal of Law and Medicine, 386, 387. 
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 commission 30 years ago, when it was stated that ‘parental authority must occasionally 
be superseded by clinicians when it is determined that the parent’s decisions are at 
odds with societal consensus about what best serves a child’s interests’.116
From the case law and discussion presented in this chapter, it is clear that parents find 
it difficult to accept that the best possible therapy is often non-treatment. Many 
journeys across different terrain are taken for parents and wider family units in arriving 
at the reality that their neonate will not survive, or that survival will not provide a 
fruitful life. Nevertheless, a majority of parents perceive that they have been the ones 
to make the final decision to withdraw treatment. 
McHaffie et al reported that 56 per cent of parents felt that the ultimate decision was 
theirs. The 7 per cent that did not make the ultimate decision wished they had done 
so.117 Further, parents felt that this decision had to be made by them as part of their 
responsibility as a parent. However, most parents cannot make an informed and 
independent decision to withdraw or withhold life-sustaining treatment due to their
lack of medical skills, training and information. Gilliam and Sullivan assert that ‘many 
parents wanted to participate [in decision making], but not decide, citing lack of 
medical knowledge and the possibility for emotional factors to overwhelm a rational 
decision’.118
116 Jeffrey P Burns and Christine Mitchell, ‘Is There Any Consensus About End-of-life Care in Pediatrics’ (2005) 159(9) Archives 
of Pediatrics and Adolescent Medicine 889, 890.
117 McHaffie et al, above n 8, 104, 105. 
118 Gillam and Sullivan, above n 110, 594, 596.
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 Thus, any decisions regarding neonates must be made in collaboration between the 
parents and the medical team. For this reason, transparent, honest and informative 
relationships between parents and doctors are crucial.119 However, parents are often
aware of the inequality that exists between medical staff and parents. McHaffie found 
that discussions or disagreements between staff about treatment decisions happened 
‘behind the scenes’, yet when discussing options with parents, the medical team stage 
a united front. Often doctors excluded certain information from parents that they 
deemed ‘irrelevant’ to decision making, to strengthen a particular professional opinion 
or recommendation about treatment.120 This will be discussed in greater detail later in 
this chapter.
This leads to the question of who is really making the decision. It would seem that 
doctors ‘stage’ the communication process with parents, making parents believe they 
are casting the deciding vote. Given that parents are those most affected by decisions 
to withdraw treatment, both at the time and for many years later, this staging could be 
seen as allowing parents to draw some closure, solace and comfort in believing 
themselves to have made the choice, enabling them to bid farewell to their child with
a sense of benevolence and duty.
The discussion so far has focused on parental involvement in decision making to 
withdraw or withhold life-sustaining treatment from critically impaired neonates. It 
has been noted that the medical team takes into account parental wishes and that
parents play an active role in the decision-making process. However, situations arise 
in which parents oppose the treatment options that doctors deem best for the neonate. 
119 This point is supported by Bracegirdle, above n 93, 513, 514. 
120 McHaffie et al, above n 8, 104, 107.
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 In such instances, doctors must work together with parents to help them understand 
their options.
It is established in law and medicine that parents cannot seek to demand or refuse life-
sustaining treatment for a critically ill neonate. As considered in Chapter Two of this
thesis, parental wishes are noted and carefully considered. However, the prevailing 
interests of the child are given paramount importance. Ahluwalia et al make this point:
…decisions are to be jointly made on the basis of the infant’s best interests, with clinicians and 
parents entering into what has been described as a ‘partnership of care’. The parents’ wishes, while 
significant, are not overriding. The treating physician continues to have an independent 
responsibility towards the newborns well-being.121
Nevertheless, while they should not dictate the fate of the neonate, parental wishes 
must be given considerable weight. Each individual is a complete moral entity, and 
given legal rights at birth, a neonate’s moral status is not derivative upon others. It is 
beyond the scope of this thesis to examine the entire area of personhood; however, it 
is established in English law that once a child is born, they transition from the legal 
status of a foetus to a person possessing individual rights.122
As one of the key stakeholders in the decision-making process, parents’ decisions and 
perceptions are influenced by many factors. All these variables are subjective, and no 
two families reach their conclusions identically or experience their newborn’s death in 
the same way. 
121 Ahluwalia, Lees and Paris, above n 160, 33, 333. 
122 See especially, R J Boyle, R Salter and M W Arnander, ‘Ethics of Refusing Parental Requests to Withhold or Withdraw 
Treatment from Their Premature Baby’ (2004) 30(4) Journal of Medical Ethics 402, 403.
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 When examined as a group from a macro level, given their subjectivity, parents could 
be considered unpredictable and confused. This is understandable, given their position 
as the most immediate and emotionally connected of the relevant stakeholders. 
In seeking to navigate the decision-making process, and in looking for clear objective 
advice, parents will turn to the next most immediate stakeholder, their doctors and 
medical advisors, who are considered in the next section of this chapter. 
IV: Doctors: Subjectivity, conflicting interests and views 
The previous section considered the perspective of parents in end-of-life decision 
making, raising the issue of the emotional conflict they face in making these 
challenging decisions. By contrast, medical practitioners might be seen as the more 
able of the two stakeholder groups in taking a clear and dispassionate approach in the 
decision-making process. However, as detailed below, this is not necessarily the case. 
As the examination of case law in Chapter Two highlighted, between the early cases 
in the 1980s, in particular Dr Arthur’s case, and the more recent case law of the 2000s,
there has been a shift in both parent and doctor attitudes and perceptions of the role 
and duties of the medical profession.123 A move towards a ‘rights’-driven culture and 
greater awareness of personal autonomy may have contributed to this change in the 
doctor–patient dynamic.124 There is potential for conflict between parents and doctors, 
123 This has entailed a shift from withdrawing treatment at a parent’s request such as in the case of Baby John Pearson, to doctors
resisting treatment that they consider to be futile, even when parents request treatment continuation. 
124 Professor Julian Savulescu has researched and examined the area of medical decision making, rationalism and autonomy in 
detail, taking into account medical, legal and philosophical theory. See further, Julian Savulescu, ‘Autonomy, the Good Life, and 
Controversial Choices’ in Rosamond Rhodes, Leslie P Francis and Anita Silvers (eds), The Blackwell Guide to Medical Ethics
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 evidenced in the case law wherein treatment withdrawal disputes have turned to the 
courts for resolution. Moreover, there is clear inequality between the two groups, with
one group possessing expert medical knowledge, while the other does not.
This inequality is reinforced by a doctor’s sense of empowerment, driven in part by 
the development of new technologies and the expansion of neonatology as a field of 
medicine. Arguably, saving from death those neonates still young enough to die and 
be considered a miscarriage or even aborted has allowed doctors to feel a sense of 
authority and benevolence. 
Guyer supports this view, asserting that the parent–doctor collaborative decision-
making process is often quite to the contrary: ‘…what happened in the NICU was not 
collaboration but collision. Some doctors were loathed to give up their positions as the 
primary decision makers, and even today some continue to cling to old paternalism’.125
However, support for the view above is not universal. Truog believes that doctors are 
losing their ‘professional autonomy’ by being forced to provide treatment they 
consider futile. He further states that patients’ relatives place heavy and inappropriate 
demands on doctors, and that the traditional hierarchy of doctor and patient is being
eroding.126 Gampel further asserts that placing such demands of continuation or 
(Blackwell Publishing, 2007) 17–37; Julian Savulescu, ‘Liberal Rationalism and Medical Decision-making’ (1997) 11(2) 
Bioethics 115–129. See also, John-Stewart Gordon, ‘Medical Paternalism and Patient Autonomy in Michael Boylan (ed) Medical 
Ethics (Wiley-Blackwell, 2nd ed, 2013) 72–82.
125 Guyer, above n 14, 40.
126 Robert D Truog, ‘Futility in Pediatrics: From Case to Policy’ (2000) 11(2) Journal of Clinical Ethics 136–141.
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 discontinuation of treatment on doctors could be seen as making doctors ‘slaves to 
whatever patients want’.127
The traditional view of the medical profession and medical ethics is that it is driven by 
ideals of paternalism, beneficence and non-maleficence. Further, the belief is that a 
doctor will always do good for his or her patients and will never harm them.128
However, this is a simplistic notion. Doctors, like parents or any other human being, 
are exactly that—human. Like parents, they are the sum of their life’s experiences and 
at least partially driven by the same emotions and prejudices. The decisions that 
medical practitioners make in their professional setting are thus also affected by these 
factors, and are not intangible or exclusively independent. 
Further to this, each doctor’s personal beliefs and attitudes will differ, and 
consequently their ultimate treatment decisions for critically ill neonates may vary 
considerably.129 Craig iterates, ‘there are times when two doctors, each with the best 
interests of the patient at heart, would treat in diametrically opposite ways’.130 End-of-
life decision making for critically impaired neonates is thus influenced by medical 
practitioner subjectivity, highlighting the contention of this thesis—that there is a need 
for greater transparency and for decisions to withdraw or withhold treatment from 
critically ill neonates to be based on objective grounds. A driving force and a 
significant consideration in this regard should be the allocation of limited resources.131
127 Eric Gampel, ‘Does Professional Autonomy Protect Medical Futility Judgments?’ (2006) 20(2) Bioethics 92, 97.
128 See further, Anne Morris, ‘Selective Treatment of Irreversibly Impaired Infants: Decision Making at the Threshold’ 2009 
17(3) Medical Law Review 347, 363. 
129 Victor Yu, ‘Ethical and Moral Dilemmas in Neonates’ (2005) 1(2) World Journal of Pediatrics 88, 88.
130 Gillian M Craig, ‘On Withholding Nutrition and Hydration in the Terminally Ill: Has Palliative Medicine Gone Too Far?’
(1994) 20(3) Journal of Medical Ethics 139, 139.
131 This is considered in Chapter Five of this thesis.  
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An examination of some of the factors affecting medical stakeholders in end-of-life
decision making follows.
Religious beliefs and cross-country attitudes 
Having considered the role played by religious beliefs in influencing parents, this 
section considers whether doctors are also subject to such influences. Cross-country 
empirical research suggests that end-of-life decision making for neonates varies within 
Europe, with the secularity of certain countries also a determining factor.
The EPICure studies from the UK, considered in Chapter Three, and a EURONICS
study across Europe overwhelmingly indicate that doctors acknowledge that there 
must be ‘limits’ to the amount of intervention they provide to premature neonates.132
However, this is the only issue on which there is consensus. The studies reveal a 
surprising range of views as to the gestational age such decisions should be made. 
Some variability is understandable, given the differing jurisdictions and educational
backgrounds.
Warrick notes that the ‘highest rate of physicians in agreement was in the Netherlands, 
the UK and Sweden’.133 This is perhaps predictable, particularly given the progressive 
societal attitudes and secular democracies of these countries. The lowest rate of 
withdrawal of treatment decisions were in Spain and Italy, perhaps reflecting the 
132 Warrick et al, ‘Guidance for Withdrawal and Withholding of Intensive Care as Part of Neonatal End-of-life Care’ (2011) 98(1) 
British Medical Bulletin 99, 110.
133 Ibid.
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 strong Catholic influences operating in these countries. If correct, this supports the 
view of a religious influence in medical decision making.
Further, Rebagliato et al provide some important data that supports this correlation.134
They found that 33 per cent of doctors in Italy believed that all human life is sacred 
and therefore that all premature neonates should be treated aggressively regardless of 
severe disability as a consequence. The study also found that greater consideration to 
‘quality of life’ was made by female doctors that were either protestant or did not 
consider religion as an important factor in their lives.135
The resuscitation of premature neonates is mandatory in Italy, and the law strongly 
advocates a pro-life stance, even in instances of an induced late abortion.136 This 
creates a potential for internal conflict for an Italian doctor, where he or she may 
believe that withdrawal of treatment is in the best interests of the newborn. In such 
cases, the doctor’s decision is bound by the dominant faith, prevailing tenet of sanctity 
of life and the illegality of withdrawal of intensive care treatment in that country.137
Doctors of the Jewish or Muslim faith have also been found to make end-of-life
decisions based on their faith, sometimes justifying withdrawal of treatment based on 
Jewish law rather than considering the lawful authority of the country in which they 
reside. Warrick et al highlight this point:
134 Rebagliato et al, above n 2, 2451.
135 Ibid 2455.
136 Ibid 2458.
137 Pignotti, above n 114, 405.
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 In the Jewish faith active withdrawal of care, e.g. discontinuation of ventilation is forbidden. In 
clinically stable infants with a poor prognosis, withholding treatment is unacceptable as one should 
not judge the quality of another’s life. However, is an infant is likely to die then Jewish law states 
that ‘one must not impede the natural departure of the dying soul’.138
This decision-making process is challenging. Doctors are seemingly not only being 
guided subjectively by their religious beliefs, but also by religious laws that may not 
have any bearing on the laws of the relevant jurisdiction.
This is supported by Morris, who reinforces that subjective factors play a significant 
role in decision making, and that treatment decisions are often swayed by the social 
and religious values of the consulting physician. Morris claims that in situations in 
which the doctor held religion in high regard, the decision to withhold or withdraw 
treatment was less likely.139
Interestingly, Morris posits that, although doctors in the UK strongly believed that 
parents should be involved in decision making, they felt that the ultimate treatment 
decision rests with them (doctors). Significantly, she states that ‘ownership’ of the 
final decision provides doctors with the opportunity to give greater weight to their own 
personal non-clinical views.140
A study published in the Journal of Perinatology in 2007, found that American doctors 
made treatment withdrawal decisions based on their own interpretation of the ‘grey 
138 Warrick et al, above n 133, 110.
139 Morris, above n 129, 364. 
140 Ibid 365.
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 zone’ of gestational period. Eighty-five per cent of neonatologists in the study stated 
that resuscitation should be enforced anywhere between 22 weeks’ gestation to 26
weeks.141 In this study, the disparity of gestational ‘grey zones’ and doctors’ personal 
fear of litigation were the subjective factors that most determined treatment decisions, 
while religious beliefs or practices were less significant for this group of doctors. The 
study found, ‘the litigiousness of parents may result in resuscitation of infants against 
the physician’s better judgement’.142
By contrast, French neonatologists do not share a similar fear of litigation; on the 
contrary, they feel empowered to make decisions, often without seeking any parental 
involvement. French doctors perhaps perceive giving parents rights and choices in 
decision making as ‘opening the flood gates’ to issues of liability and arbitration. 
Orfali supports this view: ‘French neonatologists seem actually reluctant about any 
legal change that could restrict their action; and their attempts to provide rules for self-
regulation are a way of obviating the need for changes in the law’.143 The French 
medical system widely perceives the American legal system as an ‘anti-model’. Orfali 
finds:
…opposition to what they consider to be a perversion in the American legal system. Liability 
issues in the US are highly publicised in France, and are viewed as an anti-model contributing to 
on-going disputes between patients, parents, families and doctors’.144
141 A R Weiss et al, ‘Decision Making in the Delivery Room: A Survey of Neonatologists’ (2007) 27(12) Journal of Perinatology
754. 
142 Ibid 758.
143 Kristina Orfali, ‘Parental Role in Medical Decision Making: Fact or Fiction? A Comparative Study of Ethical Dilemmas in 
French and American Neonatal Intensive Care Units’ (2004) 58(10) Social Science and Medicine 2009, 2012.
144 Ibid.
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Doctors’ perceptions of death, disability and decision making 
Of the three stakeholder groups considered in this chapter, medical professionals have 
the most exposure to death. It is not uncommon for neonatologists and other medical 
professionals to experience the death of one or several patients in any given ‘working 
week’. While doctors may be thought to be accustomed to this, particularly considering 
that decisions to withdraw life-sustaining treatment are common in the NICU, this is 
often not the case, as explained below. 
A study conducted by Neonatologist Dr Peter Barr from NSW, Australia supports the 
view that there is a correlation between withdrawal or withholding life-sustaining 
treatment and doctors’ personal fears of death and dying. In the study, doctors were 
asked to consider forgoing life-sustaining treatment where its goal was to relive pain 
and suffering or where further treatment was considered futile and burdensome on the 
neonate. Given the sensitivity and possible illegality of the issue, the surveys were 
anonymously completed by both Australian and New Zealand neonatologists 
registered in units across both countries in 2004.145 Barr avoided any issues of 
contention:
What I indicted to them was that I was asking them something that was medico-legally illegal. 
And so I asked them to put that concern to one side for the purposes of answering the questions. 
So it’s a self-report questionnaire, rather than ask them what they do in practice.146
145 Peter Barr, ‘Relationships of Neonatologists: End-of-life Decisions to their Personal Fear of Death’ (2007) 92(2) Archives of 
Disease Child Fetal, Neonatal Edition 104–107. 
146 Barbara Miller, ‘1 in 3 Doctors Would Break the Law to Euthanase Disabled Babies: Survey’, AM, 7 February 2007 (Peter 
Barr) <http://www.abc.net.au/am/content/2007/s1842041.htm>. 
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 However, Barr’s assertion is not entirely correct: given the findings and purpose of the 
questionnaire, the findings were not ‘hypothetical’, but were more likely to relate to
‘clinical practice’. Of the 138 surveys distributed, 78 were returned. Ninety-four per 
cent of neonatologists stated that they would provide adequate medication to control 
pain and suffering, even if the dosage was too high and caused hastened death.147 Barr 
found that of the eight facets of ‘fear of death’ listed in the survey:
Doctors with a greater fear of the dying process and greater fear of premature death are more likely 
to accept hastening a newborn infant’s death when further treatment is non-beneficial or overly 
burdensome, whereas those with a greater fear of being destroyed are less likely to condone such 
an action.148
Further, the survey found that an overwhelming number of doctors were prepared to 
forgo treatment or provide pain relief with the intention of hastening death. Barr stated:
‘ANZ neonatologists seem to support the moral notion that it is sometimes “better to 
kill than let die” even though, the former is unlawful and seems not to respect the 
“sanctity of life”’.149
Barr demonstrates that it is possible to have an open, honest dialogue outside the closed 
doors of hospital meeting rooms, allowing non-medical professionals to understand 
what ‘really happens’.150 However, the information arising out of this dialogue does 
not sit comfortably with everyone. In his article, Schultz reported that Barr’s study 
147 Gudrun Shultz, One-Third of Australian Doctors Would Euthanize Sick Babies, Survey Finds (8 February 2007) 
LifeSitenews.com <http://www.lifesitenews.com/news/archive/ldn/2007/feb/07020806>. 
148 Barr, above n 146, 104, 106.
149 Ibid.
150 Loane Skene, Law and Medical Practice: Rights, Duties, Claims and Defences (Butterworths, 1998) 247.
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 found that ‘one third of Australian doctors would euthanise sick babies’, causing pro-
life activists to condemn the findings and question the rights of doctors to ‘kill another 
person’.151
Subjectivity is also evident when doctors make decisions to treat premature neonates 
in the face of severe lifelong disability. While some doctors make decisions to 
aggressively treat in light of their religious beliefs, others may take quality of life 
considerations into account. Orfali’s study, for example, found that French 
neonatologists considered the survival of a neonate with severe disability or 
impairment to be the ‘worst risk’ of continuing treatment.152
As considered in relation to parents as stakeholders, perceptions of disability and the 
future prospects of neonates are also factors affecting the decisions of treating doctors. 
Considering that the doctor will not have to bear the stress and financial burden of 
raising the disabled child, the doctor’s subjectivity in providing aggressive treatment 
to neonates that will survive with severe disability can be viewed as egotistical. This 
treatment choice may be a protection for the doctor’s own moral conscience, with little 
regard for the financial and emotional costs to the family and society once the child 
has left the NICU.153
In this regard, the French stance should be contrasted. The Orfali-led study found that
‘the acceptability of disability led to very pessimistic evaluations of the infant’s current 
151 Shultz, above n 148.
152 Orfali, above n 144, 2018.
153 This is discussed in Chapter Five of this thesis. 
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 and future condition’.154 One doctor interviewed for the study stated, ‘when one 
imposes such severe handicap on parents, one has a responsibility towards society’.155
French doctors thus appear to have a radically different approach to disability and 
premature neonates; that is, they recognise the burden to society once a child has left 
the NICU, and consider that the preservation of life at all costs is not absolute. This 
point is supported by Orfali’s findings that, ‘statistically there are more divorces and 
things like that … the same clinicians operate in the NICU and the follow up clinics 
gives them a kind of legitimate expertise: they know by experience the consequences 
of their medical intervention’.156
Another example of this wide-angle approach is that French neonatologists believe 
that their involvement and medical intervention is directly responsible for any arising
repercussions and that it is their ‘professional duty to correct them in the appropriate 
way’.157 One doctor stated, ‘the professional duty of neonatologists is to give parents 
a child in good condition. I have always thought we should limit treatment instead of 
giving (the parents) a handicapped child’.158 The French approach is undoubtedly 
paternalistic, although markedly different from the other examples of judicial and 
medical paternalism examined above. French neonatologists distinguish themselves in 
their confidence and clarity in linking their professional obligations to the infant and
its family to those they owe to society.
154 Orfali, above n 144, 2018
155 Ibid.
156 Ibid 2019.
157 Ibid.
158 Ibid.
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As considered in Chapter One, France was the birthplace of neonatology, the purpose 
of which was to help to rebuild France’s decimated population. While it may be 
expected that its long history with the field would make French medical professionals 
leaders in advocating for saving imperilled neonates, such a view would ignore that
neonatology did not derive from a sense of principle to save individual neonates. 
Rather, the development of neonatology was driven by considerations of the state; a
tradition that modern-day French neonatologists appear to be carrying forward.
Different parents, different treatment—Are parents treated differently by 
doctors? 
At a conference in Geneva in 2012, Chicago-based neonatologist, William Meadow,
discussed the socio-economic factors and attendant cultural attitudes of African 
American mothers such as often presented at his hospital. Many mothers that have 
neonates born at 23 weeks passionately express their desire for resuscitation at birth. 
Meadow recalled one woman stating ‘save my baby and treat me seriously as a woman 
in a bad situation’.159 However, when doctors are of the medical opinion that any 
treatment would be futile, they often allow parents to believe that they have ‘done 
everything they can’ to save their baby. Such ‘sham attempts’ allow parents to believe 
that everything that could possibly have been done to save their neonate has been done, 
and they are grateful that the doctors ‘tried’.
159 William Meadow, ‘Practice Variations in the Care of Critically Ill Neonates: Good, Bad or Simply Inevitable? (Speech 
delivered at the Ethical, Legal and Social Implications of Neonatal Intensive Care Units, Geneva, 4–5 June 2012) 
<http://www.brocher.ch/en/events/ethical-legal-and-social-implications-of-neonatal-intensive-care-units/>. 
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 This again highlights the imbalance of power between doctors and parents. However, 
in this instance, the play on power and the dispersal of information may actually save 
parents from heartache and guilt and assist them through the grieving process.
Doctors also make decisions to treat more aggressively based on the likelihood of a 
mother experiencing pregnancy again. This has become a more relevant issue in recent 
times with the development of reproductive technologies such as IVF.160
Older parents who have used reproductive technologies may be more willing to accept 
a child with severe disability, as the pregnancy may be their last chance of having a 
child. Meadow commented that ‘older mothers may consider wanting the child to 
survive even at odds of five per cent survival with one hundred per cent disability’.161
He further noted that this group of parents are more likely to be accepting of 
technology, given its utilisation to conceive in the first place.
According to Meadow, doctors were more willing to apply aggressive treatment for 
longer periods if the mother of the neonate was older, or had conceived by IVF 
treatment after several years of infertility.162 This attitude towards withdrawal of 
treatment could be perceived as discriminatory in nature. Moreover, such 
discrimination is not exclusive to the age or fertility history of the parent, it is also 
apparent in doctors’ perceptions of pre-term infants as patients.
160 This is particularly true of Australia, see, eg, Melissa Davey and Philip Ly, ‘Over-50 Mums on the Rise’, The Age (Online) 
15 June 2013 <http://www.theage.com.au/national/over50-mums-on-the-rise-20130614-2o9uc.html>. For a recent discussion 
about perceptions of age and fertility among women conceiving after the age of 40, see especially, K MacDougall, Y Beyene 
and RD Nachtigall, ‘Age Shock: Misperceptions of the Impact of Age on Fertility Before and After IVF in Women Who 
Conceived after Age 40’ (2013) 28(2) Human Reproduction 350–356.
161 Meadow, above n 160.
162 Ibid.
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Are pre-term infants treated differently to other patients?
While one might predict that there would be a strong desire on the part of doctors to
protect neonates given their fragile, vulnerable status, a study conducted by Canadian 
neonatologist Annie Janvier found that doctors and medical students did not prioritise 
treatment for premature neonates above other patients.
The study, which comprised an anonymous questionnaire, posed a scenario with eight 
critically ill patients ranging from a 24-weeks-premature neonate to an 80-year-old 
patient suffering dementia and a recent stroke. The patients in between this range 
included a two-month-old with meningitis, a 14-year-old with leukaemia and a 20 per 
cent chance of disability, a 35-year-old with brain cancer and a 100 per cent chance of 
handicap if operated on, and a seven-year-old with cerebral palsy and learning 
difficulties.163
Janvier noted 842 respondents, including neonatologists, obstetricians and emergency 
doctors, and students across the disciplines of anthropology, law, medicine and 
bioethics. She found that of the hypothetical patients, pre-term neonates ranked 
seventh out of eight, only ahead of the 80-year-old stroke victim.164 The median order 
ranked the two-month-old with meningitis as the patient that both medical practitioners 
and students would resuscitate if they could only treat one of the eight patients. Sixty-
163 Annie Janvier, ‘Neonates are Treated Differently from Older Children and Adults’ (Speech delivered at the Ethical, Legal and 
Social Implications of Neonatal Intensive Care Units, Geneva, 4–5 June 2012) <http://www.brocher.ch/en/events/ethical-legal-
and-social-implications-of-neonatal-intensive-care-units/>. See also, Laventhal et al, ‘Ethics of Resuscitation at Different Stages 
of Life: A Survey of Perinatal Physicians’ (2011) 127(5) Pediatrics 1221–1229. Power point presentation at Treuman Katz Center 
for Paediatric Bioethics, Seattle 2007 Conference <http://www.seattlechildrens.org/research/initiatives/bioethics/>. 
164 The order from first to eighth was: 2-month-old with meningitis, 7-year-old with multiple disabilities, 14-year-old with 
Leukaemia, full-term baby with brain malformation, 50-year-old trauma victim, 35-year-old with brain cancer, 24-week pre-term
and 80-year-old stroke victim. 
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one per cent of respondents ranked the 35-year-old with only a 5 per cent chance of 
survival and a 100 per cent chance of disability if operated on higher than the 24-week 
neonate. 
This study clearly indicates that premature neonates may be treated differently by 
medical practitioners. Janvier suggests that one reason for this may be that women are
able to abort a pregnancy at a similar gestational age; hence, a premature neonate may 
not be considered as having the same legal rights or status as other patients, even 
though born alive.
This aligns with Peter Singer’s view that neonates and young infants lack personhood, 
autonomy and self-consciousness, and that as such medical professionals and students 
‘de-value’ them as members of society.165 This further reinforces the power that 
doctors possess in making selective treatment decisions, and reiterates the potential
consequences of their subjectivity. 
The framing effect 
Subjectivity and variability extend to even the manner and type of information that 
physicians consider important for parents to know and understand. This can vary 
between doctors in one unit and across different departments, dependant on whether 
their focus is on withdrawal of treatment and palliative care or intensive care.166 This 
165 Peter Singer, Rethinking Life and Death (Text Publishing, 1994) 201.
166 Jox et al, ‘Medical Futility at the End of Life: The Perspectives of Intensive Care and Palliative Care Clinicians’ (2012) 38(9) 
Journal of Medical Ethics 540, 542.
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 is indicative of a possible internal power struggle between clinicians and departments 
in having the ‘final influencing role’ in life and death decisions.
McHaffie et al found that doctors gained confidence and authority in decision making 
through their personal experience. The experience gained then played a pivotal role in 
influencing recommendations in similar cases. Further, the development of strong 
communication skills to present a coherent and well-reasoned case directly influenced 
parents’ perceptions and opinions on treatment decisions. McHaffie et al
acknowledged that this is a dangerous path for doctors to take, and referred to 
‘recommendations becoming self-fulfilling prophecies’, leading to complacency in 
making decisions in which results can vary significantly.167 This view has been 
supported more recently by Wilkinson, who highlighted that such self-fulfilling 
prophecies ‘may compromise honest communication with families by causing doctors 
to mislead families about the patients chance of survival’.168
Janvier has discussed the ‘framing effect’:169 the technique of carefully managing the 
flow of critical information to parents. Janvier suggested that many parents only 
remember 25 per cent of the information they receive from the doctor. Accordingly, 
information and its absorption by parents is dependent on how a doctor ‘frames’ the 
conversation—thus the ‘framing effect’.170
Using this technique, doctors might explain to parents that half of neonates born at 23
weeks die and half survive. From this communication, parents tend to hear only the 
167 McHaffie et al, above n 8, 104, 106.
168 Wilkinson, above n 91, 401, 407. 
169 Janvier, above n 35.
170 Ibid. 
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 latter, positive, part of what is said. Presumably, the selective retention of information
on the part of parents is based on hope, as discussed earlier in this chapter. 
Janvier found that ‘there were differences in what doctors considered to be ‘important’ 
information and what the parent perceived as important’. Individuals generally prefer 
decreasing numbers, and consider what Janvier refers to as the ‘yuck factor’ last. 
However, the ‘yuck factors’ are what many doctors consider the most important: future 
prognosis, type of disability, pain and suffering—such information is confronting for 
many parents.171 The best approach is to present parents with pictures, crosses and 
ticks rather than charts, graphs and percentages. Instinctively, parents will seek even 
the slightest improvement or positivity in figures. Catherine Rutherford, interviewed 
by Wishart, confirms this view: ‘as a parent you hear what you want to hear, you cling 
onto that five per cent chance’.172
It is evident from the discussion above that doctors hold the ‘trump card’; and like in
any transaction in which there is room for negotiation, doctors will cajole, coerce or 
attempt to influence parents to their way of thinking. This is supported by Moro’s 
empirical research, in which a nurse stated that ‘she felt that the physician’s 
presentation of … information [chances of survival] was leading and may have 
affected decision making [for the parents].173 Further, many parents focused on the 
information with which they were provided by doctors, and were sensitive to whether 
information was expressed negatively or positively.174
171 See also, Wendy Yee and Sue Ross, ‘Communicating with Parents of High-Risk Infants in Neonatal Intensive Care’ (2006) 
11(5) Paediatric Child Health 291–294. 
172 The Price of Life, above n 20, 00.34.17.
173 Moro et al, above n 22, 52, 58. 
174 Ibid.
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 This suggests that, although doctors have the medical knowledge and power to dictate 
and sway parental decision making, often in the midst of emotional turmoil. A better 
approach may be to empower parents with information that is clear, honest and 
understandable. In this way, some balance can be injected into the parent–doctor power 
dynamic. 
Kuschel and Kent support this view:
…the relative emphasis of the information provided needs to be gauged against the needs of the 
family and an assessment of what is appropriate for the infant’s situation. It is critical that clinical 
staff are as objective as possible when information is provided yet empathetic to the circumstances 
of the family, as the tone or delivery of the message can have as great an impact as the content.175
The ‘framing effect’ is demonstrated in the findings of a survey of neonatologists 
conducted by Eichenwald et al. The survey posed a hypothetical scenario concerning 
further resuscitation decisions for a 23-week neonate. The same prognosis and 
information was framed as negative—the ‘chance of dying and likelihood of 
disability’—and positive—‘likelihood of survival with lack of disability’.176 Of those 
surveyed, 76 per cent chose to resuscitate and 24 per cent chose comfort care. 
However, the results from this study were not definitive for all parents and doctors. 
The reality is often very different: parents are in an unfamiliar, unpleasant 
environment, being bombarded with distressing information, framed by medical 
175 Kuschel and Kent, above n 92, 585, 587. 
176 Eichenwald et al, above n 79, 616, 618. 
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 professionals to convey selected information.177 This information leads to decisions 
which have irrevocable consequences, and thus must be balanced between rationality 
and humanity. It may be the case that such subjectivity in decision making 
overshadows the ultimate stakeholder—the neonate. It must not be forgotten that such 
decisions and conversations are to determine whether another human being lives or 
dies. 
With this is mind, Janvier makes a valuable point. She states that it is important to 
assist parents to understand numbers and data for them to make rational decisions, 
using both their head and their heart.178 Indeed, Janvier can be regarded an appropriate 
authority on this matter, considering her own experiences of making treatment
decisions following the birth of her daughter Violet at 24-weeks’ gestation.179
As she reports, although both she and her husband were neonatologists, their 
experiences and focuses differed. While she concentrated and relied on clinical 
statistics, data and her medical knowledge, her husband placed greater emphasis on 
emotions and any signs of movement or life. Their daughter survived, and the author 
acknowledges the importance that emotions play in decision making. As previously 
mentioned in this chapter, some of life’s most precious and influential moments centre
on emotion, and although emotions cannot be relied upon solely in cases of making 
such significant decisions, they should not be disregarded. As Higginson and Janvier 
177 A better view is held by Dr Ross Haslam, Associate Professor of Neonatal Medicine at the Women’s and Children’s Hospital 
in Adelaide, Australia, who described re-phrasing withdrawal of care more sensitively to parents as ‘re-directing’ care to palliative 
care.
178 Janvier, above n 35.
179 Kimberley Pfeiffer, ‘The Ethics of Caring: Expressing Humanity towards Babies Born at the Borderline of Viability’ (2008) 
20(2) Bioethics Research Notes 21, 23.
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state, ‘medical research narrowly focuses on issues that can be measured …
[However,] most decisions in life are not based on measurable quantities’.180
The roster lottery
In Chapter Three, the examination of clinical guidelines and frameworks concluded 
that there is no objective unified set of rules that is adhered to by medical professionals
when making end-of-life decisions. There are an abundance of non-exclusive 
guidelines to which to refer; however, the non-binding nature of these reflects that 
decisions regarding treatment are unaudited and rarely challenged.
Within same states governed and funded by the same health systems, different 
hospitals exercise their prerogatives based on religious or cultural factors.181 The scope 
of subjectivity extends to the doctor treating patients within one unit. Some doctors 
may treat more aggressively that others, allowing their own beliefs and opinions to 
override the wishes of parents, and possibly the best interests of the neonate.
Given the number of variables and the amount of subjectivity that doctors apply when 
making end-of-life decisions, the term ‘roster lottery’ seems appropriately fitting here. 
In the crudest form, this term highlights the depth of physician subjectivity, where 
decisions may be based primarily on their own values and belief systems. Which 
doctor is on call when a 23-week neonate is delivered can potentially be the deciding 
factor in whether treatment is withdrawn, withheld or continued. 
180 Jason D Higginson, ‘Emotion, Suffering and Hope: Commentary on “How Much Emotion is Enough?”’ (2007) 18(4) The 
Journal of Clinical Ethics 377, 378.
181 Examples of religious affiliated hospitals in Melbourne are The Mercy and St Vincent’s Hospital.
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One result of this might be that parents decide to ‘shop around’ for a hospital and 
particular doctor that they believe is more inclined to treat or not treat in accordance 
with their own values and beliefs. Such decision making is random, unethical and 
indefensible, given that decisions are being made about life and death, with the 
consequences being absolute.
Wilkinson and Troug assert that arbitrary decision making may be particularly 
prevalent when the patient’s values are unclear.182 This certainly seems to be the case 
in making decisions for premature neonates. Wilkinson and Troug further 
acknowledge that varying attitudes can ‘impact on actual decisions’.183 This supports
the call of this thesis for developments aimed at reducing subjectivity in decision 
making regarding withdrawing or withholding treatment for critically ill neonates.
Finally, having considered the extent of doctors’ subjectivity in making end-of-life
decisions, it is appropriate to pose the question: Should the role of doctors, and the 
autonomy that they are given, be reduced?
Should doctors be considered as functionaries? 
The beginning of this chapter discussed the shift in societal attitudes from an 
acceptance of the traditional ‘doctor knows best’ approach towards a more 
autonomous and rights-driven culture in which patients feel confident in challenging 
medical opinion. Indeed, as detailed above, the former approach suffers from
182 Dominic Wilkinson and Robert D Truog, ‘The Luck of the Draw: Physician-related Variability in End-of-life Decision Making 
in Intensive Care’ (2013) 39(6) Intensive Care Medicine 1128, 1128.
183 Ibid 1131.
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 inconsistency and subjectivity on the part of medical practitioners making life and 
death decisions. Supported by a wealth of academic literature, incumbent in the 
acceptance of the shift towards the latter rights-driven approach is a consequent 
requirement to question the medical profession and their essential function.
Certain standard ethical practices are understood by doctors and patients alike as 
unacceptable. Examples include not having sexual relations with patients, and not 
disclosing confidential patient information. The question then is why doctors basing 
their decisions on their own personal and religious beliefs is allowed to slip through 
the ethical net. One reason would be that this issue is contested. Foster, for example,
believes that for medicine to be practiced to its full potential, doctors need to be more 
holistic and autonomous. He asks, ‘how can they [doctors] be equipped to deal 
effectively with the complex bundles of contradictions they call their patients?’184
However, a more realistic view is held by medical doctor and ethicist Julian Savulescu, 
who succinctly states:
To be a doctor is to be willing and able to offer appropriate medical interventions that are legal, 
beneficial, desired by the patient and a part of a just healthcare system. If we do now allow moral 
values or self interest to corrupt the delivery of the just and legal delivery of such health services, 
we should not let other values, such as religious values, corrupt them either.185
Savulescu’s view is persuasive. An objective, fair system of medical treatment is 
crucial. Taxpayers, who fund public health systems, should be confident that treatment 
184 Charles Foster, ‘Why Doctors Should Get a Life’ (2009) 102(12) Journal of Royal Society of Medicine 518, 519. 
185 Julian Savulescu, ‘Conscientious Objection in Medicine’ (2006) 332 British Medical Journal 294, 295.
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 will be dispensed in a fair, just and objective manner, precluding doctors’ subjective 
values or judgments. As Savulescu points out, ‘public servants must act in the public 
interest, not their own’.186
The role of doctors should be functional. Savulescu states ‘…a primary goal of a health 
service is to protect the health of its recipients’.187 He takes this expression further,
arguing that ‘doctors who compromise the delivery of medical services to patients on 
conscience grounds must be punished through removal of licence to practise and other 
legal mechanisms’.188
It is important to note that to ‘protect the health of recipients’ is not necessarily the 
absolute extension of treatment, particularly in the case of premature birth, where 
survival is unlikely or carries a risk of severe and debilitating disability. It may be that 
the best way to protect fragile patients is not to prolong their inevitable death or pain 
and suffering.
Given the significant role that subjective beliefs and values play in decision making, 
it would be appropriate to reduce doctors’ decision-making powers, placing greater 
emphasis on clinical and technical factors dictated by an overseeing body or governed 
by stricter sanctions and protocols to which doctors must adhere. Doyal and Lister 
support this view, highlighting the need for public policy on treatment decisions, to 
186 Ibid 297.
187 Ibid 296.
188 Ibid.
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 overcome the ‘rules of thumb’ that doctors apply to cases, based on their own ‘personal 
convictions’.189
Bagaric and Amarasekara assert that, although doctors’ views should be considered, 
they should by no means be the vehicle that drives decision making in a particular 
direction:
Quite simply, there is no reason to think that doctors have a higher level of moral insight that the 
rest of the community. Certainly, their views should not be discounted—the views of any member 
of the community concerning moral issues cannot be ignored. However, they should not be given 
any extra weight…190
As discussed in Chapter Two, the medical profession plays a crucial role in 
determining and defining the principles of best interests and futility;191 concepts on
which the courts rely when hearing treatment disputes. Doctors define and characterise 
the very concept of futility, as Stewart eloquently stated: ‘part of the problem with the 
concept of futility is that it is a subjective notion masquerading as a form of 
professional, objective and scientific assessment’.192
189 L Doyal and D Wilsher, ‘Towards Guidelines for the Withholding and Withdrawal of Life Prolonging Treatment in Neonatal 
Medicine’ (1994) 70(1) Archives in Disease in Childhood 66, 69.
190 Mirko Bagaric and Kumar Amarasekara, ‘Euthanasia: Why it Doesn’t Matter (Much) What the Doctor Thinks and Why There 
is No Suggestion that Doctors Should Have a Duty to Kill’ (2002) 10(2) Journal of Law and Medicine 221, 227.
191 See, further, Lindy Willmott, Ben White and Jocelyn Downie, ‘Withholding and Withdrawal of “Futile” Life-Sustaining 
Treatment: Unilateral Medical Decision-making in Australia and New Zealand’, (2013) 20(4) Journal of Law and Medicine 907–
924. The authors highlight that in multidisciplinary literature, there are a range of definitions used for the concept of futility,
including ‘will not work’ to ‘not worth doing’.
192 Cameron L Stewart, ‘A Defence of the Requirement to Seek Consent to Withhold and Withdraw Futile Treatments’ (2012)
196(6) Medical Journal of Australia 406, 406.
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 Yet, because this concept arises out of the medical profession, often, no other 
stakeholder, not even a judge, will contest or overrule a doctor’s definition of futility 
or decision to withdraw or withhold treatment. This display of professional sovereignty 
is clear, and Stewart correctly asserts:
The medical concept of futility is based on a similar concept of sovereignty: in situations of end 
of life care, it is the medical profession who control the definition of futility and therefore control 
what treatments are provided to the exclusion of other claims for control.193
Doctors thus have the overwhelming power in making life and death decisions. The 
gravity of this power has been commented on by Willmott, White and Downie,194 who
provide four compelling observations about the current practice and power that 
medical practitioners in Australia and New Zealand have in relation to treatment 
decisions:
1. There is no general duty on doctors to provide treatment that they consider to be futile.
2. Doctors do not need consent from the patient or a substitute decision maker, or 
authorisation from the courts or elsewhere to withdraw or withhold treatment they 
consider to be futile.
3. They are the decision makers as to when their duty to treat ends, and for determining 
when treatment is futile.
4. There is no obligation on the part of the treating doctor to facilitate the resolution of a 
dispute in this way [by means of a court/tribunal]. The onus rests on the family or other 
party objecting to the treatment being withheld or withdrawn.
193 Cameron Stewart, ‘Futility Determination as a Process: Problems with Medical Sovereignty, Legal Issues and the Strengths 
and Weakness of the Procedural Approach’ (2011) 8(2) Journal of Bioethical Inquiry 155, 156.
194 Willmott, White and Downie, above n 192, 914–915.
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 These observations reinforce the need for clarity in the roles that doctors play. The 
medical practitioner’s role should be reduced from decision maker to medical enabler 
in the decision-making process, and their activities, whether undertaken or not, should 
adhere to certain protocols and be accountable, auditable and subject to rigorous 
review and penalty.195
The final stakeholder group considered in this chapter is the judiciary. 
V: The Judiciary: Over-reliance on medical opinion
The rule of law commands that courts are the ultimate decision-making body in 
relation to legal disputes, including those relating to neonates. Thus, there is no 
question that judges have the final say. However, the rule of law also requires that laws 
are clear, certain, knowable and predictable.
As noted in Chapter Two, the current application of the best-interests principle in 
decisions to withdraw or withhold life-sustaining treatment is ill-defined, insufficient 
and too vague to provide guidance in this area. Moreover, the judicial function is 
relation to this issue is potentially undermined by the deference that judges have to 
medical opinion.
It is widely accepted in society that the ultimate arbiter, which should be the most 
independent and objective, is the judiciary. Decisions and justice should be blind to 
the preferences or subjectivity of others. However, as has been illustrated thus far, end-
195 Stewart, above n 194, 155, 157, 162. 
213
 
                                                          
 of-life decision making concerning critically ill neonates is often determined by a
range of subjective factors. 
As discussed in Chapter Two, when parents and doctors disagree on whether treatment 
should be withdrawn or withheld, the courts are required to make a determination. Less 
common in Australia than in the UK, some of these decisions merely require the 
sanction of the court, whereas others require active determination.
Where a determination has been required by the courts, overwhelmingly judges have 
agreed with medical opinion to withdraw treatment, consequently leading to the death 
of the neonate. This raises questions as to the weight placed on medical opinion by the 
courts, and in turn raises questions of bias and impartiality. The judiciary seemingly 
defer to medical opinion, despite the gravity of these life and death decisions. This is 
evinced in the case of A National Health Service v D,196 in which Justice Cazalet stated, 
‘it is well established that there can be no question of the court directing a doctor to 
provide treatment which he or she is unwilling to give and which is contrary to that 
doctor’s clinical judgement’.197
Thus far in this thesis, a number of factors have been considered that support the 
contention that there is a need for greater transparency and objectivity in decision 
making for imperilled neonates. The following observations have been highlighted:
1. The imprecise and ill-defined best-interests principle 
2. The lack of uniformity or coherence of clinical guidelines
196 A National Health Service v D [2000] 2 FLR 677.
197 Cited in Skene, above n 151, 357.
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 3. The documented subjectivity of medical practitioners doctors in end-of-
life decision making.
Further, the judiciary’s deference to the medical profession and reliance on medical 
opinion is of concern. Indeed, Coggon asserts that such deference might ‘permit the 
doctor to do what he wants, unhindered because of the application of the notoriously 
troublesome Bolam test and an excessively deferential judiciary’.198
Arguably, parents seeking the continuation of medical treatment against medical 
opinion are fighting a losing battle on two fronts. Firstly, in the hospital where medical 
professionals have expertise far beyond that of parents, allowing non-medical and 
subjective criteria into the decision-making process to withhold or withdraw treatment. 
Secondly, in the court room, judges’ decisions to withdraw or withhold treatment 
reflect their heavy reliance on medical opinion. This suggests that the medical 
profession has a significant amount of power and authority in the decision-making 
process, both in the hospital setting and in court.199
The effect of this excessive weight given to medical opinion has been acknowledged 
and noted by the medical profession, and as such has possibly further empowered them
due to their awareness that the highest authority, the law, is unlikely to question their 
clinical judgment or opinion. Fortin highlights this: 
198 Cited in Muireann Quigley, ‘Best Interests: The Power of the Medical Profession, and the Power of the Judiciary’ (2008) 16(3) 
Health Care Analysis 233, 234. The Bolam test is discussed in Chapter Two. 
199 See further, Sabine Michalowski, ‘Reversal of Fortune—Re A (Conjoined Twins) and Beyond: Who Should Make Treatment 
Decisions on Behalf of Young Children?’ (2001) 9 Health Law Journal, 149, 168.
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 …there seemed little point in parents seeking the courts judicial assessment of situation involving 
children—since the answer would always be that the doctors were to be guided by their own 
clinical judgement … it led doctors and their lawyers to conclude that since a court would never 
direct them to act against their clinical judgement, they themselves did not need court authority to 
override parents objections…200
Lord Woolf also acknowledged the judiciary’s preference for, or excessive weighting 
on, medical opinion, and identified the risks this can pose in presiding over treatment 
disputes in the courts. He rightly cautioned:
…It is unwise to place any profession or other body providing services to the public on a pedestal 
where their actions cannot be subject to close scrutiny. The greater the power the body has, the 
more important is this need.201
Such an acknowledgment is remarkable for its frankness, and is cautionary for the 
potential to abuse such power. As Stewart correctly asserts, ‘the power wielded by the 
courts is open to public scrutiny. The power wielded by doctors in nursing homes and 
hospitals is not’.202 In light of this, and with reference to decision making as it affects 
the withdrawing or withholding of treatment from critically ill neonates, this thesis 
recommends that doctors be considered functionaries, and that the judiciary should 
take ultimate responsibility for decisions that have such absolute consequences.
200 Jane Fortin, Children’s Rights and the Developing Law (Cambridge University Press, 3rd ed, 2009) 373.
201 Right Honourable The Lord Woolf, ‘Are the Courts Excessively Deferential to the Medical Profession?’ (2001) 9(1) Medical
Law Review 1, 15.
202 Cameron Stewart, ‘Legal Constructions of Life and Death in the Common Law’ (2002) 2(Summer) Oxford University 
Commonwealth Law Journal 67, 89.
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 Ongoing research by Willmott et al at the Queensland University of Technology in 
Australia is of particular importance to this thesis. The authors are currently 
undertaking a project that encompasses empirical research as to the ‘role of law in 
medicine’.203 Although this research is based on withdrawal or withholding of life-
sustaining treatment from adults who lack capacity, the research, findings and 
recommendations will also be of benefit with regard to decisions concerning critically 
ill neonates, given their similar lack of capacity and autonomy. 
In a series of three articles that explore and examine the legal role of doctors in 
withdrawing or withholding life-sustaining treatment from incapacitated adults across 
NSW, Queensland and Victoria, the authors emphasise the importance of educating 
the medical fraternity about the law.204 This is valuable and should extend to doctors 
treating and making end-of-life decisions for critically ill neonates, particularly 
because of the confronting nature of this area of decision making, which, as has been 
noted in this chapter, also remains highly subjective.
As Willmott et al correctly assert, ‘medicine is no longer an autonomous professional 
enterprise, but a social endeavor occurring within social, cultural and legal 
203 B White, L Willmott, M Parker, C Cartwright and G Williams, ‘Should Law Have a Role in End-of-life Care? (2012) 42(9) 
Internal Medicine Journal 966–967. See also, Health Law Research Centre, Withholding and Withdrawing Life-Sustaining 
Medical Treatment from Adults Who Lack Capacity: The Role of Law in Medical Practice, Queensland University of Technology
<http://www.qut.edu.au/research/research-projects/withholding-and-withdrawing-life-sustaining-medical-treatment>. 
204 See especially, Ben White, Lindy Willmott, Pip Trowse, Malcolm Parker and Colleen Cartwright, ‘The Legal Role of Medical 
Professionals in Decisions to Withhold or Withdraw Life-Sustaining Treatment: Part 1 (New South Wales) (2011) 18(3) Journal 
of Law and Medicine 498–522; Lindy Willmott, Ben White, Malcolm Parker and Colleen Cartwright, ‘The Legal Role of Medical 
Professionals in Decisions to Withhold or Withdraw Life-Sustaining Treatment: Part 2 (Queensland) (2011) 18(3) Journal of Law 
and Medicine 523–544 and Lindy Willmott, Ben White, Malcolm Parker and Colleen Cartwright, The Legal Role of Medical 
Professionals in Decisions to Withhold or Withdraw Life-Sustaining Treatment: Part 3 (Victoria) 18(4) Journal of Law and
Medicine 773–797. 
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 frameworks’.205 Given the organic relationship between law and medicine, better 
education and knowledge of the law should translate to more informed and considered 
decisions being made by doctors, and should create a platform for more objective end-
of-life decision making. Undoubtedly, this much-needed research and its findings will 
provide for seminal work in the area of the withdrawal or withholding of life-
sustaining treatment in the future.
Thus far, it has been considered in this thesis that medical opinion has informed and 
continues to inform legal opinion and decisions to withdraw or withhold life-sustaining 
treatment. White et al note that ‘there is no duty [on the part of doctors] to provide 
futile treatment’ and as such ‘he or she [the doctor] is the legal-decision-maker and 
may decline to treat’.206 This has been highlighted in relation to critically ill neonates, 
with doctors often overriding parental wishes. 
For the rule of law to operate more effectively in this area, it is important that the 
determining factors in end-of-life decision making for critically impaired neonates are 
clarified. This thesis argues that one determining objective factor that should be given 
greater emphasis in this area of decision making is the allocation of limited public 
resources. Chapter Five discusses this recommendation in more detail.
VI: Conclusion 
205 Willmott, White, Parker and Cartwright, ‘The Legal Role of Medical Professionals in Decisions to Withhold or Withdraw 
Life-Sustaining Treatment: Part 3’, above n 205, 773–794.
206 Ibid 787. 
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 In this chapter, stakeholders have been shown to make withdrawal of treatment 
decisions based on subjective factors. The parent’s role in decision making is 
complicated by a range of conflicting factors and claims. Further, medical 
practitioners, the stakeholder group typically credited with basing their decisions on 
objectivity and clinical expertise, were also found to make unpredictable, subjective 
treatment decisions. Moreover, considering the heavy reliance the judiciary place on
medical opinion, this group of stakeholders also cannot be said to operate objectively 
in the decision-making process. Such approaches to end-of-life decision making for 
critically impaired neonates are indefensible, given that life is at stake.
This thesis argues that decision making should be guided by a greater rationality and 
objectively. Thus, decision making for neonates born extremely prematurely should 
be informed by consideration of the allocation of finite public resources. This issue is 
now considered in the following chapter.
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 CHAPTER FIVE: AN OBJECTIVE APPROACH: RESOURCE 
ALLOCATION AND OTHER RECOMMENDATIONS
I: Summary
The previous chapter examined the role of the key stakeholders in making the decision 
to withdraw or withhold life-sustaining treatment from critically ill neonates. Chapter 
Four considered the various factors that influence decision making for parents, doctors 
and the judiciary.
The chapter identified that both parents and doctors are highly subjective in their 
decision making. The judiciary was also found not to be objective; instead 
demonstrating an over-reliance on medical opinion. It was concluded that a more 
objective approach is needed, particularly when making end-of-life decisions for
neonates born at ‘the edge of viability’.
II: Introduction
This penultimate chapter asks some difficult questions about the cost of keeping 
premature neonates alive. For example, what is the cost to society and to families of 
keeping severely premature neonates alive? Are desirable outcomes being achieved by 
keeping them alive, considering especially those cases in which the neonate’s life is 
likely to be limited and of poor quality?
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 Recommendations are also made regarding improving consistency and outcomes in 
end-of-life decision-making processes. In particular, the allocation of limited 
healthcare resources is proposed as an objective factor that should be considered in 
decisions to withdraw or withhold life-sustaining treatment from impaired neonates.
Specifically, the question is whether the limited resources available to health 
institutions could and/or should be invested in neonatal or other patients.
Any discussion of the healthcare required to sustain severely premature neonates 
would be incomplete without a full discussion of the associated resource costs. 
Resource allocation might be considered as the true objective standard in this area, the 
consideration of which would reduce much of the subjectivity and emotion that 
currently informs decision making, allowing for a more pragmatic approach. This 
chapter begins by discussing some of the key concepts that underpin current 
approaches to health economics.
III: Economic terminology and quality adjusted life years measures
With increasing demands for, and limited supply of, health resources, it is unsurprising 
that health economics is a rapidly growing field.1 Culyer has defined health economics 
as:
1 For a discussion on the theory of supply and demand in relation to health economics, see generally, Gavin Mooney, ‘Health 
Economics and Health Policy’ in Gavin Mooney and Richard Scotton (eds), Economics and Australian Health Policy (Allen 
and Unwin, 1998) 1–13.  
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 …the application of the discipline and tools of economics to the subject matter of health, 
accordingly encompasses the full range of two-way causal relationships between the health status 
of individuals and groups and their economic activities—production, distribution and exchange.2
Klein discussed health economics with reference to the National Health Service in the 
UK as:
As more emphasis is placed on market transactions so the demand for economic analysis will grow
… hence the importance of looking critically at the discipline and its claim to use rational 
techniques of analysis to resolve complex problems of decision making in the NHS.3
Health economics is supported by a wealth of literature, where the main concepts,
including methods of measuring the economic value of healthcare, can be distilled to 
cost-effectiveness and cost utility.4
Commentators have used this methodology in their critical analysis of the cost of 
resourcing the NICU. By way of example, Zupancic et al found that ‘the incremental 
direct medical cost of low birth weight in the first year of life in the United States 
exceeded $4 billion in 1988’.5 Other commentators estimated the direct cost of NICUs
in the United States in 2004 to be closer to $21 billion.6 Regarding Australia, Campbell 
noted:
2 Quoted in, Robert Evans, Strained Mercy: The Economics of Canadian Health Care (Butterworths, 1984) 3. 
3 Rudolf Klein, ‘The Role of Health Economics’ (1989) 299(6694) British Medical Journal 275, 275.
4 Erik Nord et al, ‘Maximizing Health Benefits vs Egalitarianism: An Australian Survey of Health Issues’ (1995) 41(10) Social 
Science & Medicine 1429, 1429.
5 Zupancic et al, ‘Economics of Prematurity in the Era of Managed Care’ (2000) 27(2) Clinics in Perinatology 483, 483.
6 John D Lantos and William L Meadow, Neonatal Bioethics: The Moral Challenges of Medical Innovation (John Hopkins 
University Press, 2006) 124. 
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 The typical (only initial hospitalisation after birth) costs for early birth weight babies in intensive 
care units are around $A 1,000 per day, and average hospitalisation costs around $A 50,000–$A 
80,000 per baby. The earlier the gestation, the higher the cost. To achieve a survivor at 24 weeks 
in our region costs around $A 300,000.7
In considering the cost of keeping neonates alive, Campbell indicated that the returns 
are relatively small given the large sums spent on keeping these babies alive. In light 
of both dollars and percentile of disability, the author noted:
Care is nowadays offered at 23 weeks’ gestation, when the chances of survival are less than 10%, 
the chances of serious handicap in survivors around 30% and the cost for each survivor between 
$300,000–$400,000 … do caregivers really have a mandate from their society to use such large 
resources when returns are so poor? 8
Over 20 years ago, in a study conducted at Flinders Medical Centre in Adelaide, 
Australia, Marshall et al highlighted the expense involved in keeping neonates alive.
Concluding in September 1984, the study illustrated the specific costs incurred 
including the largest cost to any hospital, staffing.9 While medical staff represented a 
significant cost, many other elements also required consideration. These included 
‘consumable, recyclable and ancillary services’, such as sterile linen, hospital porters
and radiology, all of which are required daily or several times a week.10 In 1984, the 
7 Neil Campbell, ‘When Care Cannot Cure: Medical Problems in Seriously Ill Babies’ in Helga Kuhse and Peter Singer (eds), 
Bioethics: An Anthology (Blackwell Publishing, 2nd ed, 2006) 303, 307.
8 Ibid 303.
9 Marshall et al, ‘The Cost of Intensive and Special Care Of the Newborn’ (1989) 150(10) Medical Journal of Australia, 568, 
569. For a general discussion about the health care system in Australia, see, Michelle Foster and Jennifer Fleming, ‘The Health 
Care System in Australia’ in Sandra Taylor, Michelle Foster and Jennifer Fleming (eds), Health Care Practice in Australia: 
Policy, Context and Innovations (Oxford University Press, 2008) 46–73. 
10 Marshall et al, above n 9, 572.
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 figure arrived at by Marshall et al was $690 AUD per day, including all services 
required for a high dependency infant. 
It is likely that, to arrive at a present-day estimate, these costs would have to be doubled
or tripled, simply to adjust for inflation. This is without any consideration for capital 
expenditure costs, and the increased costs of modern-day technology, which would far 
outstrip any technology expenditure in 1984.
This is supported by Bennett, who stated that ‘advances in medical technology have 
also placed additional burdens on health care resources with the development of more 
expensive items of medical equipment or forms of medical treatment’.11
An important clarification is that the figures discussed thus far relate only to staffing, 
accommodation, medicine and equipment costs within the NICU. They do not include
the follow-up healthcare and services required post-discharge from the NICU.12
Calculating direct running costs of a NICU provides an overview of the expenditure 
that hospitals incur. However, this will vary by hospital and country. Further, such 
calculations are invariably under-estimations, as various other factors and costs cannot 
be accounted for by a hospital or government balance sheet. These other costs and 
expenditures will be examined later in this chapter. The next section examines a
popular tool used to measure cost utilisation in healthcare—the quality adjusted life 
years (QALY) measure.
11 Belinda Bennett, ‘Resource Allocation and the Beginning of Life’ (1993) 9(spring) Journal of Contemporary Health Law & 
Policy 77, 78.
12 Staffing is the highest cost, including nurses, doctors, social workers and therapists, see also, Zupancic et al, above n 5, 483–
497. 
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 IV: Quality adjusted life years
The QALY is a common measure applied when examining financial resources in 
healthcare. It attempts to combine economics and philosophy in measuring cost of 
healthcare against health benefits.13
Several explanations are available in the health economics literature as to how QALY 
is measured. Williams’ work on QALY is regarded as seminal, with Hope et al giving
Williams’ definition of QALY as:
The essence of a QALY is that it takes a year of healthy life expectancy to be worth 1, but regards 
a year of unhealthy life expectancy as worth less than 1. Its precise value is lower the worse the
quality of life of the unhealthy person (which is what the quality adjusted bit is all about).14
Therefore, the general premise of QALY is that each year that can be lived in good 
health is of a higher value than each year that is lived in poor health. Adjustments to 
the measure are made accordingly. In economic terms, the lower the cost of obtaining 
positive full health years, the more cost-efficient the treatment is and the greater the 
priority to provide healthcare. The main objective of health economics is to ‘get the 
13 One of the founding professors of the field of health economics is Professor George Torrance, of McMaster University. His 
extensive research in the economics of healthcare includes the application of health economics to the area of neonatal intensive 
care. See especially, Boyle et al, ‘Economic Evaluation of Neonatal Intensive Care of Very-Low-Birth-Weight Infants’ (1983) 
308(22) New England Journal of Medicine 1330–1337. For a discussion and evaluation of quality-adjusted life years, see, eg,
George W Torrance and David Feeny, ‘Utilities and Quality-adjusted Life Years’ (1989) 5(4) International Journal of Technology 
Assessment in Health Care 559–575; George Torrance, ‘Measuring Utilities for Health States’ in Sean McHugh and Michael T 
Vallis (eds), Illness Behavior (Springer, 1987) 365–376. See also, Tony Hope, Julian Savulescu and Judith Hendrick, Medical 
Ethics and Law: The Core Curriculum (Churchill Livingstone Elsevier, 2nd ed, 2008) 202.
14 Hope, Savulescu and Hendrick, above n 13, 202. See also, Allan Williams, ‘The Value of QALYs’ (1985) (3) Health and Social 
Service Journal 3. 
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 best possible value for each dollar spent’.15 Lockwood has applied a rational approach 
to QALYs, asserting that it is essentially about ‘trading off length of life against quality 
of life’.16
The measure is not without its critics. Some commentators have criticised QALYs as 
being an unjust measure for calculating welfare and quality of life.17 Arguably, 
combining philosophical and morals tenets about life and its worth with calculated, 
measured economics does not make for a congruent equation. Using numerical scales 
to score the value and quality of life in negative or positive sums also raises ethical 
concerns. As discussed in Chapter Two, attempts to define quality of life and futility 
of treatment are highly subjective. 
Perceptions of disability and quality of life vary between abled and disabled 
individuals. Bennett suggests that judgments by abled bodied persons about living with 
a disability are due chiefly to a ‘lack of understanding about the realities involved’.18
It would be grossly incorrect to assume that those living with a disability do not and 
are not capable of leading happy and fruitful lives. This may be because they 
fundamentally value life in any form, or have never experienced life without disability 
and therefore cannot draw any type of comparison.19 The reverse is also true, and will 
be explored later in this chapter. The next section, considers the application of QALY
to neonates, the subject of this thesis. 
15 Helga Kuhse and Peter Singer, ‘Age and the Allocation of Medical Resources’ (1988) 13(1) Journal of Medicine and Philosophy
101, 102.
16 Michael Lockwood, ‘Quality of Life and Resource Allocation’ in Helga Kuhse and Peter Singer (eds), Bioethics: An Anthology
(Blackwell Publishing, 2nd ed, 2006) 451, 453.
17 Hope, Savulescu and Hendrick, above n 13, 203.
18 Bennett, above n 11, 88.
19 Norman Daniels, ‘Justice, Health and Healthcare’ (2001) 1(2) American Journal of Bioethics 2, 4.
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 V: Quality adjusted life years and neonates
At both ends of the human life cycle, QALYs and their application are subject to 
increased scrutiny and controversy. In measuring cost utility for premature neonates,
particularly those born at 23 weeks, QALYs become difficult. Neonates born at the 
edge of viability have a significantly higher likelihood of suffering severe disability or 
retardation. Therefore, overwhelmingly, extremely premature neonates never start life 
with a QALY value of 1 and are unlikely to ever reach that value. Neonates born at 23
weeks are likely to have a poor quality of life, both physically and economically. 
Academics Kuhse and Singer apply the QALY and cost benefit analysis in a crude but 
rational manner. They highlight that, where the chances of handicap to a premature 
infant are low, the benefit should outweigh the cost. However, where the risk of severe 
handicap is high and there is the chance of a second pregnancy producing a healthy 
and abled child, then the high cost of NICU to save the premature neonate ‘produces 
a loss rather than a gain’.20
The authors note that society tends to assume that ‘it is better to save the lives of the 
young than the old, and the younger those saved are, the better it is’.21 However, it
may be that those that advocate for scarce resources to be used to save the young rather 
than the old apply the notion that the young have their entire lives ahead of them, that
they are the future and should have the opportunity to experience life and all it has to 
offer.
20 Kuhse and Singer, above n 15, 112.
21 Ibid 102.
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 Kuhse and Singer argue against this idea that saving the very young is better than
saving an adult:
The lives of people can be seen as journeys on which they have embarked. Although people know 
that the final destination must be death, there are goals along the way that they are hoping to 
achieve before the trip is over. Adding life-years extends the journey.22
In contrast, Kuhse and Singer argue that foetuses and newborn infants are yet to gain 
the capacity to embark on life’s journey:
There is no sharp, morally significant boundary between the foetus and newborn infant. If the 
foetus lacks the capacity to itself as being with a future, so presumably does the newborn infant
… being capable of seeing itself as a traveller, and capable of wanting to reach some goal, however 
simple that goal might be, then the journey does not begin at birth.23
Further to this, severely premature neonates are unlikely to ever gain the capacity 
required to independently travel life’s journey or to see many goals or aspirations come 
to fruition. The authors suggest that, when having to decide whether scare resources 
should be given to a newborn in NICU or to an adult, they should go to the adult, as 
any improvement in health could allow that person a few more years on the long-
travelled journey they have already embarked upon. This outcome is not as assured in 
the case of a baby in NICU. The argument put forward by Kuhse and Singer is 
supported by a study conducted in Melbourne, Australia by Nord et al, and published 
in the Social Science and Medicine Journal in 1995. 
22 Ibid 106.
23 Ibid 107.
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 In this study, a questionnaire was distributed to individuals from varying socio-
economic groups, asking respondents to consider the prioritisation of treatment and 
patients, taking into account factors such as age, lifestyle and dependents. The third 
scenario posed in the questionnaire is of interest to this thesis. 
When asked to consider which patient should receive one available organ transplant,
44.2 per cent of respondents stated the organ should be given to ‘the young child’ as 
opposed to the ‘newborn infant’.24 The authors of the study noted that ‘the common 
reason for opting for the young child was that the respondent’s assumed that the young 
child had a better chance of successful operation’.25 In addition, ‘the loss of a young 
child was thought to be more acutely felt by parents and others than that of the newborn 
who has not had the opportunity to touch as many lives’. 26
This thesis contends that it is becoming increasingly necessary to exercise a greater 
level of scrutiny and to engage in a public, open and honest dialogue regarding to 
whom limited financial resources should be allocated. 
While parents of critically ill neonates do not consider the cost of treatment for their 
children, often demanding futile treatments based on hope, it is important for all 
stakeholders to recognise and discuss these costs. Treatment for incapacitated persons,
whether adults, children or neonates, is costly, and the issue of resource management 
cannot be ignored.
24 Erik Nord et al, above n 4, 1433. 
25 Ibid 1434.
26 Ibid.
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 Any form of medical interaction, intervention or treatment, however minor, incurs a 
cost. The cost of different types of treatment varies, and other factors must also be 
considered;27 for instance, length of hospital stay, medication, surgery and
rehabilitation. Each patient also differs, including in age, gender, ethnicity, access to 
healthcare and socio-economic status.28 No country or government has unlimited 
funds available for healthcare. Savings in healthcare mean that finite resources can be 
distributed to other social needs, such as education and housing. 29
In most societies, it is generally taboo to put a monetary value on life, especially on 
the life of a baby. McKie et al acknowledge that discussions about cost of care may be 
distasteful. They illustrate the possible public opinion on issues about life and death 
when considered on the same platform as expenditure:
27 In an Australian report in June 2009, it was estimated that the costs associated with acute coronary syndrome, including 
hospitalisation, in Australia would be approximately $15.5 billion AUD. See especially, Access Economics, ‘The Economic 
Costs of Heart Attack and Chest Pain’ (Acute Coronary Syndrome) (Report, June 2009) 5. The cost of treating influenza in 
Australia, including time away from employment, in 2007 was between $828 and 884 million AUD per year. See especially, 
Anthony T Newall, Paul A Scuffham and Brent Hodgkinson, ‘Economic Report onto the Cost of Influenza to the Australian 
Health System’ (Report, Research and Practice Development Centre, University of Queensland and Blue Care, March 2007) 6. 
Another example of healthcare costs is the rising cost of treatment for mental illness. In Australia, treatment for mental illness 
was recently reported at in the region of $190 billion per year. See, Matt Wade, ‘Income Up, But Mental Illness Costing $190b 
a Year’ Sydney Morning Herald (Online) 8 June 2013 <http://www.smh.com.au/data-point/income-up-but-mental-illness-
costing-190b-a-year-20130607-2nvjy.html>.
28 In 2007, in the UK, it was found that ethnic minority patients generally have poorer health outcomes than do white Caucasian 
patients. See especially, Parliamentary Office of Science and Technology, ‘Ethnicity and Health’ (Postnote, No 276, January 
2007) 1–4. See also, Memon et al, ‘Health Issues in Ethnic Minorities: Awareness and Action’ (2002) 95(6) Journal of the 
Royal Society of Medicine 293–925. 
29 Lockwood, above n 16, 451. 
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 How could we possibly arrive at any figure that would represent the value of human life? And 
even if we could, would that not be a crass attempt to convert to money values something that is, 
quite literally, beyond any price?30
However, with an ageing population, increasing costs and limited budgets, clinical 
decisions have to be made regarding how and to whom health resources are allocated.31
Questions need to be asked about the cost of keeping severely premature neonates
alive. Further, what health benefits will be gained by investing scarce fiscal resources 
into NICUs? Over 20 years ago, Lyon made this observation: 
In the end, the issue of whether to let defective babies die may be solved, not by the elegant 
arguments of ethicists or by rhetoric in a court of law, but by the grim realities of the marketplace. 
The rising cost of medical treatment is placing a tremendous burden on society … since treating 
birth defects is a particularly expensive form of medicine, it is almost certain to come under 
scrutiny in the years ahead.32
The issue remains as topical today as it did in 1985. Importantly, Lyon’s assertion 
about the allocation and cost of healthcare is beginning to be discussed more openly.
However, as highlighted later in this chapter, discussion about the allocation of limited 
resources is still not as candid as it should be. Having explored some of the ways in 
which the cost of healthcare and the benefits it confers are measured and accounted 
for, the next section considers cost efficiency in the NICU.
30 John McKie et al, The Allocation of Health Resources: An Ethical Evaluation of the ‘QALY’ Approach (Dartmouth Publishing 
Company Limited, 1998) 1.
31 Bennett, above n 11, 77.
32 Jeff Lyon, Playing God in the Nursery (W W Norton and Company, 1985) 280.
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 VI: Health economics in the neonatal intensive care unit—An American and 
Australian perspective
There is an abundance of literature and academic discussion on resource allocation and 
health economics from the United States. This is unsurprising given the limited 
government healthcare funding and the role played by the private sector in the 
provision of health services in that country.
Buchh et al documented the length of stay and survival of infants in a Chicago NICU 
between 1978 and 2003. They found that, although there had been a significant rise in 
the number of admissions and bed-days in the NICU,33 the NICU was a ‘very cost-
efficient mode of ICU care’.34
This is in comparison to adult intensive care units, where ‘over 50 per cent of [adult 
intensive care unit] bed-days are devoted to non-survivors as opposed to patients who 
will be discharged’.35 The authors noted that the NICU was ‘impressively efficient’.36
The authors placed emphasis on health dollars spent on surviving neonates:
33 This rise was four-fold, from 25 to 100 per year and ten-fold for bed-days from 700 to 7000 per year.
34 Buchh et al, 'Neonatology Has Always Been a Bargain—Even When We Weren't Very Good At It!' (2007) 96(5) Acta 
Paediatrica 659, 661.
35 Ibid 662.
36 Ibid.
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 Even when we were not very good at saving ELBW (Extremely Low Birth Weight) babies lives, 
neonatology was still remarkably efficient in directing NICU bed-days/dollars/resources toward 
surviving infants as opposed to their doomed confreres.37
Further, the authors reported that, ‘in 1978, when 82% of our ELBW babies died, only 
24% of our ELBW dollars were devoted to these non-survivors’. In addition, since 
1978, birth weight specific (450–750 grams) mortality rates have decreased, with a 
higher number of survivors. This is encouraging; however, two issues require further 
consideration. 
Firstly, compared to 30 years ago, recent technological advancements mean that 
neonates born severely premature can now be saved. Secondly, where Buchh et al 
discuss the cost efficiency of the NICU based on fewer health dollars being devoted to 
‘non survivors’, this could be attributed to weaker, smaller ‘non-survivors’ dying 
sooner, requiring little or no medical treatment or bed-days.
This is supported by research conducted by Meadow et al. The authors noted changes 
in mortality rates and low-birth-weight infants during the 1990s. They found that some 
20 years ago, neonates born pre-term with little chance of survival died quicker. As a 
consequence, parents were able to determine the ‘life or death’ outcome of their child 
sooner. ‘[I]f parents could “hold their breaths” for a few days, the outcome for their 
infants was much clearer’.38 In its crudest form, NICU beds were occupied for the 
shortest period of time, making a NICU a financially viable and economical unit to 
manage.
37 Ibid.
38 Meadow et al, ‘Changes in Mortality for Extremely Low Birth Weight Infants in the 1990s: Implications for Treatment 
Decisions and Resource Use’ (2004) 113(5) Pediatrics 1223, 1223.
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 With improvements in neonatal medicine and care, by the 1990s, Meadow and his 
colleagues illustrated that, although non-surviving neonates still tended to die, they 
took longer to do so. Therefore, to have a better understanding of prognosis, parents 
had to ‘hold their breath’ for much longer, sometimes a ‘week and a half’.39 One 
consequence of this ‘prolongation’ of death is that NICU beds are occupied for longer,
even as expensive treatments continue to result in the inevitable death of neonates.
However, the authors did not consider the devotion of NICU beds for ‘doomed’ 
neonates as economically unviable. They stipulate that, for the weakest, smallest 
neonates, the ‘median day of death is 3 days’.40 Therefore, those that survive to see 
day four are likely to have a ‘more than 50% chance’ to survive.41 Of those born at 
less than 25 weeks, Meadow et al assert:
Of every 100 such infants, 75 will die, but half will be dead in 3 days. The 25 survivors, by contrast, 
will remain in the NICU for an average of 100 days. Consequently, even for a majority of NICU 
bed-days (< 90% in our NICU) will be devoted to survivors. … NICU dollars are remarkably well 
targeted to survivors as opposed to non survivors, independently of the absolute risk of death.42
Lantos, Mokalla and Meadow advocate that scarce resources are better spent in the 
NICU than in intensive care for the elderly, which involves ‘a far greater proportional 
39 Ibid 1226.
40 William Meadow, ‘Epidemiology, Economics, and Ethics in the NICU: Reflections from 30 Years of Neonatology Practice’
(2007) 45 Journal of Pediatric Gastroenterology and Nutrition 215, 216.
41 Ibid.
42 Ibid.
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 expenditure of money towards those who will not survive’.43 Buchh et al support the 
view that, ‘ICU dollars spent on patients who will die before leaving the hospital seem 
less well directed than ICU dollars spent on patients who will survive to be 
discharged’.44
Taking a similar view to their colleagues, Lantos et al argue that premature neonates 
present with serious medical complications early in life (often the first few days after 
birth). This makes the NICU a cost-efficient area of medicine because pre-term 
neonates ‘declare themselves’ by means of either early rapid decline, or surviving 
medical complications early in life.45 All three authors emphasise NICUs as cost-
efficient hospital departments that produce ‘survivors’. 
It is necessary to consider whether the economic value of NICUs in producing 
‘survivors’ is isolated to the United States or whether other global studies or literature 
illustrate a similar trend. Professor Lex Doyle in Victoria, Australia has provided 
seminal work that contributes to the discussion of economics and resource allocation 
in the NICU. 
VII: Australian neonatal intensive care units
43 John D Lantos, Mani Mokalla and William Meadow, ‘Resource Allocation in Neonatal and Medical ICUs Epidemiology and 
Rationing at the Extremes of Life’ (1997) 156(1) American Journal of Respiratory and Critical Care Medicine 185, 189. See 
generally Kenneth Kipnis, ‘Harm and Uncertainty in Newborn Intensive Care’ (2007) 28(5) Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics
393–412.
44 Buchh et al, above n 34, 659.
45 Lantos, Mokalla and Meadow, above n 43, 188.
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 Doyle conducted long-term studies over four epochs (1979–1980, 1985–1987, 1991–
1992 and 1997) to evaluate the effectiveness of NICUs for neonates born premature,
weighing between 500 and 999 grams.46 The studies followed the neonate’s survival 
and development up to at least two years of age. The author placed emphasis on 
effectiveness and efficiency as factors of importance when evaluating the NICU.47
Comparably, the NICUs in Victoria, Australia are also producing more ‘survivors’. 
Survival rates increased from 25.4 per cent in 1979–1980 to 73 per cent in 1997.48
Doyle found that ‘survival rate has increased three-fold from 1 in 4 in the late 1970s 
to 3 in 4 by the late 1990s’.49
The studies conducted by Doyle are commendable. The author explicitly states that
‘neonatal intensive care is expensive, especially in developed countries’.50 He also 
provides a balanced view of the realities of the NICU and low-birth-weight neonates.
Although the statistics highlight an increase in survivors of low birth weight in the 
NICU, the studies also recognise that, although mortality has decreased, the degree of
morbidity for premature neonates remains unchanged. Further, a recent study 
conducted over a six year period in one Australian hospital found that neonates born 
46 Another study conducted in Victoria, Australia examined the cost efficiency of NICU for babies born between 500–999 grams 
during 1979–1980 and 1985–1987. See also, W H Kitchen et al, ‘The Cost of Improving the Outcome for Infants of Birthweight 
500–999g in Victoria: The Victorian Infant Collaborative Study Group’ (1993) 29(1) Journal of Paediatrics and Child Health
56.
47 Lex W Doyle, ‘Evaluation of Neonatal Intensive Care for Extremely Low Birth Weight Infants in Victoria Over Two Decades: 
I Effectiveness’ (2004) 113(3) Pediatrics 505, 505; Lex W Doyle, ‘Evaluation of Neonatal Intensive Care for Extremely Low 
Birth Weight Infants in Victoria Over Two Decades: II Efficiency’ (2004) 113(3) Pediatrics 510, 510.
48 Doyle, ‘Evaluation of Neonatal Intensive Care for Extremely Low Birth Weight Infants in Victoria Over Two Decades: I 
Effectiveness’, above n 47, 507.
49 Doyle, ‘Evaluation of Neonatal Intensive Care for Extremely Low Birth Weight Infants in Victoria Over Two Decades: II 
Efficiency’ above n 47, 510.
50 Lex W Doyle, ‘Evaluation of Neonatal Intensive Care for Extremely-Low-Birth-Weight Infants’ (2006) 11(2) Seminars in Fetal 
and Neonatal Medicine 139, 139.
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 earlier than 24 weeks and weighing less than 500g did not survive without disability. 
The study is commendable, it has highlighted that neonates born extremely premature 
do not survive without disability. Discussing the reality of mortality and morbidity on 
a platform is a leading discussion in this area in the right direction – or more open and 
transparent dialogue. However this thesis argues that the findings from this study could 
be an opportunity to extend this discussion further, and to begin to consider the 
significant amount of financial resources that are utilised to save neonates from death, 
but not from a life with severe disability. Tudehope highlights this point further, 
asserting that ‘it is generally accepted that investment in neonatal intensive care 
reduces mortality but the costs of services are high especially if morbidity is not 
reduced’.51
Neonates born at extremely low birth weight (500–999 grams) continue to suffer 
severe disability and poor life outcomes. The studies found that even over a 20-year 
period, the decrease in cerebral palsy was marginal, from 13.5 per cent in 1979 to 10.7 
per cent in 1997. In addition, ‘deafness, developmental delay, and overall 
neurosensory disability rates were not significantly different over time in survivors in 
our cohorts’.52 Overall, Doyle highlighted that the NICUs in Victoria, Australia are 
both efficient and effective at improving survival rates. However, he qualified his 
statement as follows:
51 Susie O’Brien, ‘Leading Doctors Claim Smallest Premature Babies should not be Resuscitated’, Herald Sun (Online) 13 
October 2013 < http://www.heraldsun.com.au/news/victoria/leading-doctors-claim-smallest-premature-babies-should-not-be-
resuscitated/story-fni0fit3-1226738907028>. See also, D I Tudehope, ‘Economic Evaluation in Medicine’ (1997) 33(3) Journal 
of Paediatrics and Child Health 185, 185.
52 Doyle, ‘Evaluation of Neonatal Intensive Care for Extremely Low Birth Weight Infants in Victoria Over Two Decades: I 
Effectiveness’ above n 47, 508.
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 The dramatically improving survival and quality-adjusted survival rates for ELBW infants in 
Victoria over two decades argue strongly the case for an increasing need for neonatal services in 
the state. Moreover, such care can be provided relatively efficiently. Neonatal intensive care is 
approaching 100% availability for ELBW infants in Victoria. As most ELBW infants now survive, 
the remaining major challenge is to improve the quality of their survival.53
Severe disability and/or long-term health problems associated with premature birth, 
especially neonates born at 23 weeks, remain as challenging today as 30 years ago. 
This is reflected by the findings of the UK EPICure studies, which were considered in 
Chapter Three. In these studies, it was found that, although the survival rates of 
severely premature neonates have increased, the pattern of major neonatal morbidity,
and the proportion of survivors affected, are unchanged. These observations reflect an 
‘important increase in the number of preterm survivors at risk of later health 
problems’.54
Understandably, many neonatologists are optimistic advocates of the NICU. To most 
neonatologists (and to pro-life activists), any development or progress in saving 
neonates from death is likely to be considered positive. This also sits comfortably with 
the principle of sanctity of life, as discussed in Chapter Two. However, as noted earlier 
in this thesis, this principle is not necessarily the most important, and other factors
must also be considered in making treatment decisions.
A critical view may suggest that the drive for the allocation of limited resources to the 
NICU has less than benevolent intentions. The NICU may be considered a ‘safe 
53 Doyle, above n 50, 144.
54 K L Costeloe et al, ‘Short Term Outcomes after Extreme Preterm Birth in England: Comparison of Two Birth Cohorts in 1995 
and 2006 (The Epicure Studies)’ (2012) 345(8 December) British Medical Journal 1, 14.
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 haven’, with regular financial growth and profit for hospitals, where fiscal cuts are 
made in other departments. This point is illustrated in an article published in the 
Bloomberg magazine, which stated that ‘when you add up the million-dollar imagining 
machines, the incubators, the expensive drugs, diagnostics, nutritional products, and 
physician services, neonatology is a multibillion-dollar market’.55
American paediatrician and ethicist John Lantos candidly discussed the ‘profitability’ 
of the NICU: ‘over the past three years, the NICU has had the highest revenue-to-
expense ratio of any unit in the entire hospital including both adult and paediatric 
units’.56 Further, ‘like most new children’s hospitals, will have more NICU beds than 
the current one but will not have room left over for a new emergency department, new 
outpatient clinics, or an auditorium for public gatherings’.57
As noted earlier, the largely private American healthcare system is structured 
differently to that of Australia or the UK, making the issue of limited allocation of 
public healthcare funds particularly important. Public sector hospitals are essentially 
‘not for profit’ organisations, are are, to a greater degree, controlled by government 
funding and allocations. 
In Australia, the government is primarily responsible for deciding the amount of public 
funds that will be distributed to public hospitals. To achieve this, various 
methodologies are applied, including ‘activity-based funding’; ‘diagnostic-related 
55 Bloomberg Business Week Magazine, Million Dollar Babies <http://www.businessweek.com/stories/2008-06-11/million-
dollar-babies>. 
56 John D Lantos, ‘Hooked on Neonatology’ (2001) 20(5) Health Affairs 233, 239.
57 Ibid.
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 groups’ (DRG Codes)58 to classify hospital services; and ‘weighted inlier equivalent 
separation’, based on specific allocations made to hospitals, reflecting historical 
workloads and population changes.59 The systems that are applied are complex in 
nature and often do not reflect the ‘true cost’ of healthcare or particular treatments.
There is no universal approach to healthcare systems or government funding models. 
The Nordic welfare model of healthcare, for example, places an emphasis on 
delivering premium health services to the maximum number of individuals. This
model extends to Finland, Norway, Denmark, Iceland and Sweden and has the 
fundamental goal of ‘equal access to social and health services, education and 
culture’.60 However, such equality and universal access to welfare and healthcare for
all members of society, regardless of socio-economic background or privilege, comes 
at a price. The Nordic model of welfare places high demands on the taxpayer, with 
these countries having some of the highest taxation rates in the world.61
Studies and literature on the costs, efficiency, effectiveness and efficacy of NICUs are 
limited. This is probably because only a small proportion of extremely premature
neonates’ lives are spent inside the NICU. The relative cost of preventing impaired 
neonates from dying discussed thus far does not take into account the long-term cost 
58 For further discussion about health economics in the hospital, including payment for services, and DRGs see Australian Institute 
of Health and Welfare, Australian Refined Diagnosis-related Groups (AR-DRG) Data Cubes, Australian Government 
<http://www.aihw.gov.au/ar-drg-data-cubes/#ARDRGs>. For a discussion on the theory of supply and demand in relation to 
health economics see, S J Duckett, ‘Economics and Hospital Care’, in Gavin Mooney and Richard Scotton (eds), Economics and 
Australian Health Policy (Allen and Unwin, 1998) 93–114.
59 Department of Health, Victoria, Australia, Activity Based Funding <http://www.health.vic.gov.au/abf/definitions.htm>. 
60 Nordon, The Nordic Welfare Model <http://www.norden.org/en/about-nordic-co-operation/areas-of-co-operation/the-nordic-
welfare-model/about-the-nordic-welfare-model>. 
61 In 2012, Sweden ranked second highest in the world for tax rates at 56.6 per cent; the highest taxation rate was 59 per cent in 
Aruba. See Global Finance, Personal Income Tax Rates <http://www.gfmag.com/tools/global-database/economic-data/12151-
personal-income-tax-rates.html#axzz2Tc0LWXqW>. 
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 incurred by society and the families of extremely premature neonates. These costs
reach far beyond the NICU.
As Chapter One highlighted, significant development has been seen, and is ongoing, 
in technological advancement and medical science. Neonates, among other groups, 
have tested the limits of technology. As little as 20 to 30 years ago, premature neonates,
particularly those born at 23 weeks, would have died. Today, these neonates, born at 
the very edge of viability, survive. Every day in the developed world, technology and 
cutting-edge innovation save some of society’s most vulnerable citizens from death.62
Many individuals applaud the thriving research in medical science, engineering and 
other industries that have made it possible for humans to increasingly defy nature. The 
media praise technological progression, highlighting stories of ‘miracle babies’ who,
with the assistance of an army of medical professionals and aggressive and 
revolutionary technologies in the form of incubators and ventilators, combat death. 63
However, as noted in previous chapters, these miracle babies rarely live happily ever 
after. Although neonates born at 23-weeks’ gestation may survive, they often fail to 
thrive, and their long-term health prognoses remain bleak. 
Most spend several months in the NICU, where medical teams attempt to stabilise 
them until, with the aid of machinery and medicine, their vital organs have adequately
developed. However, even with round-the-clock care and supervision, many die after 
62 Ann Johnson, ‘Disability and Perinatal Care’ (1995) 95(2) Pediatrics 272, 272.
63 Kathy Evans, ‘The Edge of Life’, The Melbourne Magazine, The Age (Australia), Issue 90 April 2012, 40. 
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 days or even months of intensive care. Others may survive, but they are typically left 
with severe disabilities, affecting both them and their families for the rest of their 
lives.64
Health economists apply a micro-view when considering costs and benefits incurred 
through a health industry lens. While this is important, it is also necessary to consider 
the broader costs involved for the family and society. The following section of this 
chapter considers these other significant costs, using a social work lens. These are the 
costs incurred post-NICU, with some being short-term direct financial costs, while 
others are longer-term and likely to be excluded from consideration by health 
economists.
VIII: Health economics beyond the neonatal intensive care unit
Extremely premature neonates often spend months in the NICU being mechanically 
supported and cared for in a controlled environment with constant supervision. The 
aim is to allow their organs and bodies to fully develop before they are discharged. 
Time in the NICU may come as a shock to families that just want to take their 
newborns home.65 However, they must quickly adapt to the reality before them: they 
may have to spend months in the NICU. In the NICU, the other parents, the doctors 
and nurses may often become an extension of the family unit.
64 Pharoah et al, ‘Costs and Benefits of Neonatal Intensive Care’ (1988) 63(7) Archives of Disease in Childhood 715, 717.
65 Evans, above n 63, 42.
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 Eventually, medical teams of doctors and nurses cease caring for impaired neonates 
and reassure new parents that ‘they will be fine’ looking after their newborn in an 
uncontrolled, non-clinical environment. Once discharged, the constant support comes 
to an abrupt end, and parents find themselves at home with their infant, who will often 
be severely disabled.66
Evans points out that, often doctors’ ‘…egos push boundaries to produce “miracle 
babies” which are not going to be raised by super-parents, only ordinary ones with 
limited resources’.67 Indeed, Evan’s comment does not extend far enough: the needs 
of a survivor of the NICU will typically stretch far beyond those of a non-severely 
premature child. 
As considered in Chapter Two, ‘quality of life’ arguments tend to focus on physical 
conditions. However, such considerations should extend to the ‘mass of side-effects 
both on those closely involved and on the wider society’.68 These include socio-
economic factors that affect the quality of life of the neonate and the family.69 Severely 
disabled individuals require significantly more care, time and financial resources.
Society and medical practitioners consider saving neonates from the brink of death to 
be both an ethical and a legal duty.70 Thus far, it has been noted that, from a health 
economics perspective, it is generally considered to be both cost-efficient and effective 
66 Carol A Heimer and Lisa R Staffen, For the Sake of the Children (University of Chicago Press, 1998) 281. Charles C Camosy 
discusses the cost of treating critically ill neonates and considers general reforms from a Catholic perspective. See especially,
Charles C Camosy, Too Expensive to Treat? Finitude, Tragedy and the Neonatal ICU (Wm. B. Eerdsmans Publishing Co, 2010).
67 Evans, above n 63, 42. 
68 Jonathan Glover, Causing Death and Saving Lives (Pelican Books, 1977) 168.
69 Linda D Urden, ‘Ethical Analysis of Scarce Resources in Pediatric Home Care’ (1987) 15(4) Children’s Health Care 253, 256.
70 See generally, Deborah E Campbell and Alan R Fleischman, ‘Limits of Viability: Dilemmas, Decisions, and Decision 
Makers’ (2001) 18(3) American Journal of Perinatology 117–128. 
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 to use finite resources to save neonates from death. However, Johnson provides a 
differing view: 
When considering the benefits of such care, it is not enough to measure these in terms of survival, 
without considering the later health status of the surviving children and the impact of their survival 
of their families, and ultimately on society. It is clear that extremely preterm survivors are at higher 
risk of later motor sensory or cognitive disorders than neonates born at a later gestational age and 
the costs of their care are likely to be greater.71
Global empirical studies highlight that, although medical advancements have reduced 
mortality rates for extremely low-birth-weight neonates, morbidity in survivors 
remains prevalent. This point was highlighted again recently by Evans, who stated: 
Fifty per cent of babies born at his age [Joshua born at 24 weeks and 5 days] get to go home, 
though up to 20 per cent [sic] will be severely disabled; the rest will be either fine or affected by 
conditions such as milder forms of intellectual delay and cerebral palsy.72
Moster, Lie and Markestad detail the types of disabilities suffered by neonates born at 
23 weeks. The authors stipulate that such neonates have a greater likelihood of ‘major 
disabilities such as blindness or low vision, hearing loss and epilepsy’.73
Most neonates born at 23 weeks require several follow-up consultations. In addition 
to later surgeries and post-operative care, some neonates may need medical equipment 
71 Johnson, above n 62, 272.
72 Evans, above n 63, 38. 
73 Dag Moster, Rolv Terje Lie and Trond Markestad, ‘Long-term Medical and Social Consequences of Preterm Birth’ (2008) 
359(3) New England Journal of Medicine 262, 265. 
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 such as assisted ventilation at home. Auxiliary services, such as physiotherapy and 
rehabilitation, may also be required. Lantos and Meadow found: 
…former premmies have five times the rate of hospitalisation of full-term babies during the first 
year of life. Many former premmies require ongoing outpatient care from a variety of specialists. 
Some require complex home health care.74
The points above briefly illustrate some of the ongoing health conditions that affect 
extremely low-birth-weight neonates. Caring for a healthy, normal newborn is 
challenging and intense, and the care and attention required by a severely premature 
neonate suffering significant disabilities is far greater. 
The cost of post-NICU care far exceeds that of the NICU in terms of money, time and 
emotion. Some examples of the costs that begin to accumulate are, the cost of 
travelling to and from hospital appointments, and lost earnings due to one or both 
parents requiring time off work. 
This point is supported by empirical research conducted by Zupancic et al, which 
found that, while still in the NICU, of 109 low-birth-weight babies in Great Britain, 
‘36% of mothers travelled more than 21 miles to the NICU and 88% of families visited 
daily’.75 The resulting financial strain, constant time pressures and burdens of caring 
for a severely disabled neonate often affect the wider family circle.76
74 Lantos and Meadow, above n 6, 123.
75 Zupancic et al, above n 5, 486. 
76 Warrick et al, ‘Guidance for Withdrawal and Withholding of Intensive Care as Part of Neonatal End-of-life Care’ (2011) 98(1) 
British Medical Bulletin 99, 110. 
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 IX: Impact on the wider family
Caring for a severely disabled neonate brings significant challenges for new parents 
and the wider family. It may affect the existing family dynamic, and partners and other 
children may be adversely affected by the continuous needs of, and attention required 
by, the disabled neonate. Further, overall costs within the household have been noted 
to be ‘ten times higher for parents with low-birth-weight babies when compared with 
those with term infants’.77
Wilkinson supports this view, highlighting that the ‘burden of care for severely paired 
infants overwhelmingly falls upon immediate family, often involving physical, 
financial and emotional burdens’.78 This is very rarely spoken about or documented 
by the media, who prefer to portray the idyllic, resilient family.
An example of the media portrayal of the idyllic family unit comes from the UK, where
a newspaper interviewed four families about their experiences of caring for their 
premature neonates.79 Predictably, all of the families discussed their ‘miracle’ 
neonates and the joy that each of them brought to their lives. Of course, regardless of 
77 Alan T Gibson and Cath M Harrison, ‘The Consequences for Society of Intensive Care for Babies Born at Less Than 30 Weeks’
Gestation’ (2010) 20(4) Paediatrics and Child Health 167, 170.
78 Dominic Wilkinson, ‘A Life Worth Giving? The Threshold for Permissible Withdrawal of Life Support from Disabled Newborn 
Infants' (2011) 11(2) American Journal of Bioethics 20, 24.
79 Samantha Brick, ‘Born at the Very Brink of Life: Over Half of Babies Now Survive at 24 Weeks, The Legal Abortion Limit.
But at What Cost to Their Health and Families? Four Mothers Tell Us Their Stories’, The Daily Mail (Online), 2 January 2013 
<http://www.dailymail.co.uk/femail/article-2256242/Over-half-babies-survive-birth-24-weeks-legal-abortion-limit---cost-
health-families-Four-mothers-tell-stories.html>.
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 disability, parents talk about their children with great passion, pride and unconditional 
love. However, the article failed to highlight the realities of the financial hardship and 
family tensions that often arise when caring for a severely disabled neonate or young 
infant.
Recently, one mother did openly discuss the pressure of raising a premature neonate 
suffering severe disability. This mother had also made the decision to place her child
in care, for the greater good of the rest of the family. 
In the article, Jane spoke about her son James, born at 25 weeks and consequently 
suffering with quadriplegia, severe autism and epilepsy.80 Jane spoke about the 
challenges of caring for him while also raising two older, healthy children, to whom
she could no longer provide adequate attention. Regarding the constant physical and 
mental strain placed on her and her husband, she stated, ‘looking after him [James]
was a round-the-clock job, and we became zombies. I would muddle through my day 
in a fog of exhaustion while my husband, Andrew struggled through his working week 
on minimal sleep’.81
She also commented on the detrimental effects on her other children: ‘as a family we 
had no social life, and Andrew and I had no time for our other two children. We knew 
this was having a devastating effect on them, but there was nothing we could do’.82 In 
80 Jane Raca, ‘Would you Give Up Your Disabled Son to Allow Your Other Children a Chance of Happiness? Despite Agonies 
of Guilt, Jane Says it’s the Best Decision She Ever Made’, The Daily Mail (Online), 14 March 2013 
<http://www.dailymail.co.uk/femail/article-2293579/Would-disabled-son-allow-children-chance-happiness.html>.
81 Ibid.
82 Ibid.
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 addition, ‘my doctor prescribed me antidepressants and my marriage to Andrew 
limped along. What had become of us?’83
It is this type of story that the media should publicise, to allow for much-needed
discussion about some of the long-term and far-reaching effects of saving neonates at 
23 weeks.
The long-term impacts of caring for extremely premature, severely disabled neonates
are profound, including broken marriages, financial hardship and, as considered above, 
have detrimental impacts on the other children within the family.84 The long-term
impact on a family may be far greater when the severely disabled neonate is the 
couple’s first child, potentially costing them the opportunity of having a healthy child 
in the future. This is considered next. 
X: Opportunity cost
Individuals invest significant time, money, effort and emotion in raising children; this
investment is all the greater, and the sacrifices more magnified, when caring for infants
born at 23-weeks’ gestation.
Where a neonate is born extremely prematurely, and as a result suffers severe 
disability, the likelihood of parents having another child is reduced. This could be due 
to the time or financial constraints associated with the care of the disabled child, or the 
83 Ibid.
84 Neil Campbell, ‘When Care Cannot Cure: Medical Problems in Seriously Ill Babies’ in Helga Kuhse and Peter Singer (eds), 
Bioethics: An Anthology (Blackwell Publishing, 2nd ed, 2006) 307–308.
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 concern that a second pregnancy may also result in a premature birth. Kuhse and
Singer support this view: 
It seems reasonable to suppose that families are more likely to have subsequent child if a premature 
infant dies than if the infant lives; many couples have an idea of how many children they would 
like to have, and will ‘replace’ an infant who dies in order to reach that number. This assumption 
is also consistent with data that show that a family with a disabled child is less likely than other 
families to have further children.85
In this regard, the NICU enables premature neonates to survive, but also potentially 
prevents couples from having other healthy children in the future. 
Taking Kuhse and Singer’s argument further, the opportunity cost of raising a severely 
disabled neonate could mean that families never reach their economic potential due to 
having to give up careers or promotions, which then has a detrimental effect on all 
children within the family. These children may be deprived of better clothing, social 
outings or holidays, or even lose access to better education and subsequent career 
opportunities and experiences. This argument is particularly broad and may not affect 
all families. However, it is worth noting. 
More broadly, there is also a concomitant lost opportunity for society when parents 
have severely premature and disabled children. Unlike a healthy child born at full term, 
a severely disabled neonate is unlikely to be able to contribute to the economic work 
force later in life. This view is supported by Brock, who noted that, ‘… not just by a 
desire to prevent or reduce the harms of suffering, disability, and the loss of life to 
85 Kuhse and Singer, above n 15, 109. 
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 patients from illness and disease, the direct benefits of health care, but also by a desire 
to strengthen the state by creating a healthier workforce’. 86
This does not mean that the disabled neonate that survives into adult years will not 
contribute to and be an integral part of society in other ways. However, he or she is
unlikely to be able to contribute economically.
It is both necessary and timely for developed nations such as the UK and Australia to 
revisit the methodology and reasons for saving neonates at 23 weeks. New advanced 
technologies are used to save neonates. However, this often yields poor outcomes and 
leaves these neonates with severe disabilities, consequently affecting the nation’s 
productivity and future.87
From an economic perspective, the question becomes whether society is doing itself a
disservice by reducing the chances of families having a healthy child later in life.
Several commentators have reflected on this question. For example, Lyon considered 
the billions of dollars that are required to care for severely impaired children by 
institutions paid for by the taxpayer:
None of these figures appear to make note of the loss to society of the child’s productivity as a 
potential wage earner. Nor do they tabulate the associated costs that the government must bear, 
including the provisions of special education, disability payments and public accommodations for 
the handicapped. 88
86 Dan W Brock, ‘Separate Spheres and Indirect Benefits’ (2003) 1(4) Cost Effectives and Resource Allocation 
<http://www.resource-allocation.com/content/1/1/4>. 
87 Lockwood, above n 16, 457.
88 Lyon, above n 32, 285–286. Also see Wilkinson, above n 78, 24.
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 Any discussion about opportunity cost in this regard would be incomplete without 
considering the loss of opportunity and life experiences that may affect the severely 
disabled neonate throughout his or her life. 
Moster, Lie and Markestad have explored this issue and state that those born extremely 
premature with disabilities begin, and continue, life with poor outcomes. Their study 
of pre-term neonates born between 1967–1983 conducted in Norway found that ‘a 
lower gestational age at birth was associated with a reduced likelihood of completing 
high school, of receiving a bachelor’s degree, or receiving a post graduate degree and 
of having a high income’.89 The findings also indicate that those born with medical 
disabilities are less likely to be able to fulfil personal goals such as ‘finding a life 
partner or having children’.90
Further, a study conducted by Pharoah et al in Liverpool, UK supports the view that 
low-birth-weight neonates have lower educational success. During 1979–1981, the 
authors examined low-birth-weight neonates (less than 150 grams). They classified 
disability into a four-point scale measure, from 1 (no disability) to 4 (severe disability),
including conditions such as blindness, quadriplegia and epilepsy. The surviving
neonates were followed through to the age of four, and a projection was made that 
those neonates that fell within scale 4 of the measure (severe disability) were ‘assumed 
to require special education from the age of 4 to 19 years and institutional care from 
the age of 19 until death’.91
89 Moster, Terje Lie and Markestad, above n 73, 266.
90 Ibid.
91 Pharoah et al, above n 64, 716.
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 Zupancic et al contribute to this discussion, asserting the ‘need for special education 
for children suffering disability as a result of pre-term birth in the United States was 
approximately $360 million dollars per year’. With increasing survival rates and no 
significant changes in morbidity, there is also a ‘greater burden on early intervention 
and educational institutions’. 92
The allocation of limited public health resources generally remains an ‘unspoken 
issue’, but cannot be neglected any longer.93 The limited resources available to 
healthcare are increasingly under scrutiny, and it is timely to discuss and seriously 
consider the allocation of such resources as an objective standard when making end-
of-life decisions for critically impaired neonates. 
Gunderman and Engle provide some insight, asserting that often decisions to withdraw 
or withhold life-sustaining treatment focus on the best interests of the child, the
likelihood of that child having a poor quality of life, and whether treatment is futile.
The authors also suggest that some commentators may find it appropriate to:
…argue that the community as a whole cannot afford to spend hundreds of thousands of dollars 
saving the life of a premature neonate whose subsequent disabilities will only impose additional 
hundreds of thousands of dollars in medical costs of a lifetime’. 94
92 Zupancic et al, above n 5, 493.
93 Rob Heywood, ‘Parents and Medical Professionals: Conflict, Co-Operation, and Best Interests’ (2012) 20(4) Medical Law 
Review 29, 31.
94 Richard B Gunderman and William A Engle, ‘Ethics and the Limits of Neonatal Viability’ (2006) 236(2) Radiology 427 430.
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 In addition, empirical studies show that carers are the least happy group in the wider 
community, with the highest rate of depression. Although these studies are not 
sensitive enough to be broken down into the type of people being cared for, there is no 
reason to suggest that the experiences of carers for impaired neonates are any different 
to those of carers in general.95
Morris asserts that ‘paying lip service to the value of every life while failing to give 
adequate support to children and their careers is hypocritical’.96 Thus, the question can 
be asked: Is society fulfilling its social contract by keeping severely disabled neonates
alive, considering that they are not then provided with the care, facilities and support 
they need for the rest of their lives?97 To explore this issue, it is necessary to consider 
government spending and budgets in relation to healthcare.
XI: Australian budget 2013–2014 and disability care Australia: The National
Disability Insurance Scheme
Governments, particularly in developed countries, allocate a substantial portion of 
their fiscal budget to healthcare, education and welfare. Projected government 
spending and the annual budget announcement is becoming one of the much 
95 Australian Institute of Family Services, Half of Australia’s Carers are Depressed—Making a Hard Job Even Harder, Australian 
Government <http://aifs.govspace.gov.au/2012/10/18/half-of-australia%E2%80%99s-carers-are-depressed-%E2%80%93-
making-a-hard-job-even-harder/>; National Health and Medical Research Council, New Research Tackles Depression Among 
Older Australian and their Carers, Australian Government <http://www.nhmrc.gov.au/media/releases/2011/new-research-
tackles-depression-among-older-australians-and-their-carers>. 
96 Morris, above n 129, 376. 
97 See, eg, Amir Paz-Fuchs, ‘The Social Contract Revisited: The Modern Welfare State’ (Report, The Foundation for Law, 
Justice and Society, University of Oxford, 2011).
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 anticipated events of the year. This is understandable, given that it impacts all members 
of society in some way. 
Public funds are not infinite, and expenditure in the area of healthcare is increasing as 
a result of a growing ageing population. This is particularly evident in Australia.98 A
recent report by the Grattan Institute entitled Budget Pressures on Australian 
Governments revealed that 19 per cent of the 2012–2013 budget was allocated to 
healthcare.99 It was noted that, in real terms over the past 10 years, government 
expenditure in healthcare has risen by 75 per cent.100 The report found that ‘the ageing 
and aged care services are the highest, and the fastest growing spending category’.101
Further, ‘the expense that did most to increase government spending above GDP 
[Gross domestic product] was hospital spending’.102
The most recent Australian budget for 2013–2014 proposed two significant fiscal 
reforms: an investment in education of ‘$9.8 billion over six years, to enhance 
Australia’s future productivity and wellbeing’,103 and ‘$19.3 billion over seven years 
to disability care’.104 This latter proposal represents the most significant reform in 
social policy in Australia since the introduction of public funded healthcare.
98 See further, Australian Institute of Health and Welfare, ‘Australia’s Welfare 2013’ (Report, Series No 11, August 2013) 237–
280 <http://www.aihw.gov.au/publication-detail/?id=60129543825>. 
99 The Grattan Institute is an independent body in Australia that aims to examine, critique and present unbiased reportage and 
‘practical solutions to some of the country’s most pressing problems’. See Grattan Institute, About Us
<http://grattan.edu.au/about-us>.
100 John Daley, Budget Pressures on Australian Governments (Grattan Institute, 2013) 16.
101 Ibid 14.
102 Ibid 15.
103 Australian Government, Key Initiatives of the 2013–14 Budget
<http://www.budget.gov.au/201314/content/overview/html/overview_key_initiatives.htm>.
104 Ibid.
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 The new National Disability Insurance Scheme (NDIS), now governed under 
legislation, is admirable.105 Some of the core values of the NDIS are based on 
providing independence and opportunities to those with significant disability. In 
addition, the scheme aims to provide care and support to their families and carers,
assisting the disabled to have greater access to facilities and to reach their full 
potential.106
Section 22 (1) of the National Disability Insurance Scheme Act 2013107 stipulates that 
the age requirement for eligibility to the scheme:
A person meets the age requirements if:
(a) the person was aged under 65 when the access request in relation to the person was made; 
and
(b) if the National Disability Insurance Scheme rules for the purposes of this paragraph 
prescribe that on a prescribed date or a date in a prescribed period the person must be a 
prescribed age—the person is that age on that date. 
Section 23 states that persons wishing to participate in the scheme must be a citizen of 
Australia or hold permanent residency. Eligibility to the scheme based on disability is 
defined under section 24:
(a) the person has a disability that is attributable to one or more
Intellectual, cognitive, neurological, sensory or physical impairments or to one or more 
impairments attributable to a psychiatric condition; and 
(b) the impairment or impairments are, or are likely to be, permanent; and
105 National Disability Insurance Scheme Act 2013 (No 20) (Cth). See also, Harold Luntz, ‘Compensation Recovery and the 
National Disability Insurance Scheme’ (2013) 20 Torts Law Journal 153, 155–157.
106 National Disability Insurance Scheme, About Us <http://www.ndis.gov.au/about-an-ndis/what-is-an-ndis/>. 
107 National Disability Insurance Scheme Act 2013 (No 20) (Cth) s 22(1).
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 (c) the impairment or impairments result in substantially reduced functional capacity to 
undertake, or psychosocial
Functioning in undertaking, one or more of the following activities:
(i) communication;
(ii) social interaction;
(iii) learning;
(iv) mobility;
(v) self-care;
(vi) self-management; and
(d) the impairment or impairments affect the person’s capacity for social and economic 
participation; and
(e) the person is likely to require support under the National Disability Insurance Scheme for the 
person’s lifetime.
(2) For the purposes of subsection (1), an impairment or impairments that vary in intensity may be 
permanent, and the person is likely to require support under the National Disability Insurance 
Scheme for the person’s lifetime, despite the variation. 108
The scheme, due to be gradually rolled out beginning in Tasmania, South Australia 
and areas of Victoria and NSW, aims to ‘recognise that disability is for a lifetime, and 
so it will take a lifelong approach to providing care and support. This means that 
assessment will look beyond the immediate need, and across the course of the person’s 
life’.109 In addition, it provides that:
Individual support will also be given to people for whom there is good evidence that early 
intervention would substantially improve functioning (for example, autism, acquired brain injury, 
108 National Disability Insurance Scheme Act 2013 (No 20) (Cth) s 24.
109 National Disability Insurance Scheme, What is an NDIS <http://www.ndis.gov.au/about-an-ndis/what-is-an-ndis/>. 
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 cerebral palsy or sensory impairments), and those for whom early intervention will delay or lessen 
a decline in functioning (for example, multiple sclerosis and Parkinson’s disease).110
The financial support provided to those suffering disability will no longer be subject 
to fluctuating budget allocations, but come from a funding pool on a needs-assessment 
basis. In light of this recent reform, it is appropriate to consider its merits in relation to 
the subject matter of this chapter and the overall thesis. 
The intent of the scheme is noble, and the impact it will have on the lives of those 
living with disability and/or carers will be profound. It is accepted that dialogue about 
life and death, disability and the costs associated with such are uncomfortable for 
many. However, to have an objective and rational discussion about resource allocation,
it is necessary to look beyond the benevolence of the NDIS and consider the longer 
term impacts on society and public spending.
Although remarkable in theory, the far-reaching ramifications of the scheme on the 
public purse are likely to be significant. Funded by increasing the compulsory 
Medicare levy by half a per cent, there will be a section of society that is resistant of 
any additional taxation and who may thus consider that schemes or models for 
disability care should be provided for out of the existing fiscal budget. 
As noted earlier, the cost of allowing neonates to survive at 23 weeks, often with 
profound disabilities, is significant both in the NICU and beyond. Indeed, scarce 
110 National Disability Insurance Scheme, FAQs <http://www.ndis.gov.au/about-an-ndis/frequently-asked-questions/#eligible>. 
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 resources may be better spent on saving the lives of neonates born even a few weeks 
later in the gestation period, as they are less likely to suffer disability. 
One of the unintended consequences of the NDIS may be to encourage a culture that 
is reliant on government financial assistance. Where parents may once have considered 
financial and personal support as factors in deciding to opt for palliative care rather 
than aggressive treatment, they may now be swayed towards deciding to raise a 
profoundly disabled child due to the safety net and the added financial security that 
the scheme provides. 
The burden on the Australian tax payer is thus now two-fold. First, there are
compulsory tax contributions to the general healthcare budget, allowing neonates to 
be saved in the NICU. Second, the increase in the Medicare levy will fund the NDIS,
to provide lifelong care post-NICU.
The introduction of the NDIS scheme in Australia, funded by public tax revenue, calls 
for a critical re-think on the correlation of resources and patient outcomes. Despite 
projections made by the treasury, the $19.8 billion investment over seven years runs 
at a risk. It is ultimately dependent on continued population growth or, at the very least,
on a stable number of working taxpayers, able to pay the required levy to fund the 
scheme. 
Macro factors may also pose a risk to the funds available to the NDIS. For example, if
the economy contracts and unemployment rises, the available pool of tax payers 
available to pay the levy would shrink. Moreover, if the real cost of living declines and
wages fall, the amount of tax the government collects would also diminish. An 
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 example of drastically fluctuating fiscal environments can be found in the current 
economic status of Europe.
If any of the above risks are realised, there may simply not be enough in the public 
purse to satisfy need, potentially leaving all scheme participants with insufficient 
funding. Public funds and the resulting benefits (healthcare, education and welfare) to 
members of society all depend on a healthy and productive workforce, employed and 
paying taxes. To maintain a balance between economically productive members of 
society and those that need to be supported, there needs to be serious parliamentary 
consideration for a framework or model to determine the minimum gestational age at 
which medical assistance and treatment should be provided for those born extremely 
premature.
In light of this, some ethical theories support the premise that the allocation of limited 
public resources should be guided by those that will benefit the most from treatment,
and consequently cost less for society. Utilitarian and consequentialist theories, based 
largely on the notion of ‘the greatest good for the greatest number’,111 suggest that 
focusing limited resources on neonates born even a few weeks later in the gestational 
calendar would be for the greater good of society and the public purse.112
Gibson and Harrison support this view, noting that if treatment and care were not 
provided to neonates unless born at 25 weeks or above, this would ‘reduce costs from 
£2.945 billion GBP to £2.903 billon GBP’.113 This is because those starting life on a 
111 Julian Savulescu, ‘Consequentialism, Reasons, Value and Justice’ (1998) 12(3) Bioethics 212, 213.
112 Pharoah et al, above n 64, 718, See also, John McKie et al, above n 30, 536. 
113 Gibson and Harrison, above n 77, 172.
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 reasonably healthy footing, with no significant disabilities, are less likely to be 
frequent users of the limited public health dollar over the course of their lives.
Several consequential benefits flow from targeting limited resources to those most 
likely to make a substantial or full health recovery. For example, such recipients are 
more likely to be able to pay back the investment via a meaningful contribution to the 
economy and taxation base; although of course, this is not guaranteed.114
If choices have to be made regarding priority, it is reasonable for public money to be 
spent in a way that maximises public good.115
It is too soon to measure the success of the recent enactment of the National Disability 
Scheme Act 2013 in Australia, given that it is still in the early stages of its 
implementation. Further, the NDIS is not relevant to all healthcare allocations; thus, 
the issue of limited healthcare resources remains contentious.
Having considers the role of health economics and the social implications of the 
allocation of limited health resources, the next section of this chapter illustrates the 
paradoxical relationship between saving a neonate born at 23-weeks’ gestation and
aborting a foetus at the same gestational age.
XII: The paradox: Abortion or life-sustaining treatment: Both at 23 weeks
114 There will always be a portion of society that may later acquire chronic disease, commit crimes or suffer harmful addictions.
115 Hope, Savulescu and Hendrick, above n 13, 210. 
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 As briefly considered in Chapter Two, in Victoria, under the Abortion Law Reform Act 
2008,116 a registered medical practitioner can perform a legal abortion on a pregnant 
woman after 24 weeks of pregnancy, under the circumstance that it is deemed 
‘appropriate, and with consultation of at least one other medical practitioner.117 The 
practitioner is to take into account ‘all relevant medical circumstances and the 
woman’s current and future physical, psychological and social circumstances’.118
This means that within one hospital, while extensive efforts and healthcare dollars are 
being invested in sophisticated medicine and technology to save a neonate born at 23
weeks, despite the risk of that neonate receiving a poor health prognosis and requiring
lifelong care far beyond the NICU, another woman, advised and guided by her medical 
practitioner can lawfully have a pregnancy terminated at the same gestational period,
23 weeks.
This demonstrates the competing interests at stake in treating neonates of this 
gestational age. A pregnant woman has the legal right to express her wishes to 
terminate a pregnancy, with her doctor’s advice and guidance, even when it is likely 
to result in a healthy child. Thus, in the case of lawful abortion, the expectant mother’s
decision prevails. By contrast, when a neonate is born at 23 weeks, considerations 
other than the parents’ overwhelmingly prevail. 
116 Abortion Law Reform Act 2008 (Vic) (No 58). 
117 Ibid s 5 (1) (a)–(b). 
118 Ibid s 5 (2) (a)–(b).
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 This leads to the questions of whether it is just and appropriate that the wishes of 
parents to have life-sustaining treatment continued for their critically ill neonate should 
prevail and have greater claim over community resources.
Another key difference between the decision to save or abort a neonate at 23 weeks is 
seen in the effect on healthcare resources. This thesis argues that there is a need for an 
open public debate as whether wider society is truly willing and prepared to expend 
limited public health funds to keep severely premature neonates alive.119
Considerations such as the cost to society at large ought to feature prominently in such 
debates.
The relationship between sophisticated medical technology and disability is 
paradoxical: high tech equipment now allows medical teams to save the lives of 
neonates that, as little as 20 years ago, would probably have died. Some individuals 
may consider this to an enormous achievement for mankind, defeating nature and 
pushing the limits of human biology. However, others question whether saving 
critically impaired neonates born at 23 weeks is appropriate and the best use of public 
funds. The next section explores this question.
XIII: Medical technology: Doing more harm than good?
There is a need for a critical revaluation of the inter-sect between what health outcomes
can be achieved using advanced medical technology and what outcomes should be 
achieved. 
119 See, eg, Carol Nader, ‘Premature Baby Debate Needed: Pike’, The Age (Online), 7 June 2005 
<http://www.theage.com.au/news/National/Premature-baby-debate-needed-Pike/2005/06/06/1117910240693.html>.
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 Western societies are seemingly fixated with the preservation of life. This is reflected 
in attitudes towards suicide, the unlawfulness of euthanasia and the disregard by some 
medical practitioners of advance directive end-of-life wishes.120
A recent opinion piece by an anonymous Victorian physician in Melbourne takes this 
idea further, asserting that doctors are not only ‘trained to treat’ in almost all 
circumstances, but also find it difficult to let patients, particularly the elderly, die of 
‘natural causes’. The author stated:
As a GP with 25 years’ experience, I am increasingly disturbed by this trend in modern medical 
care. It is ironic that we are debating euthanasia when we can currently be denied the opportunity 
to die of natural causes at a point when it would be appropriate and the kindest thing for the 
individual.121
This preference to save all lives disregards the principles of personal autonomy and
dignity, particularly at the end of life, and fails to consider the increasing expense of 
hospital care. Australian intensive care specialist, Dr Peter Saul, comments:
The simple solution is to be guided more by what people want, particularly at the end of their lives. 
What we know is that default setting in acute care is that people receive an enormous amount of, 
120 See further L Willmott, Ben White and Michelle Howard, ‘Overriding Advance Refusals of Life-Sustaining Treatment’ (2006) 
25(4) Medicine and Law 647–661. The authors argue that the current legislation in Queensland under the Powers of Attorney Act
1998 (Qld) s 103, whereby a doctor may override a patient’s refusal of treatment under an advance directive based on ‘good 
medical practice’, should be repealed. 
121 Anonymous, ‘Why is it So Hard to Grant the Wish to Die in Peace?’ The Age (Online), May 16 2013 
<http://www.theage.com.au/comment/why-is-it-so-hard-to-grant-the-wish-to-die-in-peace-20130515-2jmnt.html>. See also, 
Will Cairns, A Natural End (2 September 2013) Medical Journal of Australia: Insight <https://www.mja.com.au/insight/2013/
33/will-cairns-natural-end>. 
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 probably not in the end life saving treatment which carries a huge burden financially and in other 
ways.122
Although Dr Saul’s assertions above are in relation to decision making for the aged,
his comments are persuasive. Similar arguments can be made about treatment 
decisions for extremely premature neonates. Expensive treatments in the NICU for 
neonates at 23 weeks generally result in either prolonging an inevitable death or 
sustaining life with subsequent severe disabilities.
Of course, when the patient is a neonate, it is not possible to ascertain their treatment 
wishes. This is further exacerbated by parents pushing for expensive life-sustaining 
treatment, and doctors overwhelmingly taking the standpoint of the need to ‘save life 
at all costs’, whether these costs be to the neonate, the family or to society.
Protecting and saving the lives of the very sick, the very young and the vulnerable are 
perhaps considered to be some of the core values and moral obligations placed on 
western developed societies.123 Severely impaired neonates meet all of these criteria, 
making their treatment morally fraught. Some commentators have referred to the over 
usage of technology and medicine to treat extremely premature neonates as a ‘form of 
extremism’. The phrase seems relevant here.124
122 Eleanor Hall, ‘To Cut Hospital Costs, Talk to the Patients’, The World Today, 29 April 2013 (Dr Peter Saul) 
<http://www.abc.net.au/worldtoday/content/2013/s3747260.htm>. 
123 See generally, David Thomasma, ‘The Vulnerability of the Sick’ (2000) 16(2) Bioethics Forum 5–12. 
124 Brenda Barnum, ‘Benevolent Injustice: A Neonatal Dilemma' (2009) 9(3) Advances in Neonatal Care 132, 135. See also, 
William A Silverman, 'Overtreatment of Neonates? A Personal Retrospective' (1992) 90(6) Pediatrics 971–976.
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 Thus far, it has been argued in this thesis that NICUs are expensive to manage, and 
that even with cutting-edge technology, those born at 23 weeks rarely escape severe 
lifelong disability. Even in an austerity-driven environment in which the cost of 
treatment and care far outweighs the benefits to the individual and society, 
governments continue to provide significant resources to NICUs.
Where governments allocate large portions of the healthcare budget to save impaired 
neonates in the NICU, the argument can be made that there is a corresponding moral 
duty to extend this to a commitment to allocate monies to provide all necessary support 
to these individuals for the rest of their lives. Therein lays the problem: public funds 
do not, and cannot, stretch to this extent. Several other competing claims can be made 
for the same pool of resources.125
Kuhse and Singer argue that:
There is a limit to the burden of dependence which any community can carry. If we attempt to 
keep all handicapped infants alive, irrespective of their future prospects, we will have to give up 
other things which we may well regard as at least equally important.126
There are two schools of thought on disability: that life is valuable and any existence 
is better than none, or that a life lived under the constraints of a severe disability is no 
life at all. An example of this latter point can be found in popular support for euthanasia 
among a wide section of society, who champion the right to die with respect and 
dignity.
125 Renéé R Anspach, Deciding Who Lives (University of California Press, 1993) 170.
126 Helga Kuhse and Peter Singer, Should the Baby Live? (Oxford University Press, 1985) 170.
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 In a recent report entitled, The Right to Choose an Assisted Death: Time for 
Legislation?127, which followed a roundtable discussion comprising a 
multidisciplinary cohort of Australia’s most eminent and influential advocates in the 
area of health law and end-of-life decision making, a powerful indication was made of
the acceptance of euthanasia. This report went beyond moral and ethical opinion as to 
whether euthanasia should be approved or sanctioned, to actually discuss what a 
legislative model should look like. 
A further illustration of the view of a life of mere existence being no real life at all is 
provided by Henner and Kluge. The authors stipulate that severely disabled neonates
may in some cases be ‘better off dead’:
…the very fact of living constitutes a continuous injury to the newborn who is being kept alive. 
To keep the newborn alive is to impose on the child a life that most other persons would not want 
to live and which, given the chance, they would want to leave.128
This statement clearly relates to those who are extremely disabled at birth. Many 
people living with disability are a valuable part of society. Further, individuals living 
with a disability are distinct from those who merely exist or survive with disability. It 
is the latter group that Henner and Kluge are referring to above. Unfortunately, due to
limited resources, premium care cannot be provided to all that require it.129
127 Bob Douglas, Lindy Willmott and Ben White, ‘The Right to Choose an Assisted Death: Time for Legislation?’ (Report, 
Queensland University of Technology, Health Law Research Centre, April 2013). See also, White and Willmott, above n 261, 
410–438.
128 Eike-Henner and W Kluge, ‘Severely Disabled Newborns’ in Helga Kuhse and Peter Singer (eds), A Companion to Bioethics
(Blackwell Publishers, 1998) 242, 245.
129 For a discussion about the cost of care for disabled individuals in the UK, see Smith et al, Disabled People’s Costs of Living: 
More Than You Think (Joseph Rowntree Foundation, 2004).
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 The previous chapter introduced Heather, who, in the BBC documentary, candidly 
spoke about her life, her struggles with depression and her fears of losing her parents. 
The first-hand experiences and thoughts of 21-year-old Heather, born extremely 
premature and living with severe disabilities, are valuable here.
Born at 26 weeks, her parents and doctors made the decision to keep her alive.
However, she is provided with little to no financial support from the government. 
Heather advocated the need for lifelong care and financial support for services stating, 
‘it’s very selfish to keep a baby alive, we’ve done our bit for society 
(hospital/government) it’s not true or right, the baby thinks I’m alive, but what do I do 
now?’130 She went on to say:
What’s my purpose now—we kept you alive (hospital/government) but now you cost us too much 
money, so we are not going to bother … if you are willing to support someone at the beginning of 
life, you should be willing to support them to the end.131
Heather’s position is understandable given that it is her life that is constrained by lack 
of public funds, affecting her quality of life. Moreover, her position is supported by
some doctors, who also find the high levels of government funding to the NICU 
spurious.
Dr Anne Orkit, a paediatrician consultant from Birmingham, UK, discussed the lack 
of public funds allocated to post-NICU care:
130 The Price of Life (Directed by Adam Wishart, BBC Production, 2011) 00.40.30–00.40.35.
131 Ibid 00.40.41–00.40.48.
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 Money from the NHS (National Health Service) has gone into NICU, but not much into
community care or disabled care. As a society we don’t look at lower profile things- saving a 
miracle baby grabs the public and NHS commissioner’s imagination. The need for physio for a 
cerebral palsy kid does not sound sexy, and you don’t get money in the same way.132
Some Australian doctors offer similar sentiments. For example, neonatologist, Dr 
Andrew Watkins, stated ‘Australia has a poor track record in providing good-quality 
care for people with disabilities. Is it ethical to bring children into a world that offers 
so little in terms of support?’133
Governments in the UK and Australia are in a difficult position, being the source of 
both the problem and the solution. A rational solution could be to allocate finite 
resources to saving neonates born at a later gestational age, or focusing on prevention 
of prematurity to encourage the birth of healthy, abled and productive future members 
of the economic workforce. However, this does not align with the current situation of
large portions of the healthcare budget being absorbed by saving neonates that are so 
premature they could legally be aborted. Dr Orkit advocates a critical re-evaluation of 
healthcare funds and their prioritisation:
We should change in terms of looking at what we do at the very early twenty-three week gestation 
period and have a hard look at the outcomes from that group and make a decision on that. Just as 
the same way we’ve made hard decisions around things like cancer drugs and seeing the outcome 
are not good enough to use, therefore we won’t spend that money. With the financial situation as 
it is, we simply can’t go on giving people what they want.134
132 Ibid 00.38.51–00.39.30.
133 Evans, above n 63, 42.
134 The Price of Life, above n 130, 00.53.35.
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 Daphne Austin, from the West Midlands NHS specialised commissioning department,
also supports a more cautious use of public funds: ‘I can’t think of very many 
interventions that have such poor outcomes as resuscitating 23 week babies, we’re 
spending an awful lot of money on treatment with very margin benefit’.135 She goes
on to state,‘…if I came out and said I’m going to stop resuscitating babies at below 
twenty four weeks there would be a witch hunt’. 136
Discussions about the allocation of finite public funds in regards to life and death 
decisions for severely premature neonates are uncomfortable for many individuals, due 
in large part to their taboo nature. However, despite not being openly discussed, 
placing a financial value on life is an active practice, as discussed in the next section. 
XIV: Placing value and price on life: A common practice 
Many facets of everyday life have an impact, both positive and negative, on health and 
life outcomes. The consequential effect of some of these practices is reflected in public 
expenditure. 
Tax payer monies are often spent on items or developments from which not all 
individuals may receive a specific benefit. For example, taxation revenue is often used 
for the maintenance or construction of new buildings or roads that will not be accessed 
or used by all tax payers. This is also true of healthcare funds, which may be utilised 
for specific initiatives or programmes that an individual may never participate in or 
135 Ibid 00.57.28.
136 Ibid 00.57.32.
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benefit from. As Savulescu et al note, the contrary is also true, with some public 
initiatives and regulations such as speed limits contributing to all individuals’ health 
and wellbeing.137 The following sub-sections outline some of the current practices in 
which a value is placed on life and where the utilisation of public funds is of significant 
consideration. 
Road death tolls
Enforcing speed limits to protect drivers and pedestrians does not provide absolute 
protection from danger. Road death tolls provide an indication of the number of lives 
that could be saved if cars were banned from certain areas, or particularly drivers were 
stopped from driving. 
Statistics from the Transport Accident Commission (TAC) highlight that in 2011–
2012, there were 276 fatalities on Victorian roads, across Melbourne and rural areas. 
Of those, 200 were male and 121 were the driver of the vehicle. Further, the age groups 
most affected were between 30–39 and over 70 years of age.138 The figures from the 
TAC website also indicate that drivers and motorcyclists killed in drink driving 
accidents accounted for 25 per cent of all road deaths; of those, 79 per cent were 
male.139
If all life was measured equally valuable it could be argued that the most effective way 
of ‘saving’ 276 or more lives this year would be to ban from driving those drivers most 
137 Hope, Savulescu and Hendrick, above n 13, 211.
138 Transport Accident Commission, Rolling 12 Month Road Toll <http://reporting.tacsafety.com.au/s/search.html?collection=tac-
xml-meta&form=tac-report-safety-rolling>. 
139 Transport Accident Commission, Drink Driving Statistics <http://www.tacsafety.com.au/statistics/drink-driving-statistics>. 
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likely to cause or be involved in road traffic accidents. However, despite the indication 
that banning men from driving would statistically considerably reduce the road toll,
such a move would be absurd. Extending this argument further, in its strictest form, if 
all life is to be considered sacred and worthy of preservation at all costs, perhaps it
would be appropriate to ban all vehicles from the road. 
Triage/Emergency room categories
Triage facilities within emergency departments of hospitals are a clear instance in 
which the value of life and healthcare is separated and rationed. If an equal value were
placed on all life, there would not be a system of prioritisation of treatment for patients 
based on the urgency or severity of their needs.140
Historically, deriving from the French verb ‘to sort’, triage was a practice developed 
by the military services over a century ago. ‘[T]he military were looking at cost 
effective medicine, and were selecting those patients for whom the medical services 
could offer something useful’.141 The same principle applies in public hospitals today, 
to target ‘limited resources to the patients with the best chance of survival’.142
Rationing healthcare and targeting emergency treatment based on need is neatly 
ranked and categorised from 1–5: resuscitation, emergency, urgent, semi-urgent and 
non-urgent. Based on these categories, assessments are made by medical teams as to 
140 Deborah Cook and Mita Giacomini, ‘The Sound of Silence: Rationing Resources for Critically Ill Patients’ (1999) 3(1) Critical 
Care 1, 2–3.
141 Edward W Brentnall, ‘A History of Triage in Civilian Hospitals in Australia’ (1997) 9(1) Emergency Medicine 50, 50. Also 
see Bennett, above n 11, 80.
142 Lantos, Mokalla and Meadow, above n 43, 187.
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the approximate time frame within which they see each patient, ranging from 
immediately to within 120 minutes.143 Many patients will be treated effectively and 
discharged, while others will require a hospital stay, and some will be referred to their 
general practitioners for follow-up treatment. 
When patients being treated by their general practitioners require elective surgeries,
they are placed on ‘waiting lists’ for treatment. In Victoria, the number people waiting 
for treatment is set to increase to over 55,000 patients,144 with limited public healthcare 
resources making it critical to ration treatment by need and chance of improvement. 
By the time a patient reaches the top of the waiting list, there is the possibility that,
during the course of the wait, they may have died, or their condition may have 
increased in severity, requiring the deployment of even greater healthcare resources to 
restore them to full health. 
Pharmaceutical Benefits Scheme
In Australia, the pharmaceutical benefit scheme provides another example of the value 
of life being accounted for by dollars. If all life were measured with the same worth, 
all medicine and treatments would be covered under the scheme to save or control as 
many diseases as possible. Yet medicines that are considered too expensive to be 
funded under public health are not covered under the scheme. 
143 Our Emergency Departments, The State of our Public Hospital June 2008 Report (Part 4), Australian Government 
<http://www.health.gov.au/internet/main/publishing.nsf/Content/E6CAF670D550F646CA25747700074A51/$File/Our%20eme
rgency%20departments.pdf>
144 Kate Hagan, ‘Hospitals Waiting List to Ensnare 55,000’ The Age (Online), 20 March 2013 
<http://www.theage.com.au/victoria/hospitals-waiting-list-to-ensnare-55000-20130319-2gdns.html>. 
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 The schemes and practices highlighted above reveal that western society does place a 
monetary value on life, albeit indirectly. Difficult decisions in the current tough 
financial climate are made daily as to which patients should receive an allocation of 
the finite public resources. 
Gampel’s coining of the term ‘noble lies’ for the subtle practice of rationing healthcare
provides a unique interpretation. His first application of the ‘lie’ is in situations in 
which medical practitioners consider palliative care to be the best option, as further 
treatment would be futile. This ‘noble lie’ is advantageous in two ways: it allows 
doctors to avoid being seen as emotionless, and preserves parents from the guilt of 
expressing their wishes for treatment to be discontinued.145
Perhaps Gampel’s most acute observation of the application of the ‘noble lie’ is that it 
is simply ‘necessary in order that health care providers perform the function of 
rationing in a society which is not facing up to the task’. 146 He further asserts:
For family are less likely to take such actions when they are told the treatments were futile, than 
if told the treatments are ‘potentially effective’, but that the odds of providing a meaningful 
improvement were too low given the financial costs involved. 147
While some individuals may contend that this is immoral, unjust or deceitful, as noted 
above, decisions about healthcare rationing are often ‘cloaked’ in other ways. A final 
illustration of this is provided below. 
145 Eric Gampel, ‘Does Professional Autonomy Protect Medical Futility Judgments?’ (2006) 20(2) Bioethics 92, 102.
146 Ibid 103.
147 Ibid.
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The judiciary
Chapter Two considered the role of the judiciary in end-of-life decisions for 
incapacitated neonates, where futility of treatment, the best-interests principle and 
quality of life are key considerations of the court.
These decisions, which are of paramount human interest, are not taken lightly. It is 
appropriate and necessary that Parliament and its legislative powers provide societal 
reforms based on the changing attitudes and social mores of the day. This is reflected 
in present-day activism in the UK and Australia for the legalisation of gay marriage 
and voluntary euthanasia. 
However, judges have the freedom to guide law making outside the democratic 
process; a freedom that an elected Parliament does not have. Although judges are 
inherently conservative, they do possess the autonomy to be robust, which can 
influence Parliament. 
The courts can suggest and influence the creation of law, but changes to law remain 
the prerogative of Parliament. Courts have been influential as activists and instigators 
for change, reflected in pivotal moments in Australian and English legislative history, 
with changes later confirmed in statute.148 However, regarding resource allocation and 
148 An example of this can be found in the landmark case of Mabo in Australia, which recognised native title. Mabo and Another 
v Queensland (No 2) [1992] HCA 23. 
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 the withdrawal or withholding of life-sustaining treatment, the courts have been 
guarded in their response, avoiding the core issues. 
Heywood contends that members of the legal fraternity ‘tread carefully around this 
issue, but it is undoubtedly considered even if not overtly, by the courts in their 
decision making’.149 Indeed, it appears that, under the guise of benevolence and with 
no uncertain degree of paternalism, judges do make decisions based on limited 
resource allocation, couched in the least offensive language as possible. For example, 
as considered in Chapter Two of this thesis, judges apply nebulous terms such as 
futility, best interests and quality of life when treatment is unlikely to yield any 
improvement or significant results.150
The English Court of Appeal, were required to consider the very question of resource 
allocation in the case of R v Cambridge Health Authority; ex p B.151 The case 
concerned a 10 year old girl suffering with Non-Hodgkins lymphoma. After initial 
success with treatment and remission, the disease relapsed, and medical opinion 
suggested that she had between six-eight weeks to live.
A second medical opinion, sought by her father, suggested that a second bone marrow 
transplant was possible, but unavailable under the National Health Service (NHS). The 
proposed cost of the treatment (in two stages) provided privately was approximately 
£75,000 with a 10-20 percent chance of success. 
149 Heywood, above n 93, 31.
150 Tara Rayne Shewchuk, ‘The Uncertain “Best Interests” of Neonates: Decision Making in the Neonatal Intensive Care Unit’
(1995) 14(5–6) Medicine and Law 331, 348.
151 R v Cambridge Health Authority; ex p B [1995] [1995] 1 WLR 898.
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 The health authority concluded that limited public funds for treatment, which they
considered to be ‘experimental’ in nature would be inappropriate. B’s father then 
sought legal intervention and judicial review of the health authority’s decision. The 
judge found that the health authority had,
…failed to take account of B.'s and her father's wishes, had misdescribed the proposed 
treatment as experimental, had not, given the threat to B.'s life, adequately explained the 
authority's funding priorities and had wrongly treated the total sum as that required whereas 
the initial requirement was limited to £15,000.152
The judge quashed the decision, but did not order the health authority to provide the 
treatment, rather, requested a reconsideration. On appeal, Sir Bingham was forthright 
in stating the realities of limited health funds stating:
I have no doubt that in a perfect world any treatment which a patient, or a patient's family, 
sought would be provided if doctors were willing to give it, no matter how much it cost, 
particularly when a life was potentially D at stake. It would however, in my view, be shutting 
one's eyes to the real world if the court were to proceed on the basis that we do live in such a 
world. It is common knowledge that health authorities of all kinds are constantly pressed to 
make ends meet. They cannot pay their nurses as much as they would like; they cannot provide 
all the treatments they would like; they cannot purchase all the extremely expensive medical g 
equipment they would like; they cannot carry out all the research they would like; they cannot 
build all the hospitals and specialist units they would like. Difficult and agonising judgments 
have to be made as to how a limited budget is best allocated to the maximum advantage of the 
maximum number of patients. That is not a judgment which the court can make.153
152 Ibid 898. 
153 Ibid 906. 
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 However, Sir Bingham did not consider the issue of allocation of limited public funds 
to be one within the courts remit. 
Further, in Re J (a minor) (wardship: medical treatment), Lord Donaldson touched on 
limited resources, before quickly moving on, being careful to avoid commencing any 
real dialogue about allocation as it applies to healthcare and neonates. He stated:
In an imperfect world resources will always be limited and on occasion agonising choices will 
have to be made in allocating those resources to particular patients. It is outwith the scope of this 
judgment to give any guidance as to the considerations which should determine such an allocation, 
save to say that the fact that the child is or not a ward of court is a total irrelevance.154
The seminal English case Airedale NHS Trust v Bland, considered previously, also 
illustrates the court’s discomfort in discussing resource allocation. Hoffman LJ
betrayed the political sensitivity surrounding this issue with a carefully worded 
judgment, avoiding any suggestion of better resource allocation: 
The resources of the National Health Service are not limitless and choices have to be made. This 
qualification on the moral duty to provide care did not enter into the argument in this case at all. 
The Airedale N.H.S. Trust invited us to decide the case on the assumption that its resources were 
unlimited and we have done so. But one is bound to observe that the cost of keeping a patient like 
Anthony Bland alive is very considerable and that in another case the health authority might 
conclude that its resources were better devoted to other patients. We do not have to consider such 
a case, but in principle the allocation of resources between patients is a matter for the health 
authority and not for the courts.155
154 Re J (a minor) (wardship: medical treatment) [1990] 3 ALL ER 930, 934
155 Airedale NHS Trust v Bland [1993] AC 789, 883.
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Lord Browne-Wilkinson also raised questions about resource allocation, but failed to 
provide any guidance or direction about future discussion on this. He asserted:
In addition to these ethical questions, the new technology raises practical problems. Given that 
there are limited resources available for medical care, is it right to devote money to sustaining the 
lives of those who are, and always will be, unaware of their own existence rather than to treating 
those who, in a real sense, can be benefited, e.g. those deprived of dialysis for want of resources.156
As discussed in Chapter Two, while resource allocation is not an overtly important 
consideration in neonate treatment cases, the trend of cases and judicial decisions 
indicates that, in reality, it is probably a forceful driving consideration. 
The final section of this chapter considers other recommendations, other than placing 
an emphasis on the allocation of limited health resources in making end-of-life
decisions for critically impaired neonates. The proposed approaches can be considered 
in a holistic or in a piecemeal fashion.
XV: Other Recommendations
An insight from the Netherlands: Groningen protocol—Permissible neonatal 
euthanasia
The Netherlands is well known for its progressive ideologies relating to health and 
personal autonomy at the end-of-life. For example, adult euthanasia has been 
156 Ibid 879.
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 legalised,157 and individuals over the age of 12 with a ‘limited life expectancy and 
[who] experience severe and persistent suffering’ are permitted to die. 158
The Groningen protocol, formulated by a number of medical practitioners based at the 
University Medical Centre in Groningen, Netherlands provides criteria to guide 
doctors in end-of-life decision making concerning critically ill neonates. The protocol 
and its objectives have been the subject of public debate and controversy.
Jotkowitz et al strongly oppose the protocol, stating ‘any effort to actively euthanize 
infants is morally unacceptable and violates the traditional ethical codes of physicians 
and the moral values of the overwhelming majority of citizens of the world’.159
However, such criticism reflects the degree of misunderstanding surrounding the 
protocol. 
The above authors’ emphasis on the violation of ‘ethical and moral codes’ fails to 
consider that one of the core motivations of the protocol is to alleviate ‘hopeless and 
unbearable suffering’, which to many is considered a moral responsibility. This is 
particularly so for very young individuals who are unlikely to be able to tolerate the 
same amount of pain or suffering as an adult, and who, unlike adults, have no 
comprehension of the reason for their pain and suffering. 
157 A A Eduard Verhagen, ‘The Groningen Protocol for Newborn Euthanasia; Which Way Did the Slippery Slope Tilt?’ (2013) 
39(5) Journal of Medical Ethics 293, 293. See also, Alex K Huibers, ‘Beyond the Threshold of Life: Treating and Non-Treating 
of Critically Ill Newborns in the Netherlands’ (1995) 16(2) Journal of Legal Medicine 227.
158 A A E Verhagen and P J J Sauer, 'End-of-life Decisions in Newborns: An Approach from the Netherlands' (2005) 116(3) 
Pediatrics 736, 736.
159 Alan Jotkowitz, S Glick and B Gesundheit, ‘A Case against Justified Non-voluntary Active Euthanasia (The Groningen 
Protocol)’ (2008) 8(11) The American Journal of Bioethics 23, 23.
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 One of the chief contributors to the protocol, eminent physician Dr Eduard Verhagen,
points out that end-of-life decisions for infants generally fall within three categories:
(1) there is no chance of survival;
(2) the child has a very poor prognosis and is dependent on intensive care and their future condition 
is grim; and
(3) those with a hopeless prognosis who experience what parents and medical experts deem to be 
unbearable suffering; their quality of life will be very poor and for whom there is no hope of 
improvement.160
As noted in Chapters Two and Three of this thesis, English and Australian courts are 
conceivably already applying the above, permitting the withdrawal or withholding of 
treatment when doctors and parents are in agreement. However, the judgments that 
record these decisions are careful only to apply time-honoured legal principles of 
quality of life, futility and best interests. 161 Thus, where the Dutch have succeeded,
English and Australian jurisdictions have not been able to codify the approach
identified above. Nor have they called on Parliament for such.
Another contentious issue considered throughout this thesis, over-reliance on medical 
technology that yields poor results, is also addressed by Verhagen and Sauer, who state 
that ‘where even modern technology cannot produce adequate solutions as regards 
treatment or adequate relief of the suffering caused by disease’.162 This is a primary 
focus of the protocol, whereby unbearable pain and suffering to a newborn is alleviated 
by active euthanasia. 
160 Eduard Verhagen and P J J Sauer, ‘The Groningen Protocol—Euthanasia in Severely Ill Newborns’ (2005) 352(10) New 
England Journal of Medicine 959, 959. See also, Verhagen and Sauer, above n 155, 736.
161 Julian Savulescu, ‘Abortion, Infanticide and Allowing Babies to Die, 40 Years On’ (2013) 39(5) Journal of Medical Ethics
257, 258.
162 Pieter J J Sauer and A A Eduard Verhagen, ‘The Groningen Protocol, Unfortunately Misunderstood’ (2009) 96(1) Neonatology
11, 11.
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 The Groningen protocol expressly stipulates conditions that must be met ‘before’ and 
‘after’ any active steps are taken to end the life of a severely impaired infant. These 
conditions are:
(1) certainty of the diagnosis/prognosis
(2) there must be hopeless and unbearable suffering 
(3) the hopeless and unbearable suffering must be confirmed by at least one independent doctor 
(4) both parents must give informed consent.163
Further, post infant death, the decision is subject to review by an ‘outside legal body’ 
to determine whether ‘all necessary procedures have been followed’.164 This 
requirement reflects the checks and balances inherent in the protocol. Decisions must 
be weighed and justified, and doctors are not immune from prosecution. The authors 
sensibly assert that ‘all cases must be reported if the country is to prevent uncontrolled 
and unjustified euthanasia and if we are to discuss the issue publicly and thus further 
develop norms regarding euthanasia in newborns’.165
Taking the idea of the Groningen protocol further, the Belgian Federal Parliament is 
likely to extend legal euthanasia to critically ill children in the immediate future, 
making it the first country to provide euthanasia legislation for neonates.166
163 Verhagen and Sauer, above n 741, 960. 
164 Ibid.
165 Ibid.
166 Connor Adams Sheets, ‘Belgian Parliament Posed to Approve Child Euthanasia Law’, International Business Times (Online), 
June 11 2013 <http://www.ibtimes.com/belgian-parliament-posed-approve-child-euthanasia-law-1301825>. 
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Given the discomfort surrounding legal voluntary assisted euthanasia for competent 
and freely consenting adults in the UK and Australia, it is unlikely that a counterpart 
to the Groningen protocol or Belgian position will be undertaken in either of these 
countries in the near future. Nevertheless, the objectivity and transparency of the 
Groningen protocol should be championed by the UK and Australia. 167
The Groningen protocol offers doctors a comprehensive framework to ‘responsibly 
end the lives of severely impaired newborns’.168 Verhagen and Sauer describe the 
protocol as a codified process under which is it acceptable to deliver death as a means 
of alleviating unbearable pain and suffering in the most exceptional cases of severe
impairment in neonates.
Prevention rather than cure
The undercurrent to this discussion is whether it is appropriate to keep extremely 
premature neonates, born at 23 weeks, alive. While the significant financial resources 
that have been injected into new technologies and medicines have pushed the 
boundaries of medical science, this has not proven to be entirely successful. 
The prioritisation of healthcare funds for extremely premature neonates needs to be re-
visited, and prevention of premature birth rather than cure should be of central
importance. Dr Imogen Morgan, clinical director of neonatology at Birmingham 
167 Darin Achilles, ‘Examining the Groningen Protocol: Comparing the Treatment of Terminally-Ill Infants in the Netherlands 
with Treatment Given in the United States and England’ (2010) 28(4) Wisconsin International Law Journal 795, 797.
168 Hilde Lindemann and Marian Verkerk, ‘Ending the Life of a Newborn: The Groningen Protocol’ (2008) 38(1) Hastings Center 
Report 42, 42.
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Children’s Hospital in the UK, champions this approach, stating ‘that’s where we put 
our money in preventing premature birth if we possibly can’.169 Bennett also advocates 
that, ‘there is no doubt that funding of prenatal care must always be a priority in the 
funding of health care’.170 Emphasis needs to be placed on initiatives and resources to 
reduce the number of premature births. 
As considered earlier, the role of the media and government allocation of health funds 
reflect a priority to save extremely premature neonates from death, perhaps more so 
than investing monies into prevention of premature birth. This is considered more 
appealing than dealing with long-term difficulties and poor health prognoses in any 
great detail. Musaskas and Parsi support this view:
In many ways the world of neonatology is a microcosm of our health care system which greatly 
rewards rescuing our most vulnerable patients through a panoply of technological interventions 
but downplays the role of prevention’.171
To prioritise prevention of premature births requires an assessment of the causes of 
such births.
Increases in educational awareness and reduction of poverty
Rather than injecting finite resources into the NICU to treat 23 week neonates, a better 
use may be to re-direct some of those funds to improve the overall health and wellbeing
169 The Price of Life, above n 130, 00.46.47.
170 Bennett, above n 11, 84. 
171 Jonathan Muraskas and Kayhan Parsi, ‘The Cost of Saving the Tiniest Lives: Nicus versus Prevention’ (2008) 10(10) Virtual 
Mentor 655, 657.
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 of those groups in society most likely to produce premature neonates. As Weightman 
et al argue, government policies and priorities need to focus on ‘tackling social 
determinants, which … includes health, education, and child poverty’.172
Poverty and social disadvantage are significant factors associated with premature birth 
and poor healthcare outcomes.173 Dr Orkit contends that the ‘problem is outside the 
hospital, you are more likely to give birth to a child with extreme prematurity if you 
live in poverty’.174 In the UK, teenage pregnancy rates are the highest in Western 
Europe and ‘teenage mothers and their babies are at increased risk of poor health 
outcomes’. 175
Public funds should be provided for educational initiatives targeting teenagers and 
school age children that highlight the increased chance of premature birth and the 
subsequent likelihood of neonatal death or survival with severe disability. Suburbs 
with the highest rates of teenage pregnancy, and social disadvantage could be targeted 
under such a scheme. Behaviours are more likely to be mimicked in suburbs with high 
numbers of school leavers and teenage pregnancies. Thus, targeting these areas would
have a good chance of success.
172 Alison L Weightman et al, ‘Social Inequality and Infant Health in the UK: Systematic Review and Meta-Analyses’ (2012) 2(3) 
BMJ Open 1, 11.
173 RT Webb, CE Marshall and KM Abel, ‘Teenage Motherhood and Risk of Premature Death: Long-Term Follow-up in the ONS 
Longitudinal Study’ (2011) 41(9) Psychological Medicine 1867, 1875.
174 The Price of Life, above n 130, 00.45.41–00.46.09.
175 Shantini Paranjothy et al, ‘Teenage Pregnancy: Who Suffers?’ (2009) 94(3) Archives of Disease in Childhood 239, 239. See 
also, Gordon C S Smith and Jill P Pell, ‘Teenage Pregnancy and Risk of Adverse Perinatal Outcomes Associated with First and
Second Births: Population Based Retrospective Cohort Study’ (2001) 323(September) British Medical Journal 476.
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Paranjothy et al found that, in a randomised controlled study, there was a reduction in 
the ‘pre-term rate among females under 18 years’,176 stipulating the need for 
‘comprehensive social and medical care using antenatal clinics specific for 
teenagers’.177
It is encouraging that, in the UK, the compulsory legal age requirement for attendance 
of an educational institution will be raised from 16 to 17 in 2013. High teenage 
pregnancy rates are on impetus for this change in law. Researcher Tanya Wilson 
indicates that ‘incarcerating’ teenagers in the schooling system until they are 17 could 
potentially lead to ‘postponement of motherhood by one year’.178 This educational 
reform is commendable, but results will have to be weighed for their efficacy once 
available. 
Pre-natal advance directive
As discussed in Chapter Four, there is a significant amount of subjectivity within each 
stakeholder group when making end-of-life decisions for impaired neonates. Parents 
of premature neonates are the group most affected.
As part of the pre-natal care process, parents are informed of fetal development, and 
advanced technologies now allow parents to not only see their unborn child via ultra 
sound but also to take sophisticated three-dimensional images of their unborn child. 
Given the wealth of information that is being imparted to parents regarding the 
176 Paranjothy, above n 175, 242.
177 Ibid.
178 Jamie Doward, ‘Rise in School Leaving Age is Predicted to Cut Number of Teenage Pregnancies’, The Guardian (Online), 7 
April 2013 <http://www.guardian.co.uk/society/2013/apr/07/teenage-pregnancy-school-leaving-age/print>. 
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 development of their neonate, there is an opportunity for open and frank discussions 
with parents about the possibilities of and risks involved in premature birth.
The preparation of pre-natal advance directives; that is, a ‘pre-negotiated treatment 
plan for an imperilled newborn’, should be considered.179 Arguably, arranging such 
directives would be less confronting for parents than to experience a pre-term birth 
and the discussions that must follow. 
Catlin supports this view, stating that ‘much of the education women receive about 
preterm delivery occurs at the bedside when preterm labour is occurring, or during or 
immediately after a preterm birth. At these critical periods, they are often asked to 
make to serious decisions’. 180 For expectant parents to be able to make a truly 
informed decision, it is important that they understand all the information provided to 
them and have time to make rational choices based on that information. The optimum 
time for this to occur is before the birth, when prospective parents can take away 
information and discuss it. Catlin again reinforces this point:
For women to be able to make coherent choices about their own care and the care of their 
prematurely born foetuses, they must appropriately understand the actual meaning of prematurity 
and the possible short- and long-term consequences. 181
179 Ruth Levy Guyer, Baby at Risk (Capital Books, 2006) 76. 
180 Anita Catlin, ‘Thinking Outside the Box: Prenatal Care and the Call for a Prenatal Advance Directive’ (2005) 19(2) The 
Journal of Perinatal & Neonatal Nursing 169, 171. See also, Helen Harrison, ‘The Offer They Can’t Refuse: Parents and Perinatal 
Treatment Decisions’ (2008) 13(5) Seminars in Fetal and Neonatal Medicine 329, 332.
181 Anita Catlin, ‘Thinking Outside the Box: Prenatal Care and the Call for a Prenatal Advance Directive’ (2005) 19(2) The 
Journal of Perinatal & Neonatal Nursing 169, 172. 
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Competent adults often prepare advance care directives about their health and 
wellbeing; thus, ‘competent parents’ should be afforded the same liberty as regards 
potential life-changing circumstances that will affect them.
Of course, the thought of a premature disabled neonate and the reality are markedly 
different. Understandably, parents’ attitudes may change radically after birth. 
However, a pre-natal advanced directive is a powerful tool, creating a platform for an 
honest and open discussion about the realities of premature birth and possible 
associated disability or even death. 
Finally, this chapter examines Parliamentary intervention: the most effective method 
of societal and policy change with regard to end-of-life decision making for impaired 
neonates.
Parliamentary intervention
Chapter Two of this thesis discussed the development of case law with regard to 
decisions to withdraw or withhold life-sustaining treatment from critically ill neonates. 
Three decades on from the case of Baby Pearson in 1980 in the UK, treatment 
decisions for incapacitated neonates remain fraught with subjectivity. 
It must be questioned whether the courts should be presiding over cases concerning 
whether impaired neonates live or die when this is unsupported by statute. A host of 
considerations, moral, legal and constitutional, support the view that Parliament as a 
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 democratically elected institution is the correct home for such a determination, and 
that the courts should not play the role of moral arbiter.182
A policy-based approach to end-of-life decision making for neonates born at the edge 
of viability at 23 weeks is the best means of development of a legislative framework. 
Such a framework could stipulate a minimum threshold at which those born premature 
and suffering pain and ongoing debilitation should not be resuscitated. 
As noted earlier in this chapter, such a debate is unlikely to occur in the current climate 
of either the UK or Australia. That Parliament adopts an inherently conservative 
approach to legislative and ethical change is evident in the ongoing debate surrounding 
voluntary active euthanasia for competent adults, despite 85 per cent of Australians 
supporting this initiative.183 However, academic and community interest in the issue 
could, through the democratic process, force this issue onto the parliamentary agenda. 
 
182 A view shared by L Willmott and Ben White, ‘A Model Form Decision Making at the End-of-life: Queensland and Beyond’ 
(2006) 25(1) Medicine and Law 201, 208.
183 The Queensland Times, Seven in 10 Support Voluntary Euthanasia (19 November 2012) <http://www.qt.com.au/news/seven-
10-support-voluntary-euthanasia/1627273/>. 
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 XVI: Conclusion
This chapter discussed in detail the contentious issue of balancing treatment decisions 
with finite resource allocation, recommending this as one means by which decision 
making in this area can be imbued with some objectivity. Additional recommendations
were also made towards greater coherence in and a better understanding of end-of-life
decisions for extremely premature neonates.
In western societies, there is rarely any detailed consideration about the true fiscal cost 
involved in preserving life. Advances in technology and medical science have further 
entrenched the expectation that ‘everything that can be done, should be done’ to save 
lives. Resource realities are a controversial but real consideration, relating to the 
question of which individuals are cheaper to keep alive and the likely benefits to 
society of doing so. On both of these criteria, impaired neonates rank low. 
However, placing more importance on resource allocation in decision making would 
ensure the process is informed by objectivity and rationality, as opposed to subjectivity 
as is currently the case. Substantial public funds are consumed in keeping 23 week 
neonates alive, with the typical outcome being that they live with severe disability or 
endure a painful and prolonged death. This calls into question whether as a society we 
are doing the right thing by keeping these neonates alive? Are we actually causing 
them and society more harm by keeping them alive? 
The final chapter of this thesis draws together the central themes of each chapter and 
presents the final conclusions of this thesis. 
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 CHAPTER SIX: CONCLUSION
Just over three decades ago, discussion concerning withdrawing or withholding life-
sustaining treatment from critically ill neonates began to receive serious public, 
political and legal attention in the UK and Australia. Today the area remains fraught 
with ethical, moral and legal issues and remains unresolved. 
The aim of this thesis was two-fold: to identify the deficiencies in the manner in which
these decisions are currently being made, and to make pragmatic recommendations to 
inform the design of an objective, consistent and transparent model. 
To meet the objectives of this thesis, it was necessary to critically examine the key 
factors currently affecting life and death decision making in regards to critically 
imperilled neonates, to identify the most problematic and contentious issues hindering 
objectivity, transparency and uniformity. 
This thesis has confirmed that the manner in which decisions are made to withdraw or 
withhold life-sustaining treatment from critically ill neonates is inconsistent, not 
transparent and heavily influenced by the subjective opinions, beliefs and emotions of 
all relevant stakeholders.
The development of sophisticated technologies means that extremely premature and 
critically impaired neonates, that 20–30 years ago would have died, now live. This 
includes neonates born at the edge of viability at 23-weeks’ gestation (a stage of 
development at which abortion is still legal).
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 Although neonates can be saved from death at 23 weeks, the current state of
technology and medical science means that these babies continue to be at risk of severe 
disability. As one commentator candidly asserted, ‘science is moving fast, but until we 
invent an amniotic sac, there’s a big cost to these babies, and nature is against their 
survival’. 1
This thesis focused on decision making in the UK and Australia. While Australia only 
has a handful of cases on record that have required coronial or legal intervention, 
English case law has an abundance of cases in which medical practitioners and parents 
have disagreed on the withdrawal or withholding of life-sustaining treatment from 
premature neonates. 
Chapter Two critically examined case judgments, highlighting the lack of consistency 
in the courts in attempting to reconcile the sanctity of life principle, a long-standing
tenet of society, with making decisions that uphold dignity and serve a patient’s best 
interests. Judges often apply nebulous and ill-defined principles such as futile 
treatment and poor quality of life, and weigh up the burdens of treatment against the 
benefits it will confer in a scoreboard-like fashion, to cloak decisions that ultimately 
amount to the lawful withdrawal or withholding of life-sustaining treatment.
The over-reliance on medical opinion by the courts further underscores the reluctance 
of the courts to drive any meaningful reform of the law in this area. This has given rise 
to the current situation in which determinations are unpredictable, often almost 
arbitrary and seemingly driven by the idiosyncratic sentiments of the decision maker. 
1 Tracey McVeigh, ‘I Would Have Wanted Him to Die in My Arms’, Sunday Herald Sun Magazine, The Herald Sun (Australia), 
17 April 2011, 18. 
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 In Chapter Three, a critical evaluation of the most current clinical guidelines in the UK
and Australia found that they too are interspersed with inconsistencies and lack any 
codification or uniformity. While the 2006 Nuffield Report on Bioethics was
commended for attempting to provide further guidance and certainty, it was ultimately 
yet another missed opportunity to generate any robust reforms. The inter-relationship 
between the courts and doctors also came to the fore in the discussion of these
guidelines, which advocate a holistic approach encompassing ethical, legal and clinical 
factors in decision making. It appears that judges rely on medical opinion and doctors 
rely on case decisions when developing guidelines to assist in decision making. 
Overall, the one aspect of uniformity that exists between these guidelines is their 
variability. In a particularly stark example, guidelines within the same country, and 
even within the same state, all provide different gestational ages at which resuscitation 
is ‘best practice’. 
Chapter Four examined the roles and influence of the key stakeholders, parents, 
doctors and the judiciary, as an integral part of the decision-making process.
Stakeholder inconsistency and subjectivity in decision marking was strongly evident.
The brief discussion of the key points of each chapter above serve to highlight the 
present inconsistent and highly subjective state of decision making as regards the 
withdrawing or withholding of life-sustaining treatment for critically imperilled 
neonates. This thesis argues that a formalised process is required at a national level, 
formulated on objective and pragmatic principles, as discussed in Chapter Five. This 
could be achieved with reference to the following conditions:
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 1. An immediate focus on resource allocation, where decisions to save and 
preserve damaged lives are made in consideration of the immediate costs 
of medical treatment, the costs of disability for the family, requirements 
for long-term care, and the benefits and associated costs of life, not only 
to the patient, but also to society. 
2. An immediate discussion of this topic by Parliament, with the eventual 
aim of a legislated, mandatory and national framework for decision 
making. 
The conservative social and political climate of Australia, and to a lesser extent in the 
UK, explains why the discussion continues around the issue of end-of-life decision 
making for impaired neonates three decades on from the cases of the 1980s. It is 
unlikely that, in the near future, any proposals made by this thesis will be given the 
serious consideration they deserve.
Despite this, this thesis has attempted to raise general consciousness of the issue, 
particularly against the present-day backdrop of improving medical technologies and 
declining healthcare dollars. With improvements in technology, there will be a greater 
number of neonates surviving at 23 weeks and below, despite the future prospects of 
these neonates remaining bleak. In light of this, this thesis proposes the adoption of
less confronting approaches (as compared to the basing of life and death decisions on 
resource allocation) that can be actioned now, such as a focus on prevention. 
Finally, while critically impaired and extremely premature neonates can be kept alive, 
in most instances they probably should not be. This thesis recognises and 
acknowledges that decisions to withdraw or withhold life-sustaining treatment leading
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 to inevitable death should not be taken lightly. Moreover, this thesis does not take the 
position that a life with disability is a worthless life.
However, despite medical practitioners’ best efforts and the deployment of substantial 
public funds to keep premature neonates alive, they are often left with lifelong 
debilitating disabilities. If such efforts are to continue, then there is a compelling moral 
obligation to also provide lifelong care and support for these neonates.
That we are unable to provide such support, which has far greater resource 
implications than the act of saving them in the first instance, is a moral failing in its 
own right. As a society, in making the choice to actively save impaired neonates and 
force them into lives of pain and disability, we are failing in not providing requisite 
standards of care post-NICU support. Until medical technology advances to the point 
that saving extremely premature neonates does more good than harm, doing so remains
detrimental to the neonate, family and society. 
However, the aim of this thesis was not to argue for better investment in disability 
care. It was instead to question the rationale behind decisions to save and preserve 
lives of extremely premature and impaired neonates. In choosing to preserve such 
lives, are we making decisions that are best for the infants, best for the parents, or best 
for our collective moral conscience as a society?
As noted throughout this thesis, the value of human life is measured continually under 
the guise of concepts or guidelines that indicate at what point further treatment is 
considered either futile or not in the best interests of the patient or futile. 
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 This thesis proposes a need for greater transparency in end-of-life decision making,
already happening in hospitals on a daily basis. When addressed objectively, the 
stakeholder groups should find considerable common ground. The suggestion made 
here that the allocation of finite healthcare resources should drive medical choices 
relating to premature neonates is not novel. Further, in the past, such arguments have 
not been influential. However, a key contribution of this thesis to the research and 
thinking in this area is in showing that, in reality, resource allocation already heavily 
influences medical decisions.
Moral, cultural and religious values and norms continue to render discussing human 
life in dollar terms taboo. However, in the end, (near) impossible choices appear to be 
driven by the thinking that finite resources should not be devoted to saving and 
extending life. 
Framing life-saving and -sustaining decisions relating to premature neonates in these 
terms would therefore be in line with that which informs most life-defining medical 
decisions. Moreover, doing so transparently would improve the soundness of decisions 
and the outcomes for all stakeholders in the life or death of critically imperilled 
neonates.
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